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To the 
Doughboys and Leathernecks 
of Seven Divisions 
in whose support it was our privilege 
to strive mightily for two years. 
* 
* i * ~ * 
\ 
~ 
* 
lst Marine Division 
(New Britain) 
37th Infantry Division 
(Luzon) 
31st Infantry Division 
(Mindanao) 
32d Infantry Division 
(Saidor, Aitape) 
43d Infantry Division 
(Aitape, Luzon) 
Sixth Army 
(December 1943-Aprill945 
August-November 1945) 
40th Infantry Division 
(New Britain) 
24th Infantry Division 
(Mindanao) 
Eighth Army 
(April-July 1945) 
Foreword 
In these pages will be found the story of our own 
53 3d in the greatest of all the wars of the world. It 
is a story of toil and hardship and danger mixed 
with happy interludes and comradeships made the 
dearer thereby, a story of great deeds in the face of 
great obstacles, of reverses and disappointments but 
of pride and glory in the end. 
This book is not written to impress others with 
our deeds. In the many commendations of high 
commanders is found the testimony to our success in 
an unusual and most important role in many land-
ings on enemy-held shores. In our own minds and 
hearts are the priceless memories of our great adven-
ture and the pride that comes from the knowledge 
of a job well done. May these pages help to keep 
them fresh through the years to come. 
(/lC;i3?J~: ~ 
W. S. MOORE ..._...) 
Colonel, Corps of Engineers 
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CHAPTER I 
Origins of the Engineer Amphibian Brigades 
The fortress island of Corregidor quivered under the relentless pounding of the 
Jap bombers and the heavy batteries massed on recently subdued Bataan. The weary 
defenders, safe only in the depths of its tunnels, knew they could not hope to repulse 
the final assault that would strike them any day. The last effective barrier to com-
plete Japanese conquest of the Philippines was doomed. 
A tiny Aussie garrison in the mountains above Port Moresby, the last impertinent 
Allied foothold on the second largest island in the world, wondered when the J aps on 
the north coast of New Guinea would decide to rub them out. 
The bitter rear-guard action in Burma was drawing to an ignominious close as 
the remnants of the British, Indian, and Chinese forces stumbled over the trackless 
mountains into India, and the victorious J aps seized the Burma Road and pressed on 
into isolated China. 
Between New Caledonia and the Solomons roamed the scouting planes of a small 
American naval task force seeking to locate the Japanese fleet that was about to sally 
forth for an attack on the Australian mainland. 
On the other side of the world, Germany and her satellites bestrode Europe 
unchallenged from Gibraltar to the North Cape, from the Channel Islands to the 
African desert. The Russian winter counteroffensive, having hurled the Germans 
from the suburbs of Moscow, had bogged down in the ooze of spring. The Germans 
were attacking at Kharkov and in the Crimea, and their Afrika Korps was coiling for 
a deadly lunge at Egypt. German submarines stalked ships in the delta of the Missis-
sippi and within sight of the New Jersey coast. 
So began the month of May, r 942. 
In these darkest moments of World War II, the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff 
were nevertheless grimly preparing offensives to regain the ground lost and bring the 
Axis ultimately to abject surrender. One fact stood out: there was no land route of 
approach, and so the British and American forces could come to grips with the Ger-
mans and Japanese only by amphibious attack. Not only would strong armies have 
to be raised, trained and equipped, but those armies would also have to be provided 
with ships and boats and trained beach parties in order to assault the fortress of 
Europe and the vast island empire of Japan. 
Both the British and American navies were doing all they could to procure ships 
and small landing craft and to train crews for them, but the U. S. Navy in particular 
was necessarily preoccupied with meeting the menace of German submarines in the 
Atlantic and the threat of the now superior Japanese naval forces in the central 
Pacific. In order better to distribute the burden of preparing the amphibious forces, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned to the Army the task of creating a major amphibious 
training center and of recruiting and training specialized units capable of operating 
landing craft and handling the engineering work on beachheads. 
This decision was reduced to orders on May 9, 1942 directing General Somervell, 
10 
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commander of the Army Service Forces, to establish an amphibian training center 
at Camp Edwards, and to procure equipment and personnel for the specialized 
amphibian units. 
As had been its lot throughout its long history, the U.S. Corps of Engineers 
received this new and unique assignment. After a briefperiod of study, the Engineer 
Amphibian Command was activated on June 5, 1942, with the mission of organizing, 
equipping and training eight engineer amphibian brigades, each capable of trans-
porting and supporting a reinforced infantry division in a shore-to-shore amphibious 
attack. Colonel Daniel Noce, an engineer who had had much to do with the organ-
ization of the original air-borne units took command, and opened his headquarters at 
Camp Edwards, on Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Ten days later the rst Engineer 
Amphibian Brigade was activated, using two engineer combat regiments as its 
nucleus. Five days later the 2d Brigade came into being. 
To procure personnel with appropriate civilian background as officers and non-
commissioned officers for this work, an intensive recruiting program was inaugurated 
with headquarters in Washington. Employing extensive publicity and cooperating 
with the U.S. Power Squadrons, yacht clubs, and other organizations concerned with 
maritime activities, this drive resulted in many hundreds of civilians being enlisted 
or commissioned during the summer of r 942. 
Procurement of boats was handled through the Navy Bureau of Ships in order 
not to duplicate effort. In accordance with the decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the engineer amphibian units were restricted to craft less than roo feet long, on the 
general theory that these would be adequate for the short distance across the English 
Channel, where the brigades were initially expected to be employed. 
Each day brought a fresh influx of personnel and equipment to Cape Cod. 
Veteran Coast Guard and Marine officers, battle tested· Britishers with experience in 
commando raids, experts in civil engineering, navigation, boat repair, and communica-
tions formed the nucleus of the training command at Edwards. Camps were opened 
at Waquoit and Cotuit, and docks were built to provide appropriate training bases 
for the boat units. 
During June and early July 1942 the Allied situation throughout the world grew 
more perilous. The Afrika Korps routed the British Eighth Army and reached with-
in striking distance of the Nile; von Bock's great group of armies started its rooo-mile 
plunge from Orel to Stalingrad; and the Japanese, despite the naval battles of the 
Coral Sea and Midway, still threatened Australia. 
To the Combined Chiefs of Staff, meeting in London early in July, the most 
serious danger appeared to be that the German summer offensive would succeed in 
knocking Russia out of the War. In order to do what little they could to relieve the 
pressure on the hard pressed Red armies, they agreed to launch, if necessary, a cross-
channel invasion of France, even though the forces at their disposal were pitifully 
small. To do this they would need more landing craft and crews than were available 
in the British Isles; so the rst Brigade on July 23 was ordered to England as fast as it 
could be moved. The Brigade was in a sad state of confusion, with almost no equip-
ment and all ranks barely oriented as to their technical missions and training objec-
- 1 
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tives. Nevertheless, equipment was rushed from all parts of the country to the 
Brigade, and it was brought to full strength and sailed from New York on August 5th. 
Hardly had it debarked in England when it became apparent that the German drive 
was slowing down in the Caucasus and was being fought to a standstill at Stalingrad, 
and that it would not be necessary to launch the major attack across the channel dur-
ing that year. Given this breathing spell, the navies of both Great Britain and the 
United States set about reversing the decision made in May to have the Army run the 
small landing craft, and in England they actually took away the 1st Brigade's boats. 
Back in the United States a bitter wrangle ensued, and the understandably 
inexpert performance of some of the engineer boatmen in their first maneuvers lent 
weight to the Navy's argument that only 'boys in blue' could satisfactorily handle 
boats. Colonel Arthur Trudeau, the Chief of Staff of the Engineer Amphibian Com-
mand, made a flying trip to visit General MacArthur in Australia during the early 
part of October to see if he was interested in continuing the development of the 
amphibian brigades. Just at this time MacArthur was engaged in his "Battle of the 
Marne" in the passes of the Owen Stanley Mountains and in the steaming jungles and 
plantations of Milne Bay. Though he had been successful in driving the Japanese 
back toward their bases on the northeast coast of New Guinea, lack of water-borne 
transportation had caused him to rely almost exclusively on his pitifully few airplanes, 
and he was, necessarily, in a most receptive mood. He promptly informed the War 
Department that he would like one engineer amphibian brigade immediately, to be 
follbwed in 1943 by a second one. The War Department, therefore, reduced the 
number of brigades to be created by the Engineer Amphibian Command to three. 
Thus, the Navy's campaign to keep the Army out of the boat business succeeded 
to the extent that the amphibians in the European theater were henceforth to be 
nothing more than shore party engineers, while in the portion of the Pacific under 
Admiral Nimitz's control there would be no specialized amphibian engineers at all. 
Only in the Southwest Pacific were the amphibian engineers to be given a chance to 
operate in the manner originally contemplated in the dark days of May, 1942. 
"!~ - @-. 
--¥--.-
Both !'ides paid dearly for Buna - the Japs paid more, yet lost. 
• 
CHAPTER II 
Massachusetts 
While the Ist Brigade was crossing the Atlantic to England, its place at Camp 
Edwards was taken by the 3d Engineer Amphibian Brigade activated on August 8, 
1942 under the command of Colonel David A. D. Ogden. Its principal components, 
activated simultaneously, were the 533d Engineer Shore Regiment, the 593d Engineer 
Boat Regiment, the 263d Medical Battalion, the 563d Quartermaster Battalion, and 
many smaller service units. This form of organization persisted for three months 
before both boat and shore elements were integrated at the regimental level to form 
engineer amphibian regiments. So, to develop the early history of the 533d Engin-
eer Boat and Shore Regiment as it ultimately came to be known, it is necessary to 
look separately at the initial days of what were to be its principal components- the 
Boat Battalion and the Shore Battalion. 
Boat Battalion 
This section is the story of the 2d Battalion of the 593d Engineer Boat Regiment 
which was to become the Boat Battalion of the 533d EB&SR. The 593d, from which 
all of the boat elements of the 3d Brigade initially stemmed, was activated with a 
cadre of noncommissioned officers from the 7 I st Field Artillery Brigade, a New York 
National Guard unit. Although its tables of organization and equipment provided 
for a strength of over 3,ooo men, principally composed of three identical engineer 
boat battalions and a fleet of 500 -landing craft capable of embarking an entire in-
fantry division, the 593d EBR never reached full strength, and throughout the three 
months of its existence it operated primarily as a flexible training command. 
From the date of activation until the last day of August, the 2d Battalion re-
mained in the east block of Camp Edwards. Its few score men and officers were 
barely sufficient to take care of administration and preparation for receiving the 
anticipated recruits. When a few could be spared from these routine duties, they 
attended specialist classes in piloting, seamanship, and marine maintenance. When 
Colonel Oliver W. van den Berg, a Regular Army officer who had, appropriately, 
matriculated at Annapolis, took command of the Regiment, he instituted an intensive 
training program designed to prepare the Regiment for large-scale combined arms 
exercises, which, it was expected, would take place in a matter ofweeks. 
Camp Edwards was located nearly in the center of Cape Cod, and the several 
miles which separated it from the landing craft delayed the training program. Ac-
cordingly, on August 31, the 2d Battalion moved to a tent camp at Cotuit, Massachu-
setts, which was conveniently close to the landing craft pool. The camp had been 
established by the 592d Engineer Boat Regiment and was, in fact, little more than an 
inferior bivouac. Hot water was for some weeks a rarity, which presented problems 
not only of personal hygiene, but of a military nature in maintaining proper cleanli-
ness of uniform. Located as it was in a pine gully, drainage was difficult and sand 
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was ever present. Transportation to the neighboring towns was difficult, and on the 
whole the camp furnished a rude awakening to the recruits who arrived fresh from the 
reception centers. But it was undoubtedly a comparatively accurate forecast of what 
life overseas would be like. Ingenuity in providing refinements was soon developed 
to such an extent that the camp was given the name Candoit. 
Training with the landing craft was soon interrupted by a brief flurry of excite-
ment over the reported approach of German bombers from Brittany. The embryo 
Battalion was hastily deployed as antiaircraft gunners on .50 calibre machine guns 
in the Falmouth-Woods Hole area. Higher authority has yet to explain what profit 
transatlantic raiders would find in bombing a summer resort and how . 50 calibre 
machine guns could inconvenience heavy bombers. While the Battalion was still 
widely scattered on this questionable assignment, Headquarters, Engineer Amphibian 
Command, stripped it of all enlisted men except the original cadre of noncommis-
sioned officers. For the next three weeks, the Battalion existed with a bare 100 men. 
Its real :fimction during this period was the operation of a casual officers' camp and 
school, for the influx of officers was greater than that of enlisted men, and at times the 
ratio between them was about equal. It was the general rule that NCOs were the 
instructors and inexperienced officers were the students in the classes which were held, 
covering all manner of subjects from semaphore and telephone to the use of the 
bayonet and the identification of naval vessels. 
At the same time, the officers were being given intensive training afloat. Thanks 
to the facilities and personnel of the Amphibian Command's Boat Unit Detachment, 
which was well seasoned with experienced sailors and navigators from the Coast 
Guard and the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the officers learned to beach and retract 
LCVs, LCPRs and LCMs, * to pilot and do dead reckoning, and to control " waves" 
ofboats. Night after night missions put to sea to make surprise landings on Martha's 
Vineyard and Chappaquiddick, with senior officers acting as wave leaders and lieu-
tenants as coxswains. On at least one occasion, the landing was a surprise to the 
guardians of the beaches, and more than one officer found himself held at the point 
of a tommy gun by an aroused coast guardsman or civilian defense watcher. During 
this period the officers who were commissioned direct from civilian life on the basis 
of their nautical experience learned soldiering, the officers from Fort Belvoir, trained 
as combat engineers, learned boating, and both groups learned much of the ec-
centricities and shortcomings of the landing craft. When the task of training the 
1 ,ooo men who were to make up the Battalion was undertaken, this personal experi-
ence was to prove invaluable to the officers. 
Early in October, enlisted replacements flowed in again in substantial numbers, 
and by the 5th of October the companies at last assumed the semblance of military 
entities. All of the original boat company commanders were transferred within a 
few months, but ten lieutenants who were assigned from battalion headquarters to 
letter companies that day continued with their companies throughout the war. 
During the early fall months, the shortage of men and ofboats furnished an excel-
lent opportunity to use specialists' schools for the training of all ranks, and full advan-
*Explanation of abbreviations of landing craft and description of the differen t typ es will be found on pages 276-295. 
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Top: Doughboys dash out of an LCPR in maneuvers on Martha's Vineyard. 
Bottom: Fuel and water cans are unloaded from LCVs of a later wave. 
tage was taken of their facilities. Officers spent three-week periods at Harvard study-
ing celestial navigation; maintenance officers, mechanics, and enginemen studied 
their field at General Motors and Gray Marine Diesel schools in Detroit and at the 
Hall-Scott school in Berkeley, California; and noncoms and coxswains learned the 
refinements of operating landing craft properly at the Higgins school in New Orleans. 
Those who remained at Camp Candoit divided their time between boat training 
and the fundamentals of general military subjects. All men in the Battalion learned 
elementary boat handling with the Boat Unit Detachment, making cold, wet trips up 
and down Vineyard Sound and chewing up the beaches of Martha's Vineyard and 
Waquoit with their blunt-nosed boats. 
Three general aspects of military training were emphasized ashore: communica-
tions, weapons, and conditioning. Commands shouted from one boat to another 
over the roar of Diesel engines result in confusion and sore throats, so all personnel 
were trained again and again in semaphore and blinker. The passing of a test in the 
former was made a condition precedent to a pass. In addition to learning to fire 
their basic shoulder weapons, all men were trained in machine gun fire against aerial 
targets in preparation for the day when the .3os or .5os on their craft might be their 
only protection against hostile aircraft. Finally, to prepare the men for grueling 
work with little rest, speed marches were held over the heavy sand roads. The short-
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ness of time and the necessity of training both on land and sea led to the not-regretted 
result that spit and polish and close-order drill were definitely skimped. 
On October 2 5, the Battalion finally received its first boats - only 2 7 badly 
abused LCPRs and LCVs. They had been the training aids for many others and 
showed the result of the earnest efforts of beginners, but they did provide a means of 
training as a unit and also furnished valuable experience to the maintenance person-
nel in putting them into satisfactory condition and keeping them that way. On the 
same day, a warning order came down from higher headquarters, indicating a prompt 
move was in the offing for large-scale amphibian maneuvers to take place at Carra-
belle, Florida. There was no time to waste, and maximum use was made of the 
boats. Officers and boat crews of each company as a unit operated boats together for 
the first time. Mechanics started what was to prove a three-year uphill struggle to 
reduce the "dead line" of boats that always seemed a little too frail for the punishment 
they received. 
On November 3, after the companies had been running their own exercises for a 
week, the Battalion ordered its first formal problem. Shortly after midnight, thirty 
boats with carefully selected crews slipped out of Cotuit Harbor and proceeded down 
to Hyannisport. A provisional rifle battalion composed of surplus boatmen marched 
from Camp Candoit to the Hyannisport beach where they swiftly and silently em-
barked on the landing craft. The little convoy ran back to the westward, and as 
dawn was breaking, landed in three waves at Waquoit. It was far from a perfect 
combined operation, but it presented on a small scale examples of the problems 
which could be expected in actual operations, and set the pattern for future intensive 
training. As soon as the problem ended, all the boats were run to Falmouth where 
they were loaded on flat cars for shipment to Florida. 
The next four days were the turmoil that is always associated with a long rail 
movement by an inexperienced organization. To the usual packing, crating, and 
loading was added an emergency program of range firing of shoulder weapons. 
Even the men who had never had preliminary marksmanship training were required 
to fire for record, and the best that can be said for the resulting scores is that they 
showed the need for such training. 
At dawn on November 10, Camp Candoit was struck, and during the afternoon 
the Battalion embarked on two trains, happy to exchange the frigid waters of Vine-
yard Sound for the reaches of the Gulf of Mexico, which all fondly expected to be 
balmy and semi-tropical. Simultaneously, the 593d Boat Regiment ceased to exist, 
and its 2d Battalion became the 1st Battalion of the newly-activated 533d Engineer 
Amphibian R egiment under the command of Colonel Charles T. T ench. Companies 
D, E, and F were renamed A, B, and C respectively, but there was no change in their 
personnel, organization, or primary mission. 
Shore Battalion 
On August 8, 1942, the 533d Engineer Shore Regiment was activated at Camp 
Edwards, Massachusetts, under the command of Major Bruce Russell. At the start, 
Top: Shore engineers erect beach 
markers and unroll strips of Somer-
vell matting to provide a temporary 
road for vehicles soon to be landed. 
Bottom: The matting, of chicken wire 
stiffened with soft iron rods, is 
further strengthened with steel edge 
strips and staked down to prevent 
curling under the weight of the 
heavily loaded trucks. 
the Regiment was made up of but a dozen officers and no enlisted men, but by the 
end of the month sufficient cadremen had been received to man the key posts in a 
headquarters and in three shore battalions. Of these three battalions, the first was 
later to become the Shore Battalion of the 53 3d EB&SR. 
At the end of August, Colonel Charles T. Tench, a graduate of West Point in 
1929, took command of the Regiment and Major Eldon F. Ziegler, also a Regular 
Army man, was appointed his executive officer. In the middle of September, all of 
the 1st Battalion of the 533d ESR was transferred to activate another regiment and 
the Battalion had then to be built up anew. Capt. DeWitt L. McLallen, a West 
Pointer who had been out of the service for more than fifteen years, took command 
of the 1st Battalion, which by then consisted of five officers and sixty enlisted men who 
had been transferred from the 532d Engineer Shore Regiment. Both officers and 
men were comparatively new in service and were completely lacking in knowledge of 
amphibian warfare. Their training in the branch of service in which they were to 
serve went little further than the identification of the colored pieces of cloth known as 
beach markers. With great enthusiasm, however, the cadre entered its new organ-
ization, and received the exalted ratings which generally fall to the lot of a cadre. 
The training at Camp Edwards was primarily basic, but some conditioning, 
engineer construction, and orientation in beach operations was included. Many in 
the Battalion had received their first M-1 rifles, and a thorough course in rifle marks-
manship with range firing was given priority. Interest in range firing, competitive 
spirit, and pride in the respective companies was stimulated when the regimental 
commander offered a three-day pass to the company making the best showing. 
Since no general passes or furloughs were being allowed at that time, the offer was 
18 
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greatly appreciated and personnel showed great zeal. Company C proved to be the 
winner, and it was not surprising that when the day upon which the passes ended 
arrived, Company C also led the Battalion in number of men AWOL. 
Training in construction was for the most part limited to carpentry, for heavy 
equipment had not yet been drawn. Materials were scarce, but a fair knowledge of 
their use was gained by building miniature models and by repairing existing camp 
facilities. Instruction in driving and care of vehicles was given to all potential motor 
pool personnel, and a limited number of drivers learned to operate tracked-type 
equipment through the use of small tractors. Physical conditioning was not ignored, 
for swimming and hikes were scheduled regularly. Most of the hikes were made to 
Ranger Camp, seventeen miles away, where the men learned the advantages and 
disadvantages of life in the open. 
Beach training also was stressed, despite the lack of equipment and satisfactory 
terrain. Many "dry runs" were held in which beach landings were simulated and 
beach markers were set up, roads staked, dump sites selected, advance positions 
established, aid stations located, and experiments made in many other phases of the 
operation of a beachhead. Early knowledge of cargo handling was gained by the 
Battalion in helping with experiments conducted at Sandy Neck. LCTs were decked 
over, and a workable facsimile of a cargo ship was produced by using a Quickway 
crane as a cargo boom. By this means familiarity was attained with ships' gear, cargo 
gear, stowing of cargo, and discharge of cargo with both DUKWs and alligators. 
Schools were put to full use, and cooks, bakers, and cobblers studied appropriate 
courses. Approximately twenty men were sent to amphibian tractor school in 
Florida, while others went to boat or navigation school. Special lectures and demon-
strations in crew-served weapons filled out the courses of instruction. 
For some time rumors had been rife of an impending reorganization and a pos-
sible move to a winter training site, and these rumors came true early in November. 
The 533d Engineer Shore Regiment became the 533d Engineer Amphibian Regi-
ment, of which the 2d Battalion had been the Ist Battalion of the 533d ESR. The 
companies were redesignated as Headquarters 2 d Battalion, D, E and F, and the 
Battalion prepared to become part of a regiment that apparently would be even more 
unorthodox. 
The move, it developed, was to Carrabelle, Florida, which caused general jubila-
tion except for those who were familiar with northwestern Florida. It seemed that 
the unit was being unusually well taken care of- Cape Cod in the summer and Flor-
ida in the winter - and there was some doubt as to whether Sherman was right. 
Before moving out, the usual orders to clear all sick soldiers were received, and the 
usual confusion of packing, crating, building of kitchen cars, and loading of vehicles 
took place. It was the first major move for both battalions, and everything was done 
the hard way. Mess sergeants and cooks later learned that their duties while aboard 
a troop train were not insurmountably difficult, but at that time the consensus of 
opinion was that no one would eat well enroute. Security regulations also were new 
to the troops and caused some irritation, as when contact with civilians on platforms 
was rigidly banned. Some trains were all Pullman, others largely coaches, but the 
trip lasted only 48 hours and spirits were generally high. 
CHAPTER III 
Florida 
The 533d Engineer Amphibian Regiment soon learned that Camp Carrabelle 
was an orphan of the resort state of Florida. The terrain was flat and covered with 
jack pines. The water had a high sulphur content. Snakes were numerous, and it ap-
peared as if every farmer in the region used the roads as a playground for his hogs. 
It was a rude shock to find that the balmy weather that had been anticipated was 
very much absent, and many mutterings were heard that November was warmer in 
Massachusetts than at Carrabelle. 
The camp was more livable than the Ist Battalion had been accustomed to at 
Cotuit. The barracks were standard 100-foot by 20-foot tar paper shacks with kitch-
ens and showers nearby. There was not always enough hot water, and plumbing was 
a thing of the past, but on the whole the facilities were adequate, and after mess halls 
and day rooms had been dressed up, Camp Carrabelle became a satisfactory home. 
Those northerners in the Regiment who had thought of Florida as a state com-
pletely filled with resorts, recreation, and bathing beauties suffered a rude disappoint-
ment. The nearest town, Carrabelle, was dismal proof that Tobacco Road was not a 
figment of its author's imagination. To the north one passed through Sopchoppy and 
other towns made up of a few shacks and a swarm of hogs, until Tallahassee was 
reached, sixty miles away. There was a highway which ran in front of the camp, 
connecting Apalachicola to the west with Tallahassee. The traffic was light and 
bus service was, for all practical purposes, non-existent. It was soon obvious that 
the Florida Board of Commerce would not be flattered to hear the opinion of the 
newest residents of its northwest section. 
, -----
Pier 2, Carrabelle, looking shorewards; boats of Boat Battalion Headquarters Company 
in the foreground. 
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A wave of LCPRs hits G Beach, Carrabelle, as a Shore Battalion bulldozer stands by; the 
lower picture was snapped only 20 seconds after the upper, yet in that time the boat in the 
foreground was completely emptied and its ramp raised ready to retract. 
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The 3d Engineer Amphibian Brigade, of which the new Regiment was a part, 
was attached to the Amphibious Training Command with the principal mission of 
training infantry divisions in amphibian warfare and a subordinate mission of gaining 
as much training for its own units as it could on the side. When the Regiment moved 
into camp, there was no infantry division present to be trained, which was most 
fortunate, for much work had to be done. 
The Shore Battalion was detailed to construct a suitable landing beach for the 
loading and unloading ofvehicles. The best site available was low and marshy, and 
required a great deal of fill. Since only native materials were available, the battalion 
commander decided to corduroy the entire area. The work was divided among the 
companies, and under supervision of the battalion engineer officer the first major 
construction job began. One platoon of each company was set to work felling 
and trimming logs. Another loaded and hauled the logs to the beach area, and the 
third laid the logs and wired them. It was the Battalion's first coordinated effort, and 
it worked out well considering the rough materials and the unsatisfactory nature of 
the area. This loading beach stood up well in the suceeding weeks and proved that 
the Battalion, after whose commander the beach was named, was capable of accom-
plishing much with few tools and materials. 
In the middle of November the Boat Battalion drew a battered fleet of about 100 
assorted LCPRs, LCPLs, and LCV s, powered by every known type of Diesel and gas-
oline engine, and the boat companies soon learned that there was nothing subtropical 
about northwest Florida. The temperature averaged around 40 degrees during most 
of the winter and occasionally dropped below 20, and these temperatures, while 
afloat, were made to seem many degrees lower. Dog Island Sound, on which most of 
the boat training took place, was extremely shoal, and all but a few beaches were so 
flat as to be unthinkable as targets for a landing force. Even more important, there 
was no surf except during high winds, so coxswains easily became over confident and 
lax in their beaching and retracting. Among the assets of Carrabelle from the point 
Doughboys n1ove on the double from their assembly area to board a waiting wave of 
LCPRs. 
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Right: LCV s landing various 
types of equipment - .from 
top to bottom: Shore engineers 
with beach markers and sled; 
antitank gun section; 105 
mm howitzer; jeep with radio. 
Left: An LCVP "with a bone 
in her teeth" towing a barrage 
balloon. 
ofview of the Boat Battalion were the three 1000-foot piers, one of which was assigned 
to each letter company, and which made an ideal arrangement for boat administra-
tion and maintenance. It is true that some problems came near to failure before they 
were even begun because of low tide, for some of the boats moored to the piers were 
found to be high and dry, but on the whole the piers proved to be workable and satis-
factory. 
Before the maintenance sections had an opportunity to give the boats some sadly 
needed maintenance, the ATC issued orders under which the boats were employed 
to capacity in training exercises. In late November, combined training with the 38th 
Infantry Division began in earnest, with the 533d working with the 14gth Regimental 
l\1en from a heavy weapons company land sn1artly from an LCPR. 
' 
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D-4 dozer slithers down the ramp of a Bureau-type LCM; note emergency tow line 
already fastened in case the dozer bogs down. 
Combat Team and Division Troops. Generally speaking, the mission of the Boat 
Battalion was to transport troops in accordance with prearranged problems, and the 
Shore Battalion was to provide facilities, instruction, demonstrations, and advice. 
Preliminary training instruction was given in chocking and lashing of vehicles in 
landing craft, and through demonstrations and assistance the infantry soon learned 
the best method ofloading, securing, and unloading their own equipment. They also 
became familiar with the mission of the Regiment and its organization. 
The Boat Battalion was also engaged in basic training for the infantry, and the 
fact that the boats were called upon to train a regiment, whereas there were barely 
enough to train a battalion, made the pressure pretty heavy. The usual schedule was 
for a departure at o6oo, two hours before dawn, forK beach, and a return at 2000, 
well after dark. During this time, the troops were instructed in the types of boats, 
their general characteristics, and the number of troops each could carry. The next 
step required troops to embark in the boats, take a turn on the Sound, and then to 
make a simulated landing at the place where they had embarked. Full attention was 
given to boat discipline, and to the requirement that the coxswain was in full com-
mand of his boat and all personnel aboard regardless of rank. This aspect of boat 
discipline was one that caused trouble as long as the Regiment was active. 
The second phase of the training consisted of running small problems, usually 
consisting of an infantry battalion supported by a shore company. In these exercises, 
the shore companies perfected their organization and technique in laying out and 
marking beaches and supply dumps, construction af roadways using various types of 
wire matting, directing the orderly movement of troops and equipment, and serving 
as an information center, while the boat companies perfected their wave discipline, 
navigation, piloting and maintenance. Each of the two battalions became familiar 
for the first time with the work of the other, and it was soon learned that the closest 
cooperation between them was essential in landing operations. Small exercises were 
followed by larger ones, and from day time the operations were moved to night. 
After about the third week, the confusion and the wet, cold misery of night landings 
were unhappily familiar to all. The shallow water of the Sound produced a sharp, 
Right: A small tractor gets a thorough 
dunking as an LCV grounds on a 
sandbar. Plenty of man power man-
ages to extricate it. 

• 
After a cold Dog Island 
dawn landing, a pair 
of beach control men 
check in by phone with 
the Beachmaster's 
CP as the crew of 
a water-cooled .50 cal-
ibre antiaircraft ma-
chine gun scans the 
sky for hostile planes. 
choppy sea, and the spray deluged the boats and their occupants. The necessity for 
waterproofing became painfully evident to both battalions, and warm, dry clothing 
reached a popularity never before attained by the uniform. 
The boats had been in poor condition when received, and the lack of opportunity 
for a complete overhaul gave them a bad start. Once in use, the boats had no rest, 
and this virtually ceaseless operation on beaches protected by steep, hard sandbars, 
placed an almost insupportable burden on the maintenance section, to which ade-
quate tools and parts were unknown. The 533d met this situation by concentrating 
as much responsibility as possible on the boat companies, and gave them all possible 
personnel and facilities to do their own work, even if that meant infringing on the 
sacred 3rd echelon reserve of the 563d Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion. The 
other regiments of the Brigade complied with the echelon set-up, and there thus com-
menced a battle between the 533d and the rest of the Brigade that was not finally 
resolved until the Regiment had been overseas for six months. By that time, the need 
for unified control of operations and maintenance at the company level could no 
longer be denied. The tremendous pressure that was cast upon the company me-
chanics at Carrabelle unquestionably developed in them an ingenuity and a resource-
fulness which was the salvation of their companies when they were forced to operate 
separately overseas. 
In mid-December came the first large-scale maneuvers, in the first of which the 
Regiment distinguished itself in landing the 149th Regimental Combat Team. The 
big reinforced divisional problem was scheduled for the 17th, 18th, and Igth of 
December, in which two full regimental combat teams were to be loaded during the 
evening on the boats of the 53 3d and 59 3d, to move thirty miles down the coast under 
the strictest blackout, and to land on a peninsula an hour before daybreak. The 
embarkation of IO,ooo troops in nearly 300 craft went well; the beach was well 
organized, all things considered; and the problem was off to a good start. In the 
darkness between moonset and dawn, the Boat Battalion slipped badly. The Boat 
Battalion commander in the lead boat had no information as to the effect of the 
currents in the area, and relied too implicitly on an untested ancient radio homing 
device, and he led the column past the peninsula before turning toward land. Once 
on the prescribed last leg of the. course the flotilla could not be diverted. Daylight 
disclosed a most appalling mess. Most of the boats had shot into the bay beyond R ed 
Beach and were busily discharging their troops on islands and in mangrove swamps 
in the vicinity of Live Oak Point. Some wave leaders realized the error and tried 
28 
Testing the beach 
wire net as a bar-
rage balloon and 
its winch are un-
loaded from a 
Higgins-type 
LCM. 
to unsnarl the tangle, but they were considerably hampered by an extremely effective 
smoke screen which had been laid down by the amphibian chemical units. Some of 
the doughboys who had plunged ashore with such elan that they could not be re-
called andre-embarked had to march 25 miles to get back into the problem. 
At the objective, Red Beach, a group of international brass hats, headed by the 
late Lieutenant General McNair, commanding Army Ground Forces, awaited the 
landing, stop watches in hand. At H hour plus an hour and a half, the anguished 
liaison officers from the Brigade saw the first wave appear over the horizon, but when 
the wave had beached and the troops had debarked, it was discovered that the shock 
troops spearheading the landing were parts of a medical battalion and an ordnance 
company which were promptly annihilated by the enemy. The second wave de-
livered the medium artillery of the Division, which was not only annihilated but had 
its weapons turned to sea to await the arrival of the remainder of the landing force. 
This was more than the brass hats could appreciate, and they left in disgust, thus 
saving themselves the sight of even worse confusion. 
The prestige of the Boat Battalion suffered a severe blow as a result of this fiasco. 
But it had a healthy effect on the overconfidence of its leaders, and it convinced 
higher authority that something more than a compass and a lead line was necessary 
An umpire checks beach layout during landing exercise. 
\ 
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Night loading; Top: a 2:Y2-ton truck climbs the ramp of an LCT; Bottom: a wave of LCPRs 
with ramps up awaits the signal to retract. 
On Red Beach a beach 
control man "rogers" 
for a signal from a 
boat approaching an 
ammunition landing 
point. 
if a pin-point landing under cover of darkness was to be made. From this debacle 
stemmed allowances of taffrail logs, radio compasses, peloruses, night glasses, and 
ultimately even radar. It further became evident that special navigation officers with 
appropriately equipped boats were necessary, whose sole function would be to lead 
the mission along a prescribed course, while the commander of the mission and others 
in free boats could ride herd without concern for navigation. This system, born of 
chaos, was used successfully throughout the war. 
The maneuver was repeated a week later on a clear night in a strong northwest 
wind with the temperature just above freezing. For many it was as miserable a night 
as they had spent in the service, but despite the hazards of the weather, the problem 
was a reasonable success and did much to rehabilitate the spirits and reputation of 
the unit. 
Meanwhile, Christmas had come and gone, and it cannot be said that the Yule 
spirit was entirely rampant. The small city of Tallahassee, ill equipped to handle a 
large body of men, was forced to close its restaurants to service men, and thousands 
of men with passes in their pockets found themselves left at camp for lack of trans-
portation. The Christmas dinner was good, however, and the break in the strict 
training routine was most welcome. 
During the month of January, the 38th Division moved away and the 28th 
Division moved in. The break in divisional training was utilized fully for unit train-
ing. The Shore Battalion, whose confidence had not suffered a jolt in the divisional 
problem, was shaken out of any semblance of overconfidence by innumerable 
assaults on Dog Island, a flat, undesirable stretch of sand located in the Gulf just off 
the coast of Carrabelle. No one could understand why any self-respecting program 
would require the capture of the island. Nonetheless, problems went on and on 
until the men claimed that they knew every grain of sand on the island and on the 
beaches and bars which protected it. The Shore Battalion took turns in being shore 
Another view of Red 
Beach showing tractor 
standing by to aid 
stranded vehicles. 
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Shore engineers quickly lay beach matting over the soft sands of Red Beach. 
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party and infantry, and although the problems lacked excitement and required that 
all personnel wade ashore in water ranging as high as their armpits, much benefit 
was derived by everyone - with the probable exception of Dog Island. 
The Boat Battalion was also taking part in the daily attacks on Dog Island 
and was learning valuable lessons in making up waves of boats, in handling waves in 
narrow channels, and in timing the last run from the point of departure to the beach. 
It should be added that prior to this time the shortage of boats was such that a wave 
leader, in order to meet his commitment, was forced to steal a boat from another 
wave that had already been made up. This practice, which was the father of tre-
mendous confusion, finally disappeared during the Dog Island days. Of particular 
value during this period to the Boat Battalion were the teachings of Lt. Peter R. G. 
Worth, R.N., whose familiarity with the work of the commando beach parties in 
France and Norway gave solid foundations based on actual experience to the beach 
control sections, especially in salvaging stranded boats. To the Regiment as a whole, 
this unit training period was invaluable, for it gave an opportunity to rectify the 
deficiencies in training and standard procedures which had been mercilessly dis-
closed during the training with the 38th Division. 
At the end of January, the Regiment furnished a cadre to form the 4th Engineer 
Amphibian Brigade. The regimental commander stated, in handing out to the 
subordinate units the requirements they would have to fill, that he demanded a good 
High ranking French officers observe 
the landing of the 28th Division on 
Red Beach. Tear gas sprayed from 
planes caused the donning of gas 
masks. 
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cadre and that it was not to be considered as an opportunity to dispose of misfits. This 
order was obeyed in letter and spirit, and the Regiment felt ever after that it showed 
exemplary generosity. 
Shortly after the cadre had left, training began with the 28th Division, and it 
progressed rapidly and smoothly throughout February, as the men and officers of the 
Regiment had profited by the experience with the 38th Division. As far as the Shore 
Battalion was concerned, training of this division was pretty much routine except for 
the final divisional problem. To make sure that there would be no flaws in the final 
show on Red Beach, a two-day rehearsal was held on the site. The dry run worked 
out smoothly, and the Shore Battalion felt that it was ready for almost any emergency. 
The Boat Battalion, remembering the Ides of December, was reasonably confident, 
but determined to redeem itself. The rehearsal for the divisional problem produced 
the only potentially grave accident when the LCPRs of the Boat Battalion commander 
and the commander of Company C had a head-on collision while running at high 
speed in the dark. One of the boats was completely demolished, and a high-ranking 
observer was sent back to Washington with a fractured hand and a bilious opinion of 
night aquatic maneuvers. 
On the 4th ofMarch the divisional problem began with 181 boats. The embark-
ation of thousands of troops and hundreds of vehicles in blackout and the dark of the 
moon left little to be desired. Each of the boat companies had a navigation boat, and 
the executive officer of the Boat Battalion led the way. This time, thanks to the les-
sons learned in December, the first wave was but a few minutes late and directly at 
the appointed spot on Red Beach, and the succeeding waves emerged from the black-
ness on schedule. During the day the boats returned to the near shore where they 
reloaded, and the Shore Battalion proceeded efficiently to organize the far shore, 
despite an early morning tear gas attack which resulted in considerable sneezing and 
embarrassment on the part of those caught without their gas masks. 
The boats left G Beach for the second time carrying the reserve combat team 
on what looked like an easy routine mission. Shortly after sunset, however, the wind 
backed from southwest to south and began to freshen sharply. By 2 I 30 the surf was 
Colonel Tench (left) confers with 
Brigadier General Ogden (center) and 
Colonel Trudeau, Chief of Staff of 
EAC, during the maneuvers on Red 
Beach. 
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the highest the Regiment had ever encountered. Prior to midnight, by use of lessons 
learned from Lt. Worth, beached and partially swamped boats were pulled into deep 
water. By this time a moderate gale was blowing on shore in gusts of 40 miles per 
hour. The rain came down in sheets and torrents, and visibility was zero except 
during bursts of lightning. The barrage balloons which floated above the landing 
barges were an inevitable target for the lightning, and the flaming hydrogen and the 
white-hot steel cables produced an eerie effect that few will ever forget. 
As they retracted from the far shore, some of the boats lacked the power to 
A mixed wave of LCVs and LCMs talies on its second load at G Beach a few hours before 
the big storn1 broke up the 28th Division's n1aneuvers. 
breast the seas and were forced back and driven ashore. Anchored cabin cruisers 
became unwilling landing craft. Those boats that continued to struggle back to the 
near shore were kept afloat only by pumping and bailing. Some passed inside Dog 
Island, counting on the record high tide to clear the bars, and reached the shelter of 
the Carrabelle River. Others more prudently stayed to seaward of the island, but as 
sometimes happens to prudent men, the western point of the island could not be 
weathered and many boats piled up there. By 0400 the wind had reached a force of 
50 miles per hour and the breaking seas in the shallow sound were 20 feet high. 
As the Boat Battalion fought during the night to keep its boats from destruction, 
the Shore Battalion was pressed into service saving men and equipment from the 
storm. At dawn the storm had subsided to a flat calm, dying as dramatically as it 
had come to life, but the extraordinary fury of the seas left a souvenir in the form of a 
large bell buoy, bottom side up, its dangers entangled in its mooring chains, mute 
evidence of the storm's violence. Search parties were organized to patrol the shore, 
lending aid to boat crews and passengers, and the boats that had survived were 
formed into patrols to search the sea for disabled craft. Not a man was lost from the 
AFTER THE BIG STORM 
A power cruiser command 
boat is shored up as a canal 
is dug to get it back into 
the water. 
Landing craft and ex-yacht 
strewn helter-skelter on the 
sands of Dog Island. 
Shore Battalion dozer cut-
ting the canal to the boat 
in the top picture. 
A Coast Guard patrol craft 
also wound up high and 
dry. 
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Regiment's boats or on the Regiment's beaches, but strewn along 27 miles of coast 
line by ones and by groups were 39 boats of the 53 3d, some up among the trees, others 
wedged against cottage porches, and still others just heaped together on the sand like 
driftwood. As the two battalions and the 563d Maintenance Battalion worked to-
gether with tractor cranes and tackle, another valuable lesson in cooperation was 
learned. It was more than 48 hours before all the boats were salvaged. 
That same week the Amphibious Training Command was abolished and its 
activities turned over to the Navy. A period of rumor-packed suspense followed, 
during which the boatmen had visions of being transferred bag and baggage to the 
Navy, and the shore engineers considered worriedly the possibility of becoming 
infantrymen. But this suspense was soon ended when word came down that the 
Regiment would move shortly to the West Coast and be committed to the Pacific 
theater. After the storm, a few demonstration problems were held, mostly for the 
benefit of directors of training films, and the boats were laid up and shipped back 
to Cape Cod by rail. 
Meanwhile, the training of two divisions had resulted in neglect ofbasic military 
subjects, and major effort was turned to arms qualifications. The Shore Battalion 
aided in the construction of a firing range and the entire Regiment went through a 
thorough course of preliminary instruction, qualification, and range firing. The 
highest individual score in the Brigade up to that time went to the honor of the Shore 
Battalion, and the general improvement in percentage of qualification was gratifying. 
Training for jungle warfare was also undergone, and the Shore Battalion put in con-
siderable time on general engineer construction, especially fixed bridges. 
The last seagoing exploit of the Boat Battalion in eastern waters came early in 
April when a heterogeneous fleet of ex-power yachts from 50 feet to 23 feet over-all 
were sailed to Fort Pierce on Florida's east coast and delivered to the Navy. There 
was no time to make a series of leisurely daylight trips from port to port, so the little 
flotilla cut straight across the corner of the Gulf to Clearwater thence down the coast to 
Fort Meyers. A complete lack of spare parts and limited fuel capacity caused much 
towing, but the boats were finally maneuvered through the Lake Okeechobee Canal 
and up the inland waterway to Fort Pierce, 445 miles in four days. 
On April 2, Colonel Tench relinquished command of the Regiment to Lt. 
Colonel Zeigler, and departed for duty with the G-3 section at General MacArthur's 
headquarters. 
The next fortnight was again filled with the chores attendant upon a move. 
Show-down inspections were frequent, and their necessity was evidenced by the length 
of the lists of missing items. Unit training continued until the last possible moment, 
but it was dovetailed efficiently with intensive packing, crating, chocking, and block-
ing. The lessons first learned on the move from Massachusetts to Florida simplified 
the preparations considerably, and when at the end of the third week of April the 
Regiment entrained, it was with far less confusion and followed by less complete 
exhaustion than had been the case the previous November. It is quite possible that 
the move was made the more easily because of the conviction of everyone that the 
future station could not be anything but an improvement over Carrabelle. 

CHAPTER IV 
California 
Easter week, the last week in April, 1942, found four trains rolling westward by 
different routes, carrying the entire Regiment. Despite the variety of routes, all 
elements required six days for the trip. It was a pleasant journey on the whole, and 
the rest was enjoyed and well deserved by all. If boredom was occasionally experi-
enced during the last day or so on the train, it was not surprising, but there was no 
audible complaint on that score. 
From the moment the Regiment detrained at Ford Ord, it became apparent 
that it had moved to a far, far better place. The East Garrison was an exclusive 
outpost of the Fort located a few miles to the east of the main post. If it was farther 
from Monterey than the main post, it was nearer to Salinas and to San Francisco, so 
there was little to complain about. The area itselfwas not unattractive; the canton-
ment barracks differed little from those at Carrabelle, but the mess halls, latrines, 
post exchanges, movie theatres, and recreational facilities in general were a vast 
improvement. After the isolation of Carrabelle, the proximity of Salinas, Monterey, 
Carmel, San Jose, and even San Francisco made passes for the first time a real oppor-
tunity for enjoyment. 
The Regiment had been given an alert date of July r, which permitted only two 
months in which to correct as far as possible the deficiencies that had been made so 
painfully evident at the last station. As a result, the time allotted for organizing the 
new area was cut to the barest minimum. Although facilities were generally excellent, 
those appropriate to our special requirements were distinctly lacking at Fort Ord and 
when to this lack was added the uncertainty as to the future disposition of the Regi-
ment, the establishment and carrying out of a realistic and comprehensive training 
program was extremely difficult. 
The entire tables of organization and equipment of an engineer amphibian regi-
ment had been drastically revamped. Some of the changes were needed and intelli-
gent, but many more removed essential equipment and personnel, and the over-all 
result was so far below what experience showed was the minimum that it was hard to 
believe that Washington had given any serious consideration to the lessons of Casa-
blanca and the maneuvers in Florida. That was a bitter pill which could be charged 
Left: the infiltration course at Harbe-
son City near Carrabelle provided as 
realistic aforetasteof combat as could 
be conceived without inflicting cas-
ualties on the trainees. 
Right: Road march at Fort Ord as 
seen from a liaison plane. 
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off to army "snafu," but even more bitter was the change in name. The 53 3d 
Engineer Amphibian R egiment had felt that its name reflected to some extent its 
duties, but now the War Department dropped the word "Amphibian" and redesig-
nated it the 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. This tongue-twisting title was 
to be a source ot confusion and embarrass~ent throughout the war, leading as it did 
to such corruptions as "Boot and Shoe" and "Boar and Shoat" Regiment. The 
Brigade too was given a new name, hereafter being known by the mysterious title of 
3d Engineer Special Brigade. One rumor, perhaps the illegitimate offspring of the 
navy rumors in Florida, had it that the Navy had forced the Army to drop the word 
"Amphibian." More probably, however, the name was changed to assist certain less 
40 
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brilliant headquarters in Washington which continually found themselves confusing 
engineer amphibian brigades with engineer aviation battalions. 
Colonel Wayne S. Moore, a West Pointer with 23 years of service in the Corps of 
Engineers, arrived at Fort Ord to take command of the Regiment. At this time he 
found that heavy equipment for training Shore Battalion operators was in desperately 
short supply. And the Boat Battalion boasted the occasional use of something over 
sixty battered LCPRs and LCPLs, composing the entire fleet available for training 
all the boat battalions of the Brigade - slightly more than one-tenth of their author-
ized strength. As a result, training programs directed to primary missions had to be 
staggered by regiments, and a large portion of the time was devoted to secondary 
matters or improvised substitutes. The field expedient and the simulated substitute 
were called upon for assistance far too often to produce substantial results. 
Conditioning was stressed throughout the stay at Fort Ord. Battalion speed 
marches were an almost daily affair. Few will forget the five-mile-per-hour saunters 
The training areas of Fort Ord dotted with scrub oaks had little in common with the 
jungles for which the Regiment was trying to prepare. 
~~~--~~~---------------~· 
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Ship carpenters of C Com-
pany learn the rudiments 
of boat building by con-
structing a dory in the 
company street. At Saidor, 
New Guinea, this dory was 
traded to a PT squadron 
for gunboat armament and 
Inaintenance supplies. 
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along the dusty, steep trails that wound through the canyons of the training area, and 
a ten-mile wading trip down the bed of the Salinas River is no less memorable. Physi-
cal fitness programs were initiated with such zeal that there might be some question 
as to whether ultimately they built up the collective physique of the Regiment or tore 
it down. An intensive swimming program was pursued throughout the summer and 
well into the fall with the result that all but a handful of the men could swim fifty 
yards. This was a considerably greater accomplishment than it would be thought 
because of the surprisingly high percentage of non-swimmers that were found in the 
Regiment. For this purpose, the pools at the Monterey and Watsonville Schools were 
used to capacity with officers and men from college swimming teams giving expert 
instruction; the out-of-doors pool at the Mission Ranch in Carmel was sometimes 
used, and it was probably coincidental that the out-of-doors pool was employed 
on the coldest days. 
Specialists schools covering the subjects most essential to regimental operations 
were carried on, but no longer could men be spared to be sent to distant schools, and 
regimental or battalion classes were organized. Shore Battalion men took turns on 
the few available tractors, graders, and shovels, and survey crews were given intensive 
work-outs. Some explosives were available, and demolition men gained necessary 
confidence in their tools. In the Boat Battalion, coxswains were drilled in compass 
adjustment, dead reckoning, and piloting; enginemen tore down and rebuilt all 
types of Diesel and gasoline engines which they might have to use in the future, and 
tune-ups, emergency repairs, and temporary expedients were practiced and developed 
on engines coG.led from barrels of salt water. All communications personnel spent 
almost all free time becoming high-speed operators, and boat crews were trained 
toward a target of at least six words a minute on blinker and semaphore. 
For the first time an opportunity was had for an unhurried course of preliminary 
marksmanship, and proficiency with all weapons was brought to a high level. Not 
only did the Regiment qualify virtually roo per cent with the M-r rifle, but also gave 
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every man familiarization firing with the carbine and '03 rifle. Every man also had an 
opportunity to throw live grenades. Those to whom rifle grenades and bazookas 
were issued under the current table of equipment had an opportunity to fire their 
Desert antiaircraft range; Top: the firing line; center and lower left: the pup tent bivouac; 
lower right: same during sand storm. 
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weapons, and the Shore Battalion's platoon of 37 mm antitank gunners developed 
into crack shots and learned to accomplish maximum mobility in difficult terrain. 
The principal effort in training with weapons, however, was devoted to machine 
guns. Three-quarters of the Regiment fired for record with a .30 calibre light ma-
chine gun, and as many also qualified on the .50 calibre as the limited supply of 
ammunition would permit. Since indications were that the primary use of the 
Regiment's automatic weapons would be antiaircraft or antiboat, much time was 
devoted to shooting from ring-mounted guns on rolling landing craft at water-borne 
sleds and towed kites. 
The climax of weapons training came in the beginning of June when the bulk 
of the Boat Battalion and approximately one-quarter of the Shore Battalion moved 
by truck convoy 450 miles to the desert, just south ofDeath Valley. Those who made 
that trip will remember it as a very vivid experience. The single firing line with 
200 water-cooled machine guns stretched impressively for two miles in the sand, and 
when a bomber-towed sleeve or a rocket swept down the line at speeds as high as 400 
miles per hour, the roar of firing guns reverberated throughout the valley. In five 
days of firing, the taxpayers' burden was increased to the extent of nearly a million 
rounds of ammunition. 
The firing, however, was probably the less memorable experience when compared 
with life on the desert. The nearest water point was 35 miles away over a boulder-
studded track that was open only once a day due to firing regulations, and so to each 
man daily there was doled out one and one-half quarts of water for all purposes. 
This meant precious little for shaving and bathing in view ofheat that reached as high 
as 140 degrees during the daytime. To return after a day's firing to the bivouac and 
to find that a sand storm whirling down the valley at a mile a minute had caused pup 
tents to vanish and had filled with sand those which, by virtue ofbeing weighted down 
with 200 pounds of rock, had withstood the blast- this was a cause of great discour-
agement, to put it mildly, and the language employed on those occasions was far from 
mild. A trip to the mess line did nothing to raise the morale of the homeless, for his 
chow was encrusted with sand and his coffee was halffilled with it. Nor was it any 
comfort to retire to the blankets, for on many uncomfortable occasions a scorpion or 
perhaps a "sidewinder" was found to be a willing, though uncongenial, bedmate. 
The experience in the desert was valuable not only for the unquestionably fine 
opportunity it presented to improve machine gunnery, but also for the training in self-
discipline and self-preservation under difficult conditions. As the convoy moved 
back from the desert to Fort Ord, a deep appreciation was felt by all for the "desert 
rats" of the British Eighth Army who lasted four years in the African Desert. 
-, The East Garrison was far from the sea, and to engage in periods of continuous 
boat training it was necessary for the Boat Battalion to make several moves. Late in 
May the entire Battalion moved into the tent area at the Presidio of Monterey for 
their initial training on the Pacific. The Presidio is a beautiful post located only a few 
hundred yards - most of them straight up - from the inner harbor of Monterey 
where the landing craft were moored at the municipal wharf. Facilities for the main-
tenance sections were very unsatisfactory - one small shed which was almost com-
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pletely filled by even as scanty a supply of parts as was then available. Propellers, 
shafts, and rudders could be serviced only by means of chain hoists hung from the 
dock above a floating platform for the ship-fitters. The boats, in accordance with a 
tradition which had become all too familiar, were in very poor condition when turned 
over to the Battalion, and there were only about fifty of them after designating neces-
sary salvage and control boats. There was only one boat left per section, so it was 
necessary for each staff sergeant to take his four or five boat crews together in one boat, 
and for each of the fifteen or twenty men to take turns beaching and retracting -_;:m 
obviously unsatisfactory expedient. 
The very first landing was enough to prove that the calmness of Dog Island 
Sound had given no preparation for the surf that was found in the Pacific. The waves 
reared up ten feet or more in height and fell forward with crushing power, pounding 
the boats every time they retracted. There were three or four lines of breakers which 
began several hundred feet from the beach, and it was necessary to retract stern first 
with no turning until outside the outer breaker. The unfortunate boat that veered 
too soon and was caught broadside was utterly helpless, and her deck was usually 
stove in or her coaming torn off. Not even perfect handling was a guarantee of safety, 
for frequently the engine hatch was stove in and the gasoline engine drowned out. 
The beach control section had more than enough practice on salvage problems, and 
the damage to the fleet was so great that even round-the-clock work by the mainten-
ance crews was hardly sufficient to keep up. 
On the next trip to Monterey a month later, thorough-going tests were given to 
each platoon separately, each test lasting a day and a night. Each coxswain was 
required to plot a different dogleg course of about 25 miles to Santa Cruz and then 
follow that track alone. About midnight the platoon was given a skeleton field order 
requiring a pre-dawn landing twenty miles away. The oral order of the platoon 
leader and the execution of the problem were checked in detail, and after the initial 
LVTs maneuvering on the dunes above :Monterey Bay. 

Amphibian scouts at Moss Beach battle the surf in pneun1atic boats. 
landing, the test was completed with operations in salvage technique, signalling, and 
formation running. The results of these tests were most gratifying, particularly as the 
daylight individual runs were all made against heavy seas and 20- to 30-mile winds, 
with compasses that were an object of suspicion rather than of confidence and boats 
that were badly mauled. 
The only joint boat and shore exercises conducted by the Regiment were staged 
during this period as part of a War Department training inspection of the Brigade. 
Sixty boats left Monterey after sunset and bucked a vicious northwester for 25 miles to 
Santa Cruz. Mountainous seas held the speed down to less than four knots, and the 
condition of the boats was such that only 37 reached Santa Cruz, which was the near 
shore. Among the boats that failed to reach the near shore, were three-quarters of 
the wave leaders' boats and all of the salvage boats. With coxswains taking over the 
waves and a couple of lieutenants handling everything else, the run to the point of 
departure for the far shore went off smoothly. To save the day completely, a light fog 
obscured the line of departure so that as the first wave retracted and headed towards 
sea, enough of its boats could join the inbound third wave to make it complete. By 
this means 35 boats made eight complete seven-boat waves, and the rather gullible 
observers on the dunes were completely satisfied with the performance. 
Thereafter, the sixty boats were permanently divided among the three regiments 
of the Brigade. In order to use its twenty to the maximum, and also to simulate to 
some slight degree the conditions that were expected to be encountered in the South-
west Pacific, the 533d abandoned Monterey Harbor with its wharves and gas pumps 
and established a bivouac for one company on Carmel Beach under the shadow of 
Pebble Beach Golf Course. Under those circumstances the bivouac could hardly be 
called roughing it, and each boat company spent three enjoyable weeks on Carmel 
Beach. Maintenance sections developed their own marine railroad construction 
technique and actually performed all echelons of maintenance for the first time. The 
only contact with battalion or regimental headquarters was by radio, and the com-
munications section received valuable training in that way. Mess personnel too had 
an opportunity to work without the benefits of a modern army kitchen, and the com-
panies acquired an invaluable feeling of self-reliance. Taken as a whole, those three 
weeks at Carmel Beach were at the same time as pleasant and as profitable as men in 
any army ever spent. 
Not far away at Moss Beach on Point Pinos the heavy surfbeat down upon a few 
Left: Airviews of the camp built by 
B Company on the beach at Carmel 
under the Pebble Beach Golf Course. 
Note the wakes of maneuvering land-
ing craft in the upper picture and the 
the dike of sand bags to keep the 
spring tides out of the tents. 

Night and Day on the Infiltration Course at Fort Ord. 
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dozen volunteer amphibian scouts from all companies of the Regiment. Equipped 
with small rubber boats that tilted with the surf dangerously day after day, these men 
had all the tricks of the trade of the commandos and Marine raiders drilled into them. 
By the end of the summer they were ready for any reconnaissance of enemy shores, for 
demolition work, or for hydrographic surveys. 
While the Boat Battalion was learning the eccentricities of the Pacific, the Shore 
Battalion was polishing up phases of its training that were either completely new or 
had been given insufficient attention previously. The shore companies had had such 
a thorough work-out in beach work in Florida, especially during their innumerable 
assaults on Dog Island, that their training could well afford to emphasize other aspects 
of their expected mission. For instance, word filtered back from the 2d Brigade in 
Nassau Bay, New Guinea, that amphibians were not infrequently required as reserve 
infantry in repelling attacks or recapturing lost ground, and so platoon problems in 
infantry tactics, both offensive and defensive, were practiced throughout the summer. 
Particular emphasis was placed on target designation and fire control. In common 
with all other troops all men of the 53 3d wriggled through the barbed wire and under 
the whining machine gun bullets of a so-called infiltration course. 
Though engineer troops may be given specialized functions, and though their 
name may reflect that specialty, nevertheless, task force commanding officers consider 
that engineers are engineers, and with lofty disregard of their specialty expect them to 
solve any and all construction problems. To give the shore companies the ground-
work of general construction and engineer planning, and, incidentally, to get their 
hands for training purposes on certain rare and choice items of construction equip-
ment held by the post engineer, arrangements were made for the Shore Battalion to 
undertake certain portions of the post construction program. Company D took over 
the grounds and swimming pool at the huge service club, completing rapidly and 
successfully all-weather roads, parking areas, and a large concrete pool. E Company 
built the difficult "Engineer Canyon" road in the rugged terrain south of the East 
Garrison, while F Company built the so-called "Skyline Drive" in the same area. 
From these and many other smaller jobs, the shore engineers acquired flexibility and 
efficiency in handling equipment of all types. The primary mission of the Shore 
Battalion was not, however, ignored, and at the same time continuous experiments in 
sand stabilization and in beach marking technique were kept up. 
The new tables of equipment included 12 DUKWs for the Shore Battalion, and 
though only a few were available at Fort Ord, drivers and maintenance men worked 
hard to develop the necessary skill to handle these truly amphibian truck-boats in the 
rough surf at Monterey Beach and to repair the frequent failures in their complicated 
mechanisms. 
As a side line, the cargo platoons and their officers, along with a few men from the 
Boat Battalion, were sent to Oakland for six weeks training in cargo handling at the 
port-of-embarkation docks. Billeted in the grandstand of the Albany Race Track, 
the men received steady, on-the-job training in all phases of stevedore work. For the 
first time they made the acquaintance of slings and pallets, winches and jumbos, and 
at the end of the training the detachment contained many really competent hatch 
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foremen, winch 'operators, and signalmen. Some months later the Battalion was 
unexpectedly assigned to ship unloading at Cape Cretin, and as a result of the training 
at Oakland it made a fine record which could otherwise never have been achieved. 
During this time, high hopes of early shipment overseas and discouragement 
from postponement and delay were alternating in raising and lowering the morale 
of the Regiment. The original alert date of July r was put off until September 15, 
and thereafter it crept week by week into November. The main reason was shortage 
of shipping. But inevitably it was rumored that the assignment to the Southwest 
Pacific had been canceled or that the Regiment was to be converted to port compan-
ies. It was unavoidable that the Boat and Shore Battalions pursued separate training 
programs and lost, to a certain degree, the cooperation that had developed in Florida. 
The Boat Battalion had no craft larger than 36 foot LCPRs, and so could not carry 
a single vehicle. There was, therefore, no feasible combined work with the Shore 
Battalion that could be found. 
In the early fall, the Boat Battalion was loaned to the 4th Marine Division to 
expedite its amphibious training at Oceanside, California, nearly 400 miles to the 
south. Flat cars were not available, so there was no way to avoid patching up the old 
wrecks as well as possible and moving the boats on their own bottoms around Point 
Conception, the Cape Horn of the North Pacific, to Oceanside. In the middle of a 
black night made darker by a thick fog, 65 boats manned by A and C Companies 
plowed and puttered out of Carmel Bay and headed for Port San Luis, r6o miles 
down the coast. The shortage of equipment was the same old story; only a few boats 
DUKWs maneuver in the surf of Monterey Bay. 
====~~~ 
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had charts and some had no compasses; three had taffrail logs and some lacked even a 
tachometer. All of the boats, however, were well equipped with horseshoes or rab-
bits' feet, for by groups or separately they all turned up in Port San Luis. The next 
day, the convoy rounded Point Conception, blessed by unexpectedly calm seas, and 
made Santa Barbara without event. The rest of the trip via San Pedro to Oceanside 
was easy, and the flotilla arrived in perfect formation and on schedule. 
For two weeks there followed a constant grind of day and night landing problems, 
carrying a battalion of Marines at a time. Everything was done according to the 
Navy's ship-to-shore standard operating procedure. It was strange and troublesome 
at the time, but later when the Battalion was called upon to operate under navy 
jurisdiction, this training proved invaluable. The beach there was as bad or worse 
than Monterey, for although the surfwas not generally as high, beach work was com-
plicated by a four-knot current which flowed parallel to the beach and swung the 
craft so that retracting was very difficult. The pressure on the salvage and main-
tenance crews was enormous but by working around the clock they kept their end up. 
At the end of the first week 50 out of the 65 boats were operating, while the navy 
boat group doing the same work had only eleven out of its 54 in operation. 
In mid-September new alert orders were received which necessitated an im-
mediate return to Fort Ord. It was a source of great reliefthat time did not permit a 
return by water, so the boats were turned over to the Navy and the return to Fort 
Ord was made by motor convoy. The Oceanside training was the last general work 
afloat until the Regiment reached its first overseas station. 
One additional nautical activity is worthy of note. As a climax to the long-
range navigation training, three landing craft, two LCVPs and one LCM converted 
to quarter nine men each and manned with crews from each of the three regiments of 
the Brigade, took off from Monterey, California, for Cedros Island, Mexico, 700 miles 
away. The purpose of this mission was to establish the feasibility of navigation in such 
small craft and their adaptability to weather and to continuous operation over a long 
period. The boats proceeded in convoy, but each was equipped with a complete 
navigation set including radio compass, and each crew was made responsible for its 
own navigation. It was fortunate that weather and sea conditions were perfect, for 
the LCVPs, in order to carry enough fuel, were overloaded to the extent of a ton. 
At the tiny Mexican fishing village where the boats paused to refuel, considerable 
excitement was caused, but the four-day, non-stop trip was uneventful. The tour 
finished at San Pedro, California, 500 miles from Cedros Island, making a grand total 
of r 200 miles with only one brief pause to refuel. This dramatic demonstration of the 
endurance of a small landing craft earned a "well done" from the Commander, 
Western Sea Frontier and gave the Regiment a feeling of confidence that was much 
needed on some of the first long-range missions overseas. 
Back at Fort Ord the tempo of preparations for overseas movement increased 
daily, although numerous delays and postponements continued to cause disappoint-
ment. In August a secret warning order directed that one boat company be alerted 
for early movement to Cairns, Australia. At that time it appeared that the only way 
the 3d Brigade could acquire landing craft when it reached New Guinea was to move 
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them from the plant at Cairns, 500 miles across the Coral Sea and thence 200 miles 
to Port Harvey. Company B was nominated for this mission and was brought to full 
strength, reinforced with medics and an advance detachment from Boat Battalion 
Headquarters and the other boat companies. Early in October the movement order 
for the entire Brigade arrived from Washington. It broke the Regiment into four 
shipment groups: B Company, Shore Battalion, Boat Battalion less B Company, and 
Regimental Headquarters Company, with priority in that order. Final packing and 
crating thereafter required the greater portion of the time and effort of the Regiment. 
But some time was found for orientation lectures, command post exercises, and con-
ditioning marches. 
At last the total inadequacy of the tables of equipment had been appreciated in 
the Pentagon Building, and authority was granted to draw or purchase innumerable 
essential items ranging from course protractors to sawmills, and carloads of special 
equipment began to flow in. This did nothing to simplify the packing and crating; 
nor did the arrival of last-minute personnel replacements, who were as bewildered 
and surprised to find themselves in a strange outfit as last-minute replacements gen-
erally are. By the time the Regiment departed it was overstrength and reasonably 
well equipped, but it had not by any means acquired or been authorized all the equip-
ment that past experience indicated was necessary. 
Shortage of shipping continued to produce exasperating delays, and the stay at 
Fort Ord was extended a few more weeks until at last on the 21st ofNovember, 1943, 
the Shore Battalion and B Company entrained for Camp Stoneman and overseas, 
while the balance of the Regiment left early in December. 
The period between activation and embarkation had included only fifteen 
months, of which barely a year had been spent in training of any sort. The sequence 
of what training the Regiment had had would be grounds for a Section VIII discharge 
for any conscientious plans and training officer: three months oflarge-scale combined 
maneuvers at the outset; then eight to ten weeks of individual basic training; and 
finally, improvised small-unit training with hardly an item of major equipment that 
would be used in the theatre of operations. This training nightmare might be ex-
plained on the grounds that there was a pressing need to give infantry divisions am-
phibious training early in 1943, and that there was a desperate shortage of landing 
craft and heavy equipment in the combat zones during that year. Yet, those explana-
tions are not convincing in view of the fact that the divisions which the Regiment 
trained in Florida did not see action until more than six months after the 533d did. 
That operators and coxswains were able to familiarize themselves with D-8 bulldozers 
and 5-ton crawler cranes and with LCMs and LCVPs in the very midst of their first 
combat assignment is a tribute to their ingenuity and native ability. But the need 
for such training under such conditions is a sad commentary on the schedule given the 
Brigade in its state-side training, and led to the conviction that the engineer special 
brigades were the illegitimate children of the War Department's training program. 
CHAPTER V 
At Sea, Outward Bound 
It was a sobering day, that Sunday, November 21, 1943, when the Shore Bat-
talion and B Company entrained for Camp Stoneman, California, staging area for 
the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. It had been a comfortable stay at Ford Ord, 
and most of the personnel of the Regiment had enjoyed themselves as far as life in the 
Army can be enjoyed. Now, however, the first step had been taken toward separation 
from family and familiar scenes and from the comforts of Western civilization and a 
temperate climate. 
Upon arrival at Camp Stoneman "processing" began immediately, and everyone 
endured a sleepless, nerve-racking 48 hours. All personnel were required to have 
physical examinations; a show-down inspection was had, and the shortages were 
drawn and issued; censorship lectures were a necessity; and numerous odds and ends 
had to be completed. At the same time, company clerks and headquarters clerks 
were swamped in making out and completing final passenger lists and partial pay-
rolls. The processing was completed in less than 36 hours, but everyone was too 
exhausted to appreciate that a record had been set for Camp Stoneman. 
At Fort Ord the rest of the Regiment, temporarily under the command of its 
executive officer, completed all duties preparatory to moving to the port of embarka-
tion. On December 2 Regimental Headquarters Company, and 8 days later the 
Boat Battalion moved by train to Camp Stoneman. Immediately upon arrival, all 
men went through a physical examination which was notable for its speed but not its 
accuracy. The Boat Battalion remained at Camp Stoneman for twelve days, during 
which a well-organized program was arranged, which when combined with the steps 
of processing through which the Shore Battalion and B Company had passed in two 
days, kept everyone constantly on the go. It was the general consensus of both the 
Shore Battalion and the Boat Battalion, the former having been rushed through in 
record time and the latter having remained for twelve days, that the port of embarka-
USS West Point, in peacetimes the SS America, which carried the Shore Battalion and 
Company B from San Francisco to Milne Bay. 
A portion of the ! 
10,000 passengers I 
crammed aboard I 
the West Point cheer · 
arrivalinNewYork. ,. 
No such trespassing 
on gun tubs and rig-
ging was tolerated I 
in '43! 
tion was a bright spot in an army where efficiency and intelligent handling, tram-
meled only by the minimum of red tape, were all too rare. 
The Shore Battalion, B Company, and elements of regimental headquarters 
sailed on the West Point on the 23rd of November, 1943· The Boat Battalion with 
Regimental Headquarters Company sailed on the Cape Perpetua on the 23rd of 
December. The West Point was the former America of the United States Lines, the 
largest ship built in the United States, 38,ooo tons of luxury liner. But that was in 
peacetimes. Now, everything pertaining to luxury had been stripped from her and 
every available foot of space, plus a few feet that were not available, was used for 
troops and their equipment. In the same way, the Cape Perpetua, a C-3 type Kaiser 
ship, was far from the cruise ship of which many had dreamed. She had made one 
or two trips to the South Pacific as a cargo ship and had just returned from the Kaiser 
yards after having been converted to a troop carrier. 
In the absence of enemy attack, the crossings to New Guinea differed only to a 
slight extent. Once aboard the ship, strict discipline was the rule and had to be, in 
order that so many men could be efficiently handled in space designed for so few. On 
the West Point were representatives of all branches of the service: sailors, soldiers, 
marines, nurses, Red Cross workers. On the Cape Perpetua the personnel were all 
from the 3d Brigade. But on both ships the story was the same, crowding and more 
crowding. 
The first duty, once aboard ship, was the billeting of personnel. After this, 
especially difficult on a ship with inexperienced transportation corps personnel, 
came the establishing of necessary details. A guard had to be organized, with scores 
of posts mostly to keep the army passengers from trespassing on the choicer regions of 
the ship. KP was, of course, inevitable. Compartment cleaners, garbage disposal, 
safety watches in all compartments, a medical detachment, a PX detachment, gun-
ners to assist the skeleton navy gun crews - these and many other details had to be 
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selected and organized. The location of companionways, lavatories, latrines (aboard 
ship only the most dogged GI refused to refer to these as "heads"), the location oflife 
rafts, and general orientation were more tasks that had to be disposed of immediately 
upon embarkation. 
The Golden Gate is a beautiful sight, but not a happy one when outward bound. 
The decks were lined with Gls already homesick, wondering when and if they would 
see those friendly coasts again. Long after the mountains of California had dropped 
below the horizon, many men could be seen leaning on the rail looking astern, silent. 
With so many men in such cramped quarters, however, introspection could not long 
survive, and it was not long before conversation was loud and general, with particular 
emphasis placed on rumors. Destination, of course, was the great question mark, and 
there were those who insisted that the ship was bound for China or Africa or Attu; 
one rugged individualist had it direct from headquarters that the ship was bound for 
Dog Island Sound where further amphibious training would take place on G Beach. 
Rumor mongering was probably the first extra-duty activity, but it was soon 
replaced by that most favorite of all army sports-shooting craps. There is very 
little to do for the men who are not on detail, and very little room to do it in, and very 
little to do it with. Most of the time was spent on deck reading, playing cards, swap-
ping rumors, or, most frequently, rolling dice. It was too hot after the first day or so 
out to stay below decks. Occasionally a rumor of a threatened Japanese attack would 
bring everybody on deck, and at those times even the most stubborn would conscien-
tiously strap on his life jacket. A diversion of particular interest was experienced on 
the West Point when in a radio broadcast the Japanese announced the sinking of the 
USS West Point with a tremendous loss oflife. This report was most amusing at first, 
and everyone looked around smiling until someone happened to notice that the 
Japanese had announced the sinking at the ship's exact location. With or without 
such reports, however, frequent abandon ship and air raid drills were held throughout 
the voyage. 
At night, when all portholes and hatches were secured, the heat below decks was 
terrific - I 26° in some holds - and many chose to lie on the hard steel deck rather 
than endure the heat on the bunks below. Everything on shipboard was accom-
plished by standing in line. Fresh water was available for limited periods twice a 
day, and the man who happened to be reasonably near the head of the line would be 
assured of some water. The food was not plentiful, but then, under such inactive 
conditions in such heat, appetites were not great. There was a post exchange 
aboard, but in that case the line was almost prohibitive, and on the Cape Perpetua the 
PX itself was closed down for some days as a punitive measure, a procedure which 
caused considerable justified hard feeling on the part of all passengers. 
The days passed slowly, and even the celebration traditional upon crossing "the 
line" could not break the boredom for long. Ennui was worse on ;the Cape Perpetua 
which took 23 days for the crossing, whereas the swift West Point was a I 2-day ship. 
The R egiment almost welcomed the little yellow atabrine tablets when they first put 
in appearance, for they indicated that the end of the voyage was nearing and also 
conclusively spiked all incorrect rumors as to its destination. The pills were bitter 
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to those who insisted on tasting them, and after a few had been swallowed, many of 
the men acquired a dislike for them that was to cause trouble to them and to their unit 
for the next two years. 
Two to three weeks at sea with no diversions, no deck tennis, no swimming pool, 
no dancing, no school teachers on vacation are a far cry from peace-time cruising, 
and there were few who were not up early on the morning the ship entered the China 
Straits leading into Milne Bay. New Guinea is lovely when seen from a distance, and 
the series of small islands, mountainous and heavily jungled, through which the nar-
row channel winds into Milne Bay, are noted for their beauty. Those who looked for 
"plantations" reminiscent of the old South were disappointed, for only one or two 
buildings worthy of the name could be seen. As the ship entered Milne Bay, admira-
tion of the natural beauty of the place gave way to awe at the extent of the American 
war effort. Milne Bay is a 20-mile long inlet whose water is deep almost to the shore, 
and it was filled with literally hundreds of ships. Many a landlubber found it hard 
to believe that there were that many ships in the entire world, much less in one deso-
late harbor in the Southwest Pacific. As the ship worked carefully along the shore, 
ships could be seen moored so close as to be partly concealed by the jungle foliage 
behind them. Moving behind could be seen the familiar army vehicles of all sorts, 
throwing up clouds of dust, the same dust which in the heavy tropical rainfall became 
the mud which was to make life miserable in months to come. To those troops who 
stayed aboard ship for a night or more, it was a surprise to find that when darkness 
fell the entire base was lighted as brightly as any city in peace-time. They had left a 
blacked-out San Francisco a few days before and now, with the Japanese within easy 
bomber flight, blackout was a thing of the past. As the 53 3d became more experi-
enced in the theatre, it too learned that the time lost by blackout was not justified. 
Base A representatives came aboard the West Point with instructions for debark-
Dense jungle and deep water join to provide excellent concealment for landing craft. 
PT crews supplement the jungle concealment with camouflage nets at their base on the 
southern shore of Milne Bay. 
ing troops and with information on bivouac areas. Early on the r rth of December, 
DUKW s came alongside and transported the Shore Battalion to an area which 
had been designated for their camp. In accordance with the standing Base policy, 
the site was virgin jungle, the theory being that engineer troops can improve such 
areas more easily than others. In this case, however, the lack of equipment presented 
some serious problems. Fortunately, the 563d Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion 
was comparatively well established nearby, and they cooperated to the extent of 
landing hand tools, and the work of creating a camp site began. It had been hot 
aboard ship, but it soon became apparent that nothing could compare with the heat 
of heavy jungle when one is wielding an axe or machete. Troops were cautioned to 
take frequent breaks, but despite this there were some cases ofheat exhaustion. Orien-
tation lectures had pointed out the frequency of heavy downpours of rain, and so 
every effort was made to clear tent space and by nightfall the entire Battalion was 
under canvas. 
"C" rations were issued for three days pending unloading ofthe TAT equipment, 
and the improvement of the camp continued, as kitchens, latrines, and the area in 
general had to pass rigid inspections by higher echelons. The troops soon learned 
that the pictures they had seen in magazines and newsreels of unshaven, half-dressed 
soldiers did not depict troops of General Krueger's Sixth Army, and proper uniform 
and adequate mosquito defense were emphasized. 
Speculation as to how and where the Battalion would be employed was wide-
spread, and since the engineer equipment was not expected for several weeks, there 
was some thought that it might be used as infantry. Orders were soon received to 
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construct a water system to supply the section of Base A in which the bivouac was 
located, the plans calling for erection of a 20' x 20' x 6' concrete reservoir, installation 
of a pumping station and the laying of 4IOO feet of line with necessary plumbing 
fixtures. Work began immediately upon this project and, as might be expected, 
progress had just begun when on December I 8 orders came down directing the 
Battalion to draw equipment from the local depot and prepare to move forward as 
soon as shipping could be arranged. The order did not relieve the Battalion from 
working on the water system, so a deal was made to have troops from the 543d take 
over the project in case the movement should take place before it was completed. 
The regimental commander with an advance party flew to Finschhafen where it was 
learned that the Battalion would be employed at Sixth Army's advance shipping 
point from which supplies would go forward to the Arawe, Cape Gloucester, and 
Saidor operations. More precise information was not then available, but an area was 
designated for the Battalion on Cape Cretin, a few miles south of Finschhafen, and 
the immediate future seemed to have been settled. 
Meanwhile, B Company had been able to obtain little or no information as to its 
future. The original task of moving LCVPs 500 miles across the Coral Sea from the 
assembly plant at Cairns to New Guinea was canceled because the Navy regarded 
such a trip as impossible for craft as small as LCVPs, and there is little doubt that it 
would have been not only dangerous but extremely wearing on both men and boats. 
Furthermore LCVPs were not in as great demand as they had been a few months 
previously because LCMs were at last being assembled at Milne Bay. GHQ without 
looking into the needs of the Brigade yielded to the request of Seventh Fleet and 
ordered B Company to Cairns, Australia, to train with the 6th Australian Division, but 
copies of the order never reached Base A or Sixth Army; so a wall of indifference met 
all attempts to get shipping for the Company. After two days aboard ship in the harbor, 
the Company was debarked and instructed to put up a temporary camp. In the 
absence of specific orders, it seemed best to shop around for transportation to Cairns, 
and it was not long before a ship, the Cape M eers, was discovered which was bound 
for Cairns and which could and would embark the Company ifits I500 cases of equip-
ment could be loaded by I 500 the next afternoon. As usual the transportation corps 
could not offer any assistance, but a DUKW company was located and agreed to loan 
a few DUKWs to transport the equipment to the ship. A further headache arose 
when the first DUKW-load of equipment reached the ship a quarter of a mile off the 
shore and it developed that neither the ship nor the transportation corps could 
furnish winch operators. Men were quickly found in the Company to man the 
winches and to operate the crane ashore by which the equipment was lifted into the 
DUKWs. Loading of all the equipment and troops was completed ten minutes before 
sailing time, and on December I 6 B Company headed out to sea, Australia bound. 
A month later the Cape Perpetua dropped anchor in Milne Bay. She remained 
just long enough for A Company to debark in a rush without a solitary item of equip-
ment outside of the men's barracks bags and then sailed out through the D 'Entre-
casteaux Islands to Melauna Bay, Goodenough, where on January I 6, R egimental 
and Boat Battalion Headquarters Companies and Company C were set ashore. 
The Shore Battalion's Command 
Post at Milne Bay, December 1943. 
I· 
CHAPTER VI 
Company B in Australia 
Fair weather blessed B Company on its trip from Milne Bay to Cairns, but a 
storm blew up aboard ship which caused considerable inconvenience. The day 
before the ship was due at Cairns, the Captain disclosed that his orders actually were 
to go to Brisbane, which would mean a 1 200-mile train ride for his passengers. Luck-
ily the Boat Battalion CO who had proceeded to Cairns by air learned of this and 
through Colonel Tench at GHQhad the Cape Meers reordered to Cairns. The Cap-
tain, however, was a man of strong will and decided to split the difference by putting 
into Townsville 220 miles south of Cairns. On December 19 troops and equipment 
were unloaded and transferred to Armstrong Paddock, a former race track converted 
into an Army casual camp. The unloading was not expedited when the Australian 
stevedores threatened to strike the whole port because the troops, confident after their 
successful initial stevedoring venture at Milne Bay, undertook to work the ship during 
the frequent tea and luncheon breaks, without which the stevedores were lost. 
After a day or so in the paddock, B Company loaded on to an Australian train 
bound for Cairns, and, after a trip of nearly fourteen hours at a brisk speed of about 
fifteen miles per hour, Cairns was reached at 4 o'clock in the morning. Army trucks 
were available, which completed the journey to the bivouac area fourteen miles north 
of Cairns, where the troops were unloaded and settled down to wait for the sunrise. 
In a few days, Camp Wallaby, the first and only home of men of the 53 3d on Aus-
tralian soil, was reasonably well settled. On Christmas Eve, boat crews were sent to 
Cairns, where they took over sixty brand new and fully equipped LCVPs from the 
41 1th Engineer Base Shop, which had been assembling boats there since mid-1943. 
It is an interesting commentary that the first boats which the Regiment obtained in 
new condition were received after it had arrived in the theatre of operations. The 
boats were brought from Cairns around to the B Company anchorage, a small bay 
about a mile and a half from Camp Wallaby, and were made ready for heavy use. 
New Year's Eve soon rolled around and brought with it a generous beer issue. 
For the first time, the Aussies began to drop in, pay their respects, and, perhaps inci-
dentally, to enjoy an American cigarette and a free beer. As the evening wore on and 
the beer supply began to dwindle from determined onslaughts, slight differences of 
opinion began to crop up between B Company and its "down under" allies, with the 
result that customers began to straggle in to the dispensary, and the straggle became a 
flood about midnight. It was noted that the victor and victim of these affrays would 
go together to the dispensary and then return good friends to the tent for further 
debate and beer. From that night on, the medics were convinced that Australian beer 
was not conducive to quiet, philosophical discussions. 
The first training was with the Ist Australian Beach Group, a unit new to the 
Australian Army and somewhat similar in purpose to the original Engineer Shore 
Regiments of the U.S. Army. After several weeks ofbeach training work consisting 
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ofloading and unloading equipment and supplies, a practice dawn landing was held, 
on the basis of which Australian I Corps headquarters decided that the training of 
the Beach Group had progressed sufficiently for them to undertake combined exercises 
with an infantry division. Similar beach training was then started with the 6th 
Australian Infantry Division, veterans of Greece, Syria, and North Africa, culminat-
ing in maneuvers in which the Company and several Australian transports embarked 
and landed the r 6th Brigade on Bramston Beach, sixty miles south of Cairns. The 
maneuver required several days and was most successful. 
The final problem involved a landing of the r gth Brigade at Port Douglas after 
a night run of some forty miles. This maneuver again was highly successful, although 
shortly before H Hour it was discovered that an error had been made in the exact 
location of the target beach, but the miscalculation was discovered in time and a 
landing was made on schedule. 
Meanwhile word had come from Brisbane that three LCMs and three 45-foot 
picket boats were available there, so personnel were flown, as soon as air priorities 
were available, to take them over before they should be assigned elsewhere. On the 
return voyage, the fair weather that had favored the Company ever since they left 
the Golden Gate deserted them, and they had to ride out a hurricane at McKay. 
No damage was suffered by the boats or the crews, and they arrived safely at Camp 
Wallaby. 
The Company was alerted for movement to New Guinea on March 2 r, and by 
the 28th packing and crating were completed. There followed, as usual, a long and 
exasperating series of delays. Although ships were leaving Cairns periodically, the 
transportation corps could not find space for one company. It became necessary 
to set up a training program with refresher courses in communications, weapons firing, 
navigation classes etc. Boat formation practice was held, and the maintenance sec-
tion had an opportunity to try some of the improvements that time had not permitted 
in the past. There was time too for some swimming or fishing on the Great Barrier 
Reef and for baseball games between platoons and with the Aussies. Week-end 
recreational convoys were made up, which carried troops to Innisfail and to the 
beautiful mountain resort at Kurranda, the Hotel Fitzpatrick. On some occasions 
beer and fried chicken were available, bringing a very welcome bit of home. 
In May there was still no shipping space available to New Guinea and the Com-
pany, as befitted its apparently permanent status, moved into barracks in Cairns 
that had been formerly occupied by Base Section personnel. At last in June the 
Company was ordered to store the LCVPs in a warehouse. This not inconsiderable 
feat was accomplished neatly and tidily and was completed just in time to receive 
orders to transfer them to another warehouse. Although irritating, it seemed as if at 
last the move to New Guinea was drawing near. This optimistic conviction found 
support in a radio message from Brigade stating that an F boat was enroute to Cairns 
to transport the Company. When the transportation arrived, however, and was 
discovered to be a gg-foot ship with no troop accommodations, spirits hit a new low. 
But realizing that this might be the only means of getting up to the combat zone, the 
men quickly built bunks for approximately roo men, and thus the entire Company 
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could be moved in about four round trips. It was decided also to send two of the 
picket boats and an LCM under their own power across the Coral Sea in convoy with 
the F boat. The convoy encountered heavy going on its 455-mile open sea trip, but 
arrived at Milne Bay in New Guinea in good order. 
After a trip by the F boat and a C-4 7 transport plane had moved a quarter of the 
Company, a Liberty ship put into Cairns enroute to New Guinea. Higher head-
quarters advised that there was no space on the ship, and among the lower echelons 
of command it was felt that a 4th of July dance at the Red Cross was even stronger 
reason for not loading on the Liberty. Disregarding both, the balance of the Company 
finally completed loading on the ship about midnight ofthe 4th of july. On july 13, 
the Liberty ship dropped anchor at Finschhafen and B Company had returned to the 
regimental fold. The days of B Company as an independent detachment were at an 
end, but many retained very pleasant memories of Australia. 
Our Allies from. " Down Under" unloading supplies at Green Island. 
CHAPTER VII 
Cape Cretin, Goodenough Island 
and Milne Bay 
It is necessary now to pause and make some explanation of the distribution of the 
Regiment at various spots throughout the Southwest Pacific. In mid-December of 
I943, B Company was enroute to Australia; the Shore Battalion was at Milne Bay; 
and the Boat Battalion was about to set sail from the port of embarkation. It was 
several months before the Regiment was concentrated within the space of a few miles, 
and it will be necessary to follow separate elements and then return, in point of time, 
to review the activities of other units. 
In the latter half of I943 the Japs were driven from New Georgia and from the 
Lae-Finschhafen area of New Guinea, and their main line of defense then became the 
line running from Wewak through Madang and Cape Gloucester and Rabaul to 
Bougainville. It was MacArthur's consistent policy to by-pass strong Japanese con-
centrations, but this line stood squarely across his path and there was no way to avoid 
piercing it at some point. As he progressed westward along the New Guinea coast, 
the Vitiaz Strait between the western end ofNew Britain and Finschhafen would have 
to be hi~ main supply route. To make this route safe, the Japs on the western half of 
New Britain had to be destroyed or driven eastward, and so it was decided to pierce 
the line at Cape Gloucester, whereas Wewak, Madang, and Rabaul could be by-
passed, ultimately to become nothing more than self-managed Jap prison camps. 
Part ofBougainville and the Admiralties and Emirau were to be seized to seal the trap 
in the eastern Bismarcks and to bring our patrol aircraft within the range of the 
Carolines. The offensive, in accordance with this strategy, began in November, 
I943, with the Marine landing at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville, cumulated 
strength early in December when the I I 2th Cavalry seized Arawe on the southwest 
coast of New Britain, and moved into its climax when the Ist Marine Division swept 
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ashore on Cape Gloucester on the day after Christmas and the I 26th Regimental 
Combat Team ofthe 32d Division secured Saidor, Ioo-odd miles beyond Finschhafen 
on the New Guinea coast early in january. 
The comparative ease with which these objectives had been seized caused Mac-
Arthur to accelerate his schedule for seizing the Admiralties and for starting his drive 
toward the Philippines via Hollandia. To meet the accelerated schedule it was 
essential that the 3d Brigade units be employed without waiting for full equipment 
or normal orientation in their new climate and surroundings. Accordingly, on the 
4th of February, the 533d was assigned the mission of taking over the beaches and 
the water-borne support of the Saidor and Cape Gloucester task forces, which mission 
was to begin on or before March I. Considering that these areas were 425 miles 
forward of Goodenough Island where the equipping was less than half accomplished 
and that little more than three weeks was allowed within which to begin that mission, 
the Regiment was confronted with a rather difficult problem. Colonel Moore de-
cided that the best way to handle the situation was to move his command post to 
Finschhafen and to give the assignment at Saidor to the Shore Battalion less F Com-
pany, with C Company for a boat unit. Since the Gloucester mission entailed more 
long distance small-boat supply and less tonnage across the beach, that job was given 
to the Boat Battalion less Companies B and C and with F Company added. 
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Cape Cretin 
The Shore Battalion at Milne Bay was alerted for forward movement, and on 
December 21 E and F Companies plus detachments from D and Headquarters board-
ed the Liberty ship Josiah Earle headed for Cape Cretin. On Christmas Eve, the 
ship steamed into Dreger Harbor and the troops disembarked at once. The first 
night was spent in a coconut grove opposite the future headquarters of Sixth Army 
where the usual insects, the propensity of jungle hammocks to turn over, and an air 
alert contributed little to a restful night. 
Christmas Day was not as the songs and stories would have it. The troops were 
awakened early so that the maximum use could be made of the daylight, and some 
returned aboard the ship to unload. The balance were faced with a two-mile hike 
which was to be followed by a day devoted to clearing the jungle for the battalion 
area. Turkey, eggnog, Christmas trees, and the other inseparable adjuncts to De-
cember 25 were simulated; members of the Battalion ate their lunch on the ground in 
the shade of coconut trees and·substituted cans ofmeat and beans for the more elegant 
repast. For those who were not too tired to take the trouble, coconuts could be 
opened, providing milk and an enjoyable dessert. 
Fortunately, several days were allotted for making the camp, an experience 
which was extremely rare, for as a general rule the Regiment found that it was 
expected to move into a virgin area late one night and begin efficient operation at 
daylight. Two D-4 tractors cleaned the area and improved the native trail leading 
to the site. Two major problems were immediately encountered- water and latrine 
facilities. A temporary answer to the water problem was found in a neighboring 
detachment of Seabees, the 40th, who very kindly loaned a water trailer to the Bat-
talion. The second problem was not as easily solved, for the water table was so near 
the surface of the ground that every hole dug for a latrine filled rapidly with water. 
Finally, coconut log cribs were built and dirt filled in around them to provide storage 
space. At first the cribs were sprayed with Diesel oil and burned out daily, but this 
scheme had to be abandoned when someone, more zealous than thoughtful, burned 
out the latrine when it was in use, seriously injuring three occupants. By frequent 
moves, careful spraying, and thorough screening, however, this problem too was 
satisfactorily solved. 
One water trailer did not go far among several hundred men, and so efforts to 
obtain a better supply continued. A well was dug in the hope of locating an under-
ground stream, but only seepage and a small trickle of water was obtained. To 
facilitate the flow of water, a charge of dynamite was used which worked in reverse -
after the explosion even the trickle had ceased. Headquarters Company was then 
presented with the problem. By moving to approximately 150 feet from the ocean's 
edge and by using a ditching machine to dig a well, an adequate supply of water for 
all purposes was obtained. Showers and laundry facilities were constructed, and 
when pipe became available, the water was brought to all Company kitchens. Heads 
for the showers were obtained at high cost; to obtain them it was necessary to trade 
some of the precious whiskey which had been brought from the States, but even so 
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steep a price was justified by the enjoyment that the showers gave the Battalion and 
the neighboring units. 
"Washing Machine Charlie" taught the Battalion another lesson which had not 
been taken very seriously in state-side training; he made it very fashionable to be the 
owner of a covered foxhole. After "Washing Machine Charlie" had paid a second 
visit, it was discovered that no foxhole, however comfortable, was fashionable unless 
it was in close proximity to the owner's cot. Enforcement of the order requiring fox-
holes for all presented no problem. 
Early in January the remaining elements of the Shore Battalion arrived from 
Milne Bay with engineer equipment, and were pleasantly surprised to find their area 
all cleared and, relatively speaking, luxurious. Enough time had been permitted 
for establishment of the area, but the air raids and the fact that the Aussies were 
battling Japs at Fortification Point not too many miles away, kept the war from 
moving far into the background. Since the Battalion and its equipment were now all 
assembled, several conferences were held with the Sixth Army Engineer and the officer 
in charge of the forward shipping point. An agreement was reached whereby the 
Battalion would supply the shipping point with 500 men and supervisory officers, 
with a view to taking over the entire operation of the supply beach which was then 
being operated by 542d EB&SR. The remainder of the Battalion was to be given 
engineer construction work ranging from heavy road construction to carpentry and 
electrical wiring. It was a heavy schedule that lay ahead, but the days passed more 
rapidly when full, and there was a real satisfaction after training for so many months 
to be making at last a direct, albeit non-combat, contribution toward winning the war. 
The training and experience in beach work, and particularly the limited training 
gained on the docks at San Francisco, enabled personnel to carry out their duties like 
veterans, and it was not long before the battalion commander was made beach-
master. In addition to his own command, he had supervision of a port company, 
truck company, DUKW company, and a boat company of the 542 d EB&SR. The 
shore companies organized hatch crews out of their utility cargo platoons, and it was 
not long before these crews were putting more tonnage overside than crews from the 
more experienced port company. The shipping point served as an experimental 
laboratory, and various combinations of hatch crews, lighterage, trucks, and labor 
were tried in order to find which would produce the greatest net result. The experi-
ence gained at this time was a sound basis upon which future requirements were esti-
mated. It is interesting to note that it was here discovered that nearly as much ton-
nage could be handled in three six-hour shifts as could be handled in three eight-hour 
shifts because of the time lost in feeding when the longer shifts were worked. 
During January and February approximately 35 cargo ships of all kinds were 
discharged at Cape Cretin with an average daily tonnage of I ,350, the record day of 
which showed a tonnage of 2, I I o. These figures work out to an average of seven tons 
per hatch hour, which is exceptionally good over a period of two months and may be 
attributed to an excellent beach, quiet water, short haul, and the enthusiasm which 
arose from doing the real thing at last. Not even frequent raids nor near misses dimin-
ished this enthusiasm. 
I 
I 
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The Battalion also had charge of loading the landing vessels which were sup-
plying the Arawe, Cape Gloucester, and Saidor task forces. This work was kept 
separate from unloading, and since an extreme shortage of LSTs and LCTs existed, 
the work was always performed under pressure of time, and required most efficient 
coordination. The LCTs were used on the run to Arawe and the LSTs to Cape 
Gloucester and Saidor. Approximately five LCTs were loaded each week and ten 
LSTs, the average tonnage per week being about 56oo tons. In loading these craft, 
landing jetties built by the 4oth Seabees of coral and coconut logs were used, but a 
great deal of maintenance was required prior to each loading operation, and the main-
tenance was the Battalion's responsibility. Full-time use of two dozers with carry-alls 
was necessary to keep the jetties in workable condition. Twelve DUKWs had been 
assigned to the Battalion and proved to be very valuable at this time. Despite limited 
training in their operation and maintenance, an average of nine were kept operating 
at all times, and in emergencies all twelve were put in workable condition. Some of 
the drivers learned the hard way, having to take the cargo at ship's side while the ship 
was being bombed. Less spectacular but equally essential was the contribution made 
by the DUKWs in prompt disposal of the garbage. 
The defects in the state-side training program were felt most severely at this 
time; in the operation and maintenance of heavy equipment, the Battalion did not 
feel at ease. This was directly the result of lack of training with the equipment and 
the fact that the Battalion was issued many items from a special list ofheavy engineer 
equipment shortly before going overseas and had had no opportunity even to famil-
iarize itself with their use. With some 2 I dozers, five cranes with attachments, 
carry-alls of all sizes, dump trucks, well drill, and generators, major jobs were assigned 
to the Battalion despite the fact that it had far too few men trained in the use of that 
equipment. These assignments included preparation of a staging area with the 
necessary road network, sawing of timber, erecting buildings, water systems and 
electrical works for the Sixth Army. These tasks were undertaken by the men of the 
Pythons, big and little, 
killed in the Shore Bat-
talion's bivouac at Cape 
Cretin. 
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Battalion not already assigned to the beach, with little more than courage and ingenu-
ity. The situation was such that anyone who, through curiosity, stopped and looked 
at a piece of equipment found himself immediately designated as its operator. 
The Battalion motor officer was noticed during these days to be pulling out large 
handfuls of hair and talking in his sleep. It was necessary to train operators, main-
tenance personnel, and supervisors on the job, and the motor officer devoted at least 
18 hours a day to this work. The 40th Seabees, who had helped the Battalion with 
the loan of a water trailer, came to their rescue again with the loan of a very compe-
tent instructor who held classes for all operators not on shift and also instructed 
individuals while they were operating on the job. The Seabees also took student 
operators on their equipment and student mechanics in their shops, and it was a 
heartbreaking sight to see an inexperienced operator turn over a carry-all or bend a 
new dipper stick, but discouraging though it was, it was a necessity and had to be done. 
Statistics on the construction jobs which were completed at Cape Cretin are not 
now available, but a brief description of them will give a satisfactory picture of their 
scope and difficulty. The staging area referred to previously was for the 3 2 d Divi-
sion, and to reach it, it was necessary to build approximately six miles of road, a part 
of which ran through a swamp requiring considerable :fill. The road was :fifty feet 
wide from ditch to ditch, with thirty feet of road surface on a four-inch base of crushed 
coral. To do the job, six D-8 bulldozers, two D-4 bulldozers, a road grader, four 
carry-alls, one Buckeye Shovel, and seven dump trucks were required. To give 
variety, a single-span bridge 26 feet wide and 16 feet long with a 25-ton capacity was 
included in the road, as was one large culvert. 
A survey crew was organized to do all the surveying for the road and for the 
staging area, and as part of its duties this crew prepared a topographical map with 
two-foot contour intervals for the battalion area, a distance of 7500 feet including a 
shore line of 2 miles and extending inland 26oo feet to the foothills of the mountains. 
Left: The beachn1aster's headquarters at Cape Cretin. 
Right: Mess tent of Shore Battalion Headquarters Company at Cape Cretin. 
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A waterworks for the Sixth Army headquarters was another problem which 
was successfully solved. A water point was established in one of the nearby streams 
and r,ooo feet of 3-inch, 3,ooo feet of 2-inch, r,ooo feet of 1-inch, and 6oo feet of%-
inch pipe were laid. Pumping stations were installed and three water towers were 
erected, one twelve feet high with 6,ooo gallons capacity, another twenty feet high 
with two steel tanks of 4,500 gallons capacity each, and the third twenty feet high with 
a capacity of 3,ooo gallons. As part of the waterworks, three shower baths and the 
necessary plumbing were installed. A Barber-Greene ditching machine was used to 
dig the ditch for the pipeline, and it was a source of considerable irritation when upon 
completion of the line, the machine was commandeered by Sixth Army headquarters 
to dig all the necessary foxholes for its personnel. 
The carpenters of the Battalion constructed a number of buildings for Sixth 
Army headquarters, including the enlisted men's mess hall, 3 8 by I 2 8 feet with a 
corrugated iron roof, complete with concrete floor, screened-in kitchen, shelves, 
tables, septic tanks, and plumbing. A dispensary of the portable type was con-
structed, and three warehouses were built for the quartermaster and medical supply 
dump areas. The latter were of native-type construction, and presented the first 
opportunity to construct buildings entirely of native materials. 
The signal platoon, in addition to the battalion communications and electrical 
system, put in wires to Army headquarters and to the 542d EB&SR. They wired 
and maintained all of the buildings at Army headquarters, using approximately 
30,000 feet of wiring. What with storms, falling coconuts, and alerts fired into the air, 
the wires were frequently cut, and the signal platoon was always busy. 
Despite overloading from these missions and the beach work, all the jobs had 
been done so well that orders were received from the Army Engineer to set up and 
operate a sawmill. Of course, there had been no training of this sort, and a call was 
sent out from battalion headquarters for any men who had such experience to report. 
Ten men and one officer with very limited experience answered the call. With the 
aid of an instruction book, two D-4s and a few pieces of broken log chain, this detach-
ment established the mill and began producing lumber in ten days, continuing during 
the balance of their stay at Cape Cretin. 
A sector of the shipping point had been assigned to the Shore Battalion for de-
fense and the weapons platoon prepared gun emplacements for their .50 calibre 
machine guns and for the 3 7 mms and maintained two outposts 24 hours a day. The 
G-2 section of the Sixth Army called upon the Battalion for a reconnaissance force to 
be sent to Umboi (Rooke) Island, and this mission was assigned to a scouting part 
consisting of one lieutenant and three enlisted men who departed for the island on 
January 15, 1944, by PT boat and were gone for a month. During this month they 
explored and mapped the entire island, obtained valuable information from the 
natives, spotted J ap camps, and in general distinguished themselves by their intelli-
gent and thorough reconnaissance. All were awarded Silver Star medals for the high-
ly successful completion of their mission, and the officer in charge later became for 
several months a member of Sixth Army's famed "Alamo Scouts." 
There was some time for recreation, although not as much as the battalion com-
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mander would have liked. An area was cleared and used for movies, band concerts, 
and even a floor show. A substantial stage with a background of young palm trees 
was built, and movies were shown three times a week. The 32d Division swing band 
and some stage shows plus a concert by the r 12th Cavalry Band were high spots of the 
entertainment. 
In the middle of February, orders were received to leave Philbertville, as the 
battalion area was known, and to proceed to Saidor to relieve the Shore Battalion of 
the 542d EB&SR. On the 23d of February, 1944, advance elements of D and E 
Companies departed with C Company for Saidor to prepare an area for the Battalion. 
F Company, as indicated above, was to move to New Britain. 
DUKWs and LCMs work side by side unloading ships over the beach at Cape Cretin. 
"Bongs" wrestle rations and fuel drums on Goodenough Island. 
Goodenough Island and Milne Bay 
Though the Shore Battalion had been hard at work for a fortnight at Cape 
Cretin before the plodding Cape Perpetua reached Milne Bay with the rest of the 
Regiment, the two boat companies aboard, A and C, were the first 3d Brigade boat 
units to arrive in New Guinea for keeps. General Ogden had been directed to as-
semble his Brigade at Goodenough Island So miles from Milne Bay before committing 
it to various actions then in progress or planned. Though Goodenough possessed 
many facilities constructed by Sixth Army units in the latter half of r 943, it was by 
no means self-sufficient as a staging area, and frequent intercourse with Base A at 
Milne Bay was essential. Shortage of heavy shipping required that this traffic be 
performed by landing craft. One of the 59 3d shore companies had been pressed into 
service to operate boats pending arrival of a boat company and had done a remarkable 
job considering its total lack ofboat training. Yet it was not unnatural that General 
Ogden was somewhat more than slightly impatient to have a trained boat company 
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inaugurate service between Goodenough and Milne Bay. Thus hardly had the Cape 
Perpetua dropped her hook when orders were received to have A company debark 
and bivouac near the LCM assembly plant so that it could receive its allotment of 
craft and start the vitally needed runs. Since A Company's equipment was inter-
mingled in the holds with that of the other units, all of which were destined to debark 
at Goodenough, there was nothing to do but land the men of A Company with 
nothing other than the equipment they wore and carried in their barracks bags. 
Naturally A Company's camp at Milne was anything but luxurious or efficient. 
True they did receive tentage from the 543d Shore Battalion, but for everything else 
they had to beg or scrounge. Instead of a field range they acquired an Australian 
steam kitchen which they soon discovered was a very ingenious contraption. Life 
was pretty grim with no lanterns, tools, or utensils, particularly when so much effort 
had been expended in the States to make sure that the outfit would arrive in the 
tropics with everything that foresight could provide. 
On january Ig, four days after getting ashore, the Company had received enough 
boats and put them in seaworthy enough condition to inaugurate convoy service out 
around East Cape, past Normanby Island and up through the coral-studded Moresby 
straits to Melauna Bay, Goodenough. This 84-mile run once started was maintained 
with packet-ship regularity for a month. The boats would load during the afternoon 
and evening and depart shortly after midnight, arriving at Goodenough in the early 
afternoon. Shortly after sunset the return run would start and terminate early the 
next morning allowing the crews but a few hours to service their craft and eat a hot 
meal ashore before taking their boats around to the loading beach for another round 
trip. Though this grueling schedule was unfortunately to be typical of requirements 
thrown at the Boat Battalion wherever it went, the fact that many men were seeing 
an LCM for the first time in their lives and were naturally doing many things "the 
hard way" made this assignment one which was never exceeded in terms of pressure 
and fatigue. 
The outbound convoys were considerably larger than those which returned to 
Milne Bay; for A Company in addition to moving critical freight to Goodenough was 
delivering to C Company and the 593d their share of the LCMs that rolled down 
the ways of the 52 I I th Steel Hull Battalion. This convoy work was not the only thing 
that kept A Company's free time at a minimum. Normal harbor lighterage and mis-
cellaneous missions to islands off the mouth of the Bay were plentiful enough to insure 
that no coxswain and crew ever received a complete lay day. 
A detachment of the company moved up to Goodenough to locate the hundreds 
of crates of precious equipment which had been left aboard the ship at the time of 
debarkation at Milne Bay, sort them and prepare what was believed to be a semiper-
manent bivouac for the Company. Actually the temporary camp at Milne, which was 
finally struck on February I 3 when the 54 3d Boat Battalion took over the convoy 
mission, was a year-round affair when compared to the frantic 6o hours A Company 
spent on Goodenough equipping and loading up its boats for the New Britain cam-
pmgn. 
Meanwhile, on January I 6 the Cape Perpetua had wended her way into Melauna 
Left: Scenes from the Camp on Goodenough Island showing C Company kitchen and 
showers erected by Regimental Headquarters Company. Right: Laundry in the raw. 
Bay, and Regimental and Battalion Headquarters Companies and Company C had 
alighted on Goodenough's far from inviting shores. This island, roughly I 5 miles in 
diameter and dominated by an 8ooo-foot mountain, was selected during the dry season 
as the assembly area for Sixth Army headquarters and the first troops assigned to 
that force. Its northern slopes had been ideal during the southeast monsoon that 
prevailed during the second half of the year, and Sixth Army had prudently moved 
forward to Cape Cretin before the change of season. Even in late December and early 
January when the advance detachment of Brigade headquarters was allotting 
bivouac areas and laying out roads and reconnoitering fords across the countless 
"brooks" that creased the coastal plain, it appeared to be well suited to acclimate 
green troops gradually to the tropics. But a week before the Cape Perpetua arrived the 
monsoon changed with a vengeance. Day after day the rain poured down- over 
40 inches in one week - and of course that which fell on the lofty mountain swelled 
the brooks to streams and then to raging torrents in a matter ofhours. The road into 
the 533d's camp area crossed a tiny trickle one day, was barely fordable by a 2Yz-ton 
truck that night and was impassable to a D-8 tractor the next day. One company of 
the 593d had to be evacuated from trees and hummocks by assault boat. Food had to 
be air-dropped to a large hospital. Land communications were at a complete stand-
still, and coral blocked off most areas from approach by landing craft. 
Into this nightmare fresh from the States stepped the three companies of the 
533d. Luckily their area was on a slight rise from which the Kunai grass had been 
scraped with a bulldozer before the deluge started, but to reach it the men had to 
wade shoulder deep and had to manhandle all their equipment hundreds of yards 
from the tiny coral-free beach which was fortunately discovered at one end of the 
area. For four days the only access to the camp was by boat. During that period a 
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General Mud was a potent adversary throughout the tropics; he got in his first licks on 
Goodenough Island. 
group of boatmen and radio operators with no equipment other than sledges and 
hand saws built a 25-ton solid mahogany bridge across the mouth of the river that 
isolated the camp, on the theory that being over tidewater the whole sea would have 
to be raised before it would share the fate of all the other bridges on the island. A 
smaller stream was corduroyed, and as the rainy season had apparently shot the 
works in its initial onslaught, from then on the three companies could communicate 
by land with the unloading beach and supply dumps. 
Less than 36 hours after landing C Company received a fleet of thirty battered 
LCMs and a few LCVPs from the 593d's E Company. It is no reflection on the shore 
engineers who had been running them diligently for a month to say that these craft 
were in pitiful condition; yet not only did they have to be put right to work lightering 
around the clock and running missions to Kiriwina and elsewhere, but it was also 
learned that they would have to be made to last for many months. It was a sad blow 
to C Company, and these ancient hulks nearly crippled that Company's effectiveness 
when the pressure was on at Saidor. Lightering at Goodenough was of course pretty 
dull, but the boats were new to the men and the practice in handling them in shel-
tered waters was very valuable. Maintenance facilities were conspicuous by their 
absence. With no tractor crane the best that could be done on the LCMs that re-
quired underwater repairs, which they all did with alarming frequency as a result of 
the maze of coral, was to winch them out ofwater on a skidway ofpalm logs. Fortu-
nately, shortly before C Company's departure, LeTourneau cranes were issued, or it 
would not only have been unable to repair damaged boats but also unable to install 
gunmounts and other accessories which should have been installed at the LCM 
assembly plant in Milne Bay. 
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Not only did the boatmen have to build their own bridges in the absence of the 
brethren of the Shore Battalion, but they also had to take over a busy beach. The 
593d's Shore Battalion had been handling the local beach, but its entire efforts were 
required to repair the ravages of the downpours and floods. Boat Battalion head-
quarters took over supervision of the entire unloading of three liberties, the movement 
of cargo across the beach and its delivery to the proper dumps. By trial and error and 
relying heavily on the determination of all attached units to get the ships, which were 
loaded with their own much needed equipment, discharged in a hurry, the somewhat 
bewildered boat officers and noncoms hulled the job through. This experience was 
most valuable when the same headquarters was made responsible for the beach at 
Cape Gloucester, and furthermore gave the boat officers a sympathetic understanding 
of the Shore Battalion's constant problems, an understanding which helped weld the 
Regiment into an effective team in later major operations. 
The primary mission of the companies at Goodenough was securing their equip-
ment and readying themselves for real assignments in the forward areas. This 
seemingly simple task was a terrible headache for several reasons. First, the San 
Francisco Port of Embarkation seemed to have taken a fiendish delight in comming-
ling the equipment of different units. Second, all vehicles and heavy equipment had 
been shipped knocked down and crated and had to be assembled in hip-deep water 
with no tools other than the driver's hand tools packed in the crate. Third, the 
flooding of the dumps had damaged many items and had disorganized the personnel 
responsible for the dumps so that pilferage was very serious. Fourth, many items 
were received for the first time here without even a sample available to the unit 
for study and demonstration before leaving the States. Finally, the Shore Battalion 
had virtually no personnel on Goodenough, so the job of assembling and preparing its 
heavy equipment for movement forward fell on the regimental S-3 and a handful of 
mechanics. 
All told the few weeks on Goodenough were a pain in the neck to all ranks, and 
the receipt on February 4 of warning orders for movement up the line came as a 
welcome relief, but there was little time for rejoicing in the two weeks that remained 
before the departure date. Barely in time the last boats to complete A and C Com-
panies' allotments came off the line at Milne and were rushed to Goodenough to have 
gunmounts welded and equipment checked aboard. Vehicles were completed so 
close to the deadline that some were actually loaded aboard LCMs with less than one 
mile on the speedometer. At last, just as it appeared that the deadline would be met 
on all critical items, came a drastic and apparently ill-considered order to give up 
twenty-five per cent of the boats, and as will be seen in the next chapter, the final few 
days on Goodenough were probably the most annoying for the Boat Battalion of its 
entire overseas tour. 
Convoy of LCVPs coasts down the shore of New Guinea just south of Finschhafen; 
Mt. Sattelberg in the background. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
New Britain 
ON the 10th of February the advance representative of the 533d landed at the 
airstrip at Cape Gloucester. The status of the campaign on New Britain at 
that time may be summarized as follows: after lightly opposed initial landings at Sag 
Sag and at Yellow Beach in Borgen Bay, the Marines had closed rapidly on the airstrip 
and Bloody Point, and had cleared Cape Gloucester proper prior to the end of 1943. 
The Marines had then regrouped, facing toward the south, and during January had 
fought a bloody series of engagements, particularly the battle for Hill 66o, and had 
moved down the west shore of Borgen Bay, crossing the Natamo River after a sharp 
battle on January 28. Thereafter the 5th Marine Regiment had pushed rapidly 
eastward through crumbling J ap resistance and had reached Cape Gauffre. 
The push along the coast was entirely dependent for supply and evacuation on 
the landing craft of Company C, 592d EB&SR, which was also charged with unloading 
the shipping in the harbor. This company had had only twenty-odd boats initially, 
and continuous operation on bad beaches with inadequate replacement parts had 
reduced their serviceable boats to a scant dozen. Consequently, Major General 
Rupertus, USMC, the task force commander, was more than delighted at the pros-
pect of the reinforcement of another boat company, and he cheerfully outlined an 
accelerated offensive to the eastward that would be made possible by this new flotilla. 
The 533d officer made tentative arrangements for bivouacs in the least atrocious of 
the various swamps available and then departed for Goodenough to expedite the move 
forward as much as possible. 
For the next two weeks a confusion in the lines of responsibility in the higher 
command echelons made life very difficult. Brigade and regimental headquarters 
were placed under USASOS, with the primary mission of expediting the unloading 
Softening up Cape Gloucester shortly before the initial landings December 26, 1943. 
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of supplies at Gloucester and Saidor, yet the battalion commanders were placed under 
the task force commanders who were charged by Sixth Army with completing their 
tactical missions with the least possible delay. The first and unhappy effect of this 
confusion was that General Ogden withheld 25 per cent of the LCMs slated to go 
initially to both Saidor and Gloucester, so that the 593d could employ them on the 
run from Finschhafen to Arawe where there was no conflict of interest. As a result, 
the units assigned to the advance task forces were placed in the embarrassing position 
of having to hedge on their promises. While this confusion was reigning in higher 
headquarters, personnel performed herculean feats in preparing their craft for combat, 
mounting machine guns, drawing and distributing all types of equipment. The 
conflict of authority struck a particularly hard blow on the boat crews who had to 
turn their boats over to the 593d on the very same day on which they finished several 
days of very heavy work in preparing them. A similar irritating result was that ten 
out of forty of the boats which had already been loaded for the move had to be emp-
tied, and their loads had to be redistributed. Nevertheless, the job was accom-
plished and everything that could be crammed aboard the reduced fleet had been 
loaded when darkness fell on the qth of February. It should be added that the load-
ing, unloading, and reloading was performed during 48 consecutive hours of heavy 
rain, and by the time the flotilla put to sea tempers left much to be desired. 
The fleet consisting of 6o LCMs, 2 picket boats, and 37 LCVPs wound out of 
Melauna Bay and down Moresby Strait to Collingwood Bay at dawn on the 18th of 
February. The I so-mile trip to Oro Bay took less than 24 hours with good weather 
but considerable maintenance work en route. After the arrival at Oro Bay, one whole 
day was lost because it was necessary to manhandle the fuel drums. In addition, the 
battalion commander was kept occupied that day by the base commander who failed 
to see eye to eye with him on the question of garbage disposal. On the 20th, the 
flotilla proceeded uneventfully to Cape Cretin. 
At Cape Cretin two days were lost because the Shore Battalion was not released 
from its construction and beach control assignments; the headquarters to which it 
had been attached displayed profound indifference toward the necessity of meeting 
the target dates which had been established for the Talasea and Yalau attacks. Final-
ly, a few minutes after midnight on the 24th of February, C Company with elements 
of the Shore Battalion commenced the 125-mile run along the New Guinea coast to 
Saidor. A few hours later, A Company, Boat Battalion Headquarters, elements of 
F Company and of Company A of the 563d Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion 
departed on the final 85-mile run through Dampier Strait to Borgen Bay. A fresh 
northwest wind kicked up a sharp chop in the Strait and all hands suffered a thorough 
drenching, but the convoy arrived on schedule off Yellow Beach that evening. 
Immediately upon landing at Borgen Bay, it appeared that any thoughts of a 
few days in which to establish a camp and to service and repair the craft after their 
long run could be discarded. Instead, one of the worst " rat races" of all time was to 
occupy every minute of every 24 hours for the next week. The task force commander 
was confronted with a tremendous problem. In scarcely a week he had to move a 
substantial part of the ISt Marine Regiment fifty miles to relieve the sth Marines in 
A "raft" of LCMs at anchor in Borgen 
Bay - Hill "660" in the background. 
the Rein Bay area; he had to build up thirty days' supplies of all classes, including 
three units of fire, at Iboki; and he had to stage and deliver an assault on the Wil-
laumez Peninsula with a full regimental combat team. Since all of this activity 
depended on a few dozen landing craft, not an hour could be spared for any boats 
that were not actually disabled; if a boat could be run, no matter by what field 
expedient, it had to run. 
Going ashore upon arrival on New Britain was a rude awakening; the mud, the 
stench of dead Japs and foul soil, the rain that would not let up quite long enough to 
dry clothing, the area that turned out to be a bomb- and shell-cratered jungle, the 
flies, mosquitoes, and rats - into such a Utopia moved the provisional battalion of 
the 533d. Perhaps it was well that the pressure was as great as it was, for no time was 
permitted to anyone to worry about conditions. 
LST beaches at Yellow Beach, Cape Gloucester. 
Light artillery section of the llth Marines splashes ashore at Cape Gloucester from LST. 
All amphibious and allied elements were placed under control of the 533d, 
including :five LCTs from the Navy, Company C of the 592d EB & SR with its 
maintenance platoon, and a port company. As fast as the boats were unloaded they 
were checked by the A Company maintenance section, and if they were found cap-
able of half speed on one engine when loaded to the gunwales and when covered with 
as many marines as could perch on the cargo and the narrow waterways, they were 
so loaded, and convoys of a dozen or so boats were dispatched on the :fifty-mile run to 
Iboki. The run along the coast lay through continuous patches of barely submerged 
coral which stretched many miles from the shore. To avoid these reefs by passing 
to seaward of them would nearly double the distance, so it was necessary to twist in 
and out amongst the reefs, and the convoys were limited to daylight runs. The :first 
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few groups were led by boats of the 592d whose coxswains had been probing those 
waters for four weeks, but having made one trip through the maze, all coxswains were 
presumed to know the passages, and whether by knowledge or luck they always got 
through. 
Iboki was actually occupied by the Marines on the 25th ofFebruary after a sharp 
air bombardment, and as quickly as they reached the point they were met by the 
LCMs with fresh troops and supplies. The day was marred by a tragic accident 
when one of the convoys was attacked by three B-25s of our own airforce which were 
returning to New Guinea from a strike on the Admiralties. They made three strafing 
attacks on four boats of the 592d, killing one engineer officer and several marines, 
and wounding many more of both marines and amphibian engineers. It was later 
learned that the pilots had been furnished with intelligence maps on which the New 
Britain data was 45 days and 50 miles out of date. 
Meanwhile back at Borgen Bay the few men who were not involved in boat 
operations were struggling to set up a base camp in a dismal swampy forest, criss-
crossed with fallen trees six feet in diameter and pocked with thirty-foot craters 
caused by the pre-landing bombardment. A daily rainfall of some two to five inches, 
clinging bottomless volcanic ash muck, and lack of tools and equipment made this 
work a misery which will never be forgotten. The maintenance problem was some-
what eased by the arrival on February 28 of Company A, 563d Maintenance Bat-
talion less one platoon. With no opportunity for substantial repairs to the boats 
since their assembly at Milne Bay nearly five weeks before, the backlog of work 
presented to the maintenance unit as it debarked was staggering. But it rose to the 
occasion in splendid fashion and began hauling and repairing boats as fast as it could 
roll its equipment down the ramps of the LCTs. 
Relieved from work at Borgen Bay the A Company maintenance section moved 
forward that same day to Iboki and there established an advance repair base in 
preparation for the next push up the coast. Realizing the amount of work his group 
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would be called upon to turn out, the maintenance officer picked the beach best 
suited for hauling boats, completely disregarding the fact that it was located at the 
upper end of Rein Bay, several hundred yards beyond the barbed wire of the marine 
perimeter. Ignoring both Japs and marines and the blackout prescribed by the 
latter, this little task force maintained its own "perimeter," and night as well as day 
the bright arc of its welders could be seen. 
Through the first days of March the hectic shuttle service continued to pour 
troops and supplies into Iboki. Continuous downpours not only made a morass of 
the staging area, but so limited visibility that the convoys fell well behind schedule, 
as they picked their way through the tortuous route. 
The assault on the Willaumez Peninsula was directed at the airfield and village 
of Talasea on the east coast. No naval combatant craft larger than PTs could be 
spared, nor were any LCis or LSTs available, for the campaigns in the Marshalls and 
the Admiralties were then at their height, and so it was necessary to make the attack 
on the west coast and thence move overland to the east coast in order to minimize the 
risk and keep the hours of discomfort for the assault troops riding in small open boats 
to the minimum. Volupai plantation, directly across the neck from Talasea and con-
nected thereto by what was thought to be an adequate road, was chosen as the initial 
beachhead. 
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The 5th Marines were to attack in a column of battalions with normal attach-
ments, including a few pieces of equipment and a small advance detail from F Com-
pany of the Shore Battalion, which were all that had as yet arrived from Cape Cretin. 
Adequate fighter aircraft cover was expected during daylight, and a saturation bomb-
ing of the beach area was scheduled from H minus 40 to H minus ro minutes. Control 
was given to the commander ofthe 533d Boat Battalion of all elements afloat, includ-
ing eight PTs, five LCTs, and a company of amphibian tractors, in addition to the 
40 LCMs and r 7 LCVPs of the 53 3d and 592d. It was planned that the "amtracs" 
carrying the first two waves of infantry would be lifted in the LCTs and launched a 
mile off shore, from which point they would proceed directly across the barrier reef to 
the beach. The beach was so placed that the landing barges had to take a dogleg 
course in order to follow the only channel to the beach that was shown in the air 
photos. The feasibility of this channel was doubted by the amphibian scout who had 
made the reconnaissance, so an emergency plan to transfer men and appropriate 
equipment of later waves to the amtracs had to be prepared. The risks involved in 
ordering landing craft to approach the beach in column at an acute angle caused 
considerable concern, but there was no alternative. 
The approach track selected was nearly 6o miles; so in order to make the o8oo 
RJ 
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H hour the convoy, held down to the LCTs' speed of 6 knots, had to clear Rein Bay by 
2200 D-1. The PTs after providing a screen for the convoy during the night were to 
strafe the beach and neighboring headlands with 20 mm fire from outside the reefs. 
To replace the "call fire" against emergency targets usually available from destroyers 
and APDs, four medium tanks were to be carried in LCMs covering the flanks of 
the first wave of amtracs. Tests in Rein Bay showed that the tanks' 75 mm guns 
could deliver accurate and rapid fire over the coamings of the boats. 
March 5, the day before the attack, found the shuttle service between Borgen 
Bay and Iboki still operating in high gear. When the loading out commenced after 
noon, one-third of the craft had not yet arrived. The afternoon and early evening saw 
a hectic jumble of boats jammed topside to topside on the narrow beach, discharging 
supplies and the last of the troops who were to take over the Iboki area, and taking on 
the attacking troops and their equipment and stores. No floodlighting equipment 
was available, so as darkness deepened and the deadline for departure approached, 
pandemonium reached new heights. Yet by dint of superhuman efforts on the part 
of all hands, the incoming boats were discharged, serviced, organized into waves and 
loaded in time. 
The motley convoy that stood out to sea that night carried more than 3000 men 
and rooo tons of equipment in what was probably the War's outstanding example of 
overloading small boats. Luckily the wind was calm all night and only the gentlest 
of ground swells rocked the boats. 
Following close in the wake of the A Company picket boat the blacked-out 
flotilla kept in reasonably good order, though a series of inky rain squalls caused one 
three-boat wave to go astray for a time. The "free" boats carrying the various 
regimental and battalion commanders were delayed in departing, and being unable 
to find the main convoy in the blackness, proceeded independently to the rendezvous 
area. Daybreak came as a welcome relief shortly before 0700 and disclosed the little 
fleet somewhat northward of its prescribed track but about on schedule as it ap-
proached the mountainous peninsula. 
As the minutes passed and the brightening sky remained empty of planes, a chill 
sense of foreboding crept up many a spine. The calculated risk of attacking an enemy-
held shore without preliminary naval bombardment had been taken, but to go on in 
through the tricky channel and land on a beach overhung with thick jungle without 
benefit of preliminary bombing, strafing, and smoking was something else again. 
Nevertheless Colonel 0. P. Smith, USMC, commanding the force, signalled "carry 
on"; so the assault began. The amtracs clattered and splashed off the LCTs' ramps as 
the PTs hurled their small HE shells at the beach. The lead boat, an LCVP, followed 
by the beach control boat dropping buoys, and the LCMs with tanks, picked its way 
through the nigger-heads. As these craft and the churning amtracs approached 
within two hundred yards of the shore, they cut loose with all their machine guns. 
The small Jap garrison reacted sharply, picking a few marines off the approaching 
amtracs with rifle and machine gun fire and lobbing go mm mortar shells into the 
water. At this critical moment the "air support" did arrive - one L-4 cub with 
General Ogden in it tossing hand grenades at likely Jap positions! 
NEW BRITAIN 
Giant Bread-fruit tree that 
dominated A Company's 
camp at Borgen Bay. 
85 
With few casualties and in good order the amtracs reached the beach, and sim-
ultaneously two medium tanks rolled off the ramps of the LCMs, one being promptly 
disabled by a suicide attack ofajap with an armful ofmagnetic mines. The mortar 
fire increased in tempo destroying several of the channel buoys and otherwise causing 
many of the boats to get fouled up in the coral patches. No boat suffered a direct hit, 
and the only casualties were from fragments of shells bursting on the surface. Luckily 
the J aps kept their mortar fire on the water in the initial phases of the assault, for if it 
had been directed on the tiny (75 yards long) beach which soon was jammed with men 
and equipment, the casualties might have become prohibitive. 
The twelve waves were finally discharged by r roo, only 45 minutes behind 
schedule, and except for five boats left for emergencies or flank patrols, the flotilla 
headed back for Iboki, taking with it the casualties. On the return trip to Iboki, the 
airforces, which had failed to arrive at all when needed, made their record for the 
day complete when a PBY strafed the crippled boats that were tagging along at the 
rear of the column. Meanwhile, the troops on the new beachhead were facing heavy 
going. Behind the beach the terrain was little more than a quagmire, and the artillery 
had to take up a position only a few dozen yards from the water's edge. When the 
boats withdrew, the Jap mortar fire was pulled in to the beach and casualties began 
to mount, including two officers and a sergeant of the boat control section of A Com-
pany. While the F Company detachment and the marines were laboring to lay 
cyclone fencing across the bog and thus to permit reasonable dispersion, the 533d 
medics were assisting the marine corpsmen in sheltering and administering to the 
1 
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wounded. By mid-afternoon, the marines had worked far enough inland to drive the 
J aps from their mortar positions and the wounded could be moved from their fox-
holes. Those who were urgently in need ofhospital facilities were loaded on the only 
two good LCMs and on one crippled LCM for an agonizing eleven-hour trip back to 
Iboki. Not a few died on the way. Some of these lives could have been saved if the 
PTs had been retained in the objective area as was urged by the 533d and agreed to 
by the task force commander and the PT squadron commander, but Seventh Fleet 
headquarters had flatly directed that PTs be used exclusively as escorts for the LCTs, 
and when the LCTs returned to Iboki, the PTs went with them. Some of this loss 
that could have so easily been avoided was decreased during the night when the PTs 
did run out from Iboki to intercept the incoming LCMs and expedite bringing to 
shore the most seriously wounded. But the saving of time was trifling as compared 
with what it could have been. It was later learned that the commander of the Jap 
garrison and his staff escaped by barge to Garove that night, and if some PTs had 
remained on patrol in the objective area, these J aps could have been killed or captured. 
The main convoy reached Iboki just after sunset, and the night was spent re-
fueling and servicing the boats and loading the reserve battalion and the remainder 
of the units that had made up the assault force. Departing shortly after dawn, this 
echelon arrived on the beach at r6oo, by which time the fighting had moved to the 
other side of the peninsula so that the resupply unloading was unopposed. On the 
second trip back to Iboki pressure had relaxed sufficiently so that all hands were given 
3 hours sleep- the first for some in over roo hours. The third load was principally 
bulk ammunition and rations, which took all day to take aboard. 
During the day the Division's plan to attack Garove in the Vitu Islands on March 
I 5 was discussed at length between the Boat Battalion commander and the com-
manding officer of the rst Marines. The mission would involve an 8o-mile run and a 
landing on beaches overlooked by cliffs whose caves concealed three inch guns. 
Naturally destroyers were to blast the way, yet even so, such an undertaking would be 
risky in view of the run-down condition of the boats and boat crews. So a promise was 
extracted from the assistant division commander that after the coming trip to Volupai 
all but four boats were to return to Borgen Bay to refit and get set for the Garove show. 
At o8oo the gth, the convoy arrived off Volupai beach to learn that despite 
prodigious efforts of marine and army engineers the four-mile road from the planta-
tion across the peninsula was a hopeless quagmire and that the two battalions cur-
rently driving the J aps from Talasea airstrip would starve if they depended on it as a 
main supply route. Though instructed to await a DE as an escort before rounding 
Cape Hollman and landing at Talasea, the convoy got under weigh immediately 
and, unescorted, made the 6o-mile passage into Talasea, the most important peace-
time port between Rabaul and Madang. 
The trip was not uneventful, for the last three boats of the convoy, two of which 
were carrying light tanks, came upon twojap barges at dusk offBulu-Murli and in a 
brief engagement, employing the tanks' 37 millimeter guns as well as the .50 calibre 
machine guns of the landing barges, caused one J ap boat to be abandoned and cap-
sized the other. 
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Leaving five LCMs to ferry equipment and supplies from Volupai around to 
Talasea, the rest of the boats returned 100 miles to Iboki next day to pick up the 
1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and take them back to Borgen Bay to stage for Garove. 
En route Bulu-Murli, off which the previous night's barge engagement had occurred, 
was given a thorough strafing from a range of 50 yards. Arriving shortly before mid-
night the boat group learned that Sixth Army had canceled the Garove operation 
and that the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was to "clean out" Linga Linga plantation 
and the surrounding territory as soon as possible. 
The Battalion with ten days supplies was loaded in 14 LCMs and 2 LCVPs 
shortly after daybreak, and the little convoy picked its way eastward through the 
uncharted coral reefs, arriving at a 1300 H hour. Shortly before noon the column 
of boats rounded into Eleonora Bay and formed into three waves for the assault. 
Brigadier General Sheppard who had just completed a cub reconnaissance flight over 
the objective dropped a message warning the boats to lay down heavy fire before 
landing. The maneuver was tricky, for the waves had to approach close and parallel 
to the beach, execute a "by the left flank", and land. Actually there was no opposition 
to the landing, but a few score yards inland the marines killed and captured several 
Japs. 
The next day the force split up into several small amphibian patrols, approxi-
mately a reinforced platoon to each, and set forth to scour the shores of the bay 
LCMs at Talasea deliver fresh bread, baked at Cape Gloucester 120 miles away, to the 
delight of men of the garrison who.had lived for several weeks on K and C rations. 
j 
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together with its dozen inhabited islands. The results were good: over a hundred 
Japs killed or captured. A particularly neat little operation occurred at Kandoka 
village on Riebeck Bay. Twenty-five well armed Japs occupied the village, which 
could not be attacked from the sea because of an impassable barrier reef 400 yards off 
shore. Thirty-odd marines were landed a mile or more from the village and ap-
proached it from the rear. The three boats feigned a frontal attack on the town, 
grounded on the reef and plastered the village with 6o mm mortar and machine gun 
fire. At a prearranged time the boats ceased fire and the marines, who had unde-
tected crawled within hand grenade range, rushed the village killing 24 and capturing 
I Jap without suffering a single casualty. The first river penetration on the Regiment's 
record occurred the same day when an LCVP and 2 LCMs bounced over the bar and 
skidded into the mangrove-walled Kulu River. No Japs were encountered, but three 
small barges were destroyed with rifle grenades. 
Operations were continued in the entire area between Iboki and the Willaumez 
Peninsula with small patrols, using landing craft for mobility, making quick raids on 
islands and villages wherever Jap stragglers were reported or suspected. Several 
hundred Japs were killed here in the next four weeks and substantial numbers of 
prisoners captured- the largest haul in the S WP A to date. A few groups, rear 
guard elements of the division withdrawing toward the Gazelle Peninsula, put up stout 
resistance, and occasionally marine patrols which were pinned down and in serious 
danger were evacuated by LCMs utilizing their full .50 calibre fire power to keep the 
Japs at bay. 
Meanwhile to the east the 5th Marines pushed down the Willaumez Peninsula 
and garrisoned San Remo plantation as the main outpost on the north shore of New 
Britain. The 533d's job became in the main one of supplying all forces east of Cape 
Gloucester - a total of about 5000 men. Day after day convoys of a dozen or more 
LCMs loaded supplies at Borgen Bay, departed at 16oo and after 120 miles of open-
water running put in to Talasea the following morning, discharging their cargo and 
returning with casualties or damaged equipment that night. Section leaders or 
coxswains soon took command of these runs, demonstrating seafaring acumen and 
piloting ability that amply justified their arduous training off the California coast. 
To render the 5th Marines self-mstaining on the water the 3d platoon of Com-
pany A and the maintenance section that had been in Rein Bay were ordered to estab-
lish a base at Talasea. The platoon set up its camp on a high headland near the 
jetty used for unloading, while the maintenance beach was established in a small cove 
close by. The other platoons ofthe company later took turns at this ideal assignment 
and most of the men of A Company will remember Talasea with its beauty and un-
usual climate as the only spot approaching a "paradise" in the tropics. The pic-
turesque harbor so well protected from all weather, the geysers steaming and spouting 
periodically along the shore, the hot streams that supplied baths and showers, the vast 
coconut plantations, the exquisite mission that overlooked the harbor, the steers and 
bananas on Garua Island, fishing that usually only liars experience- all these com-
bined to make a tour of duty at Talasea the next best thing to a leave in Australia. 
At Cape Gloucester itself there were ships to unload and short supply runs to 
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outlying radar stations. The maintenance work was divided between Borgen Bay, 
where the 56 3d platoon did all echelons of work on boats that were deadlined there, 
and Talasea where the A Company section did Ist, 2nd and 3rd echelon work on the 
boats disabled in that vicinity. Despite impressive operating hours of all boats and 
the ravages of coral, an average of over 8o% of the boats were kept in operational 
condition. 
Company F maintained a detachment at Talasea constructing roads and landing 
points in conjunction with the I 7th Marines. The balance of the Company operated 
initially with the Igth Seabees on general road maintenance and extension in the Cape 
Gloucester area. As the pressure of off-loading ships in the harbor steadily increased 
until the port company and the marine stevedoring detachments could not cope 
with it, the Company's manpower was diverted to unloading. By early April the 
entire responsibility for handling 6oo tons of cargo a day was placed on F Company, 
and it rose magnificently to the occasion, turning out I 3 hatch crews each day in 
addition to handling the control of the beach and operating the necessary heavy 
equipment. 
On April IO the Ist Marine Division was relieved from assignment to the SWPA 
and alerted for movement to the Solomons. The Marines were to be relieved regiment 
by regiment by the 40th Infantry Division, as promptly as possible; and so continuous 
pressure was put on the boats to pull in the intermediate marine garrisons and to 
bring back from Talasea the vehicles and impedimenta of the 5th Marines. 
Fortunately the Saidor Campaign was about over, and after much bickering 
between the commanding generals of the 40th and 32d Divisions, Sixth Army finally 
ordered C Company to proceed to Cape Gloucester, and the additional boats were 
most valuable in the exchange of garrisons which commenced on April 23. The 
navy transports refused to go to or near Talasea, so the entire I85th Regimental 
Scenes from Talasea-Left: Camp of 3d Platoon of Company A. Right: Steam rising from 
one of the geysers around the edge of Garua Harbor. 
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Combat Team was disembarked in Borgen Bay into LCMs many of which had just a 
few hours before arrived after a I 30-mile trip from Saidor. When the unit was all off 
the transports, the 6o LCMs took off in three convoys for Talasea and San Remo, 
150 miles away. The passengers thus were not set ashore at their destinations until 
nearly 24 hours after they climbed down the landing nets. The next day the 5th 
Marines piled aboard the same boats for their return to Borgen Bay. Certainly this 
was the most extensive "ship-to-shore" troop movement of the War. 
By the 5th of May the last of the convoys of transports had sailed with the last 
of the Marines, and the balance of C Company and the Maintenance Company had 
arrived at Cape Gloucester. For the first time since leaving California, the Boat 
Battalion was two-thirds intact, B Company still being in Australia. 
The next development in the campaign was the extension of American control 
of New Britain to include Cape Hoskins, which point the Marines had planned to 
assault, but were prevented by their sudden move. A plan for an amphibious attack 
by two battalions of the 185th RCT was worked out, including a preliminary attack 
on an island off the Cape to secure artillery positions dominating the airstrip, but 
reconnaissance patrols developed the fact that thejaps had withdrawn all but a small 
screening force, so the plan was dropped and a quick landing was made on May IO 
by landing craft from Talasea in conjunction with troops moving overland from San 
Remo. Casualties were confined to those caused by land mines and a handful of 
snipers. In an effort to learn what was behind the sudden evacuation ofthejaps, the 
53 3d proposed to 40th Division headquarters that a road block be established 2 o 
LSTs at Yellow Beach during the relief of the lst Marine Division by the 40th Infantry 
Division. 
1 
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miles beyond Cape Hoskins at a point where the coastal trail crossed the Kapiura 
River and became a vehicular road to Rabaul. This point was I 2 miles upstream 
from the sea, and impassable swamps to the north and mountainous jungles to the 
south turned it into a perfect bottleneck. The division commander agreed merely to 
a daylight reconnaissance using a handful of 533d men. By that time an LCM had 
been converted to a gunboat, not nearly as heavily armed as were the later such 
craft, but with a 37 millimeter and five machine guns, it carried substantial armament.* 
With an additional LCVP and LCM the gunboat pushed up the river, and although 
nerves were tense as the boats moved noisily up through the heavy jungle that would 
provide perfect cover for an ambush, no opposition developed. Upon reaching the 
crossing the party went ashore and reconnoitered a few miles in each direction. 
Only one Jap was killed, but enemy telephone lines were cut and several substantial 
rafts were destroyed, and this mission was the nearest approach to Rabaul made by 
ground forces for several months to come. It also pointed out the possibility of em-
ploying landing craft on rivers for rapid stabs into doubtful territory. 
Partly for purposes of training, the 40th Division had reoccupied Sag Sag and 
Aisega on the western end of the island, so that the 533d was now responsible for 
water-borne supply of an area that extended 210 miles from east to west. Fortunately, 
lighterage at Borgen Bay was not at that time heavy and an unusually efficient SCR 
284 radio net helped solve the problem of dispatching and control. 
At this time the 533d again requested permission to reconnoiter Garove which 
would be a valuable refuge for boats making the run to Talasea and San Remo now 
that the southeast monsoon season was approaching. IfGarove were not available, a 
crippled boat in a bad southeaster would have no refuge nearer than the Carolines. 
This request was passed by Division to Sixth Army which approved it, but limited 
the force to a platoon, and Division then turned it over to the 16oth Infantry. After 
several days of planning, the I 6oth determined that the project was too risky and 
*For a detailed descrip tion of these " LCMGs" see p ages 282-288. 
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that in any event 35 miles off shore was too far for small landing craft! Thoroughly 
fed up a small party of 533d boatmen on May 27 embarked on an LCM gunboat, 
made the 8o-mile trip, landed, and, after determining from the natives that the J aps 
had departed "two moons" ago, collected a fine haul of souvenirs and prepared several 
trucks for later removal. Upon their return they learned that the mission had been 
assigned to the I85th Infantry and that strict orders had been received that 533d 
craft were not to approach the island until it had been cleared by the infantry. 
The story's sequel was that the RAAF studying photographs discovered that 
certain trucks had "moved" and plastered the island with bombs. The I 85th studied 
and planned and finally after four weeks dispatched a Kanaka in a sailing canoe to 
obtain a report. To the considerable embarrassment of the 533d who had kept the 
secret within the outfit, he reported that "Jap palla go three moon (ago) white master 
come one moon (ago)." Late in June a landing of infantry was finally carried out 
and Garove was then "officially" recaptured. 
Orders received on June I alerted all but one boat company of the 533d for 
movement to Aitape 440 miles to the westward. Before departure the I08th RCT 
had to be moved in LCMs with all their vehicles and equipment I 20 miles to Arawe 
to relieve the I I 2th Cavalry. Several convoys including boats of the 54 3d were 
required for this move, and the boats encountering the full force of the southeast 
monsoon in Dampier Strait and along the southwest coast of the island took a terrific 
beating. Ramps worn thin by lack of paint and abrasion on sand were smashed in by 
the steep breaking seas. Men and equipment were drenched for hours as the boats 
struggled to make good 3 knots against the wind and sea. One boat was lost - the 
only sinking during all operations of the 53 3d - because her bilge pumps gave out and 
her battered ramp let the seas in at will. All personnel were removed before she 
went down, but the general's foot-lockers, jeep, and ice chest full of beer necessarily 
became part of the contents of Davy Jones' locker. Part of the I08th was carried 
Garove Island's 
north shore - spot 
where l85th Infan-
try eventually made 
its "assault" land-
ing. 
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beyond Gasmata to Montagu Harbor on the south coast thus extending the opera-
tional routes of the Battalion in New Britain waters to well over 400 miles. 
Finally, after a hectic struggle to repair the battered C Company boats, Boat 
Battalion Headquarters Company, C Company, and the 3d platoon of the newly 
named 1461st Engineer Maintenance Company loaded aboard their landing craft on 
June 22 and at dawn the next day took off on the 220-mile run to Kronprinzhafen on 
the New Guinea coast between Madang and Hansa Bay. There they refueled and 
followed by a 2d ESB convoy proceeded out around the islands offWewak and arrived 
at their new base - Aitape. F Company sweated out several weeks waiting for heavy 
shipping that never showed up and eventually at the end of August was moved to 
Aitape on two convoys ofB Company LCMs. 
A Company remained based at Borgen Bay all summer, with a platoon at 
Talasea, and easily handled the required water traffic, which task was made simpler 
by the laissez-faire policy of the 40th Division. By this time its area was well set up; 
eggs, butter, meat, and bread were no longer mere words; and moving pictures 
operated on schedule. So it was not an uncomfortable nor an unprofitable stay which 
A Company put in during the summer and early fall on New Britain. In September 
a boat company of the 594th EB&SR relieved A Company of nearly all work, and it 
concentrated on readying itself for its next assignment. A so% replacement of boats 
was accomplished by exchanging worn-out craft at Milne Bay, and after the usual 
numerous false alarms, Company A finally left New Britain on November 14 to rejoin 
the Regiment at Aitape. 
CHAPTER IX 
Said or 
T URNING the 1944 calendar back to February, we find that advance elements 
of D and E Companies departed with C Company on the 24th for Saidor. The 
run from Cape Cretin to Saidor was a little over 100 miles and was accomplished 
uneventfully. The balance of Companies D and E and Headquarters Company, 
Shore Battalion arrived on LSTs on the morning ofFebruary 28. It was raining hard 
when the troops went ashore and continued to do so for most of the stay at Saidor. 
Nevertheless a camp site was selected for the Shore Battalion along the beach between 
the airstrip and the fuel dump, and the area was cleared and tents erected in rapid 
time. 
C Company, requiring a harbor for its small boats, found an area a few miles 
to the east where a long coral reef furnished nearly sufficient shelter for its anchorage. 
Although the anchorage was usable, the area ashore was not. It was swampy, and 
perfumed by decomposed Jap bodies. Nevertheless, tents were erected and steps 
were taken to create the comforts that were even at this early time known to contribute 
so much to efficient operation of an organization. In a conference with the Chief of 
Staff of the 32d Division, it was learned that the Shore Battalion would relieve the 
Shore Battalion of the 542d EB&SR and operate the harbor under the general direc-
tion of the division G-4 section. To it were attached Company B of the 542d EB&SR 
and the Amphibious Truck Platoon from the 2d ESB, and in addition assistance was 
to be given in harbor operations by the 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion, and miscel-
laneous labor from the Division and the Air Corps. C Company's LCMs were to be 
assigned primarily to combat and resupply missions, but such as could be spared from 
those duties, together with two LCTs, three barges, and some DUKWs, were to furnish 
lighterage for the harbor. All base communications and beach defense were the 
responsibility of the Shore Battalion, as were the construction and maintenance of the 
beach and dumps and the road between them, and the supply of water to troops in 
the adjacent areas. In case these tasks did not keep the two-company Battalion fully 
occupied, it was directed to furnish the division engineer with engineering equipment 
and operators whenever called upon. 
This mission was anything but glamorous, yet, in the estimation of many, it was 
the most difficult assignment the Shore Battalion had during its overseas duty. The 
entire operation was bogged down in mud; the initial supply dumps were inac-
cessible, and the road from the beach to the airstrip and to task force headquarters 
was little more than a canal of mud. There was no room to work, except for a much 
too narrow strip of beach; the beach was difficult, and coral patches made it very 
hard on LCMs. Spare parts for engineer equipment and for boats were not available, 
although the operating conditions were such that repeated breakdowns were inevit-
able. To this should be added the fact that the 32d Division was an extremely stern 
taskmaster, and that the Japs were bombing the area every night. 
Upon arrival the Shore Battalion discovered that all classes of supplies were 
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dangerously low, and so beach operations could not be suspended to give an oppor-
tunity to construct a road or to enlarge the working area at the beach. Traffic had 
to be kept moving even though tractors at work on the road had to stop frequently 
to tow vehicles that were mired. At one time the supply of POL was so low and roads 
were so bad that a D-8 towing a sled was assigned to remove fuel from the initial dump, 
although it could pull only three drums at a time. It was obvious that supplies could 
not cross the beach in any substantial quantity until the beach itself and the roadways 
had been greatly improved. This was the first and primary mission of the Shore 
Battalion and by working all hours of the day and night with all possible equipment, 
a gravel pit was opened, from which the gravel was hauled in trucks and dumped on 
the roadbed as D-8s with carry-alls removed the mud. Hand labor opened up drain-
age-ways, and slowly but surely the difficult problem began to give way before 
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determined efforts to solve it. Finally, when the weather broke for a few days, an 
excellent all-weather road was completed. 
With an exit from the beach to the dumps assured, the next necessity was work-
ing-room at the beach, and a swamp area was filled in for a parking place for trucks, 
and an office for the beachmaster and port director was built. Two other beaches 
were in use at this time from which supplies were sent to elements of the Division 
which could not be supplied by road, and time was even found to improve these 
beaches. 
Meanwhile C Company had also been put to work at once. No sooner were the 
kitchen and maintenance sections unloaded, than orders were received that boat 
operations would begin the following day. This was the first of 368 missions which 
were run from this base and, ironically, the first mission was a fishing expedition for 
two general officers- at a time when every effort was necessary to get the boats in 
condition after their long run and to establish adequate living and working con-
ditions! 
Immediately upon arrival, rumors were heard of an assault landing, and on the 
28th of February the rumors were confirmed. At this time the 32d Division was 
driving the Japs west along the coast, while Aussies were driving them inland along 
the Markham Valley. An escape from the valley was located a few miles behind the 
Jap line of resistance on the coast. It was necessary, therefore, to cut off the escape 
. 
" 
The battalion landing 
force assigned to 
strike Yalau Planta-
tion holds "dry run" 
off Yamai, New 
Guinea. 
of the J aps from the Markham Valley and to cut off those who were retreating west-
ward along the coast, and the spot chosen to plug this leak was the plantation of 
Y alau. Several night reconnaissances of the beach were made by PT boats, and the 
plans were carefully laid. Command afloat was assigned to the 542d's boat battalion 
executive as he was the senior amphibian officer, and the first three waves were com-
prised of boats of Company B, 542d EB&SR. The mission of Company C, 53 3d was 
to land the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and gth waves and to handle the resupply of the 
reinforced battalion making the attack. The embarkation area was Y amai, located 
approximately a third of the way from Saidor to Y alau and not far behind the point 
where the 32d Division was engaging the retreating Japs. 
On the day prior to the landing, a dry run was made to assure that the landing 
would go off with no hitches. Boats were loaded with troops, equipment and supplies, 
and after a short run to sea the troops unloaded again, leaving the equipment and 
supplies aboard. At dusk the troops reloaded, and the convoy started for Yalau in 
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good order. Instead of using an army navigation boat, as the 533d did in the Talasea 
operation, the flotilla commander placed a PT boat in the guide position and this 
resulted in considerable confusion, for the PT could not run slowly enough for the 
heavily laden landing craft. The PT would run at 8 knots for a half a mile or so and 
then wait for the 6 knot landing craft to close up; as a result in the dark the waves 
were constantly running through each other. To add to the problems the sea was 
rough, so much so that at times the hubs of the jeeps in the wells of the LCVPs were 
under water. Nevertheless, none of the boats were lost, a fact which reflected great 
credit on the coxswains, one of whom received an official commendation for his work 
that night. At dawn a heavy aerial bombardment took place, and the PTs and land-
ing craft showered the beach with fire. 
The Japs, however, had anticipated the attack and had disappeared, and so 
the landing can be credited chiefly as valuable experience. The boat crews learned 
A combat patrol lands at daybreak behind the enemy lines from LCVPs in 
Astrolabe Bay. 
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much from it, and one particular occurrence is worth reporting; as two boats moved 
in to the beach in their first combat landing, considerable amusement was caused 
when it was noted that coffee was boiling on their poop decks. 
After the resupply was completed, the temporary base at Yamai was abandoned, 
and all the boats returned to the original base. The demand for boats had now 
increased, for in addition to the lightering, the coastal runs had been tremendously 
increased, both in number and in extent. Initially there was considerable confusion 
in boat dispatching caused by too many different agencies ordering boats, by com-
munications difficulties, total lack of maps and charts, and general inexperience, and 
C Company was subjected to a good deal of criticism because the boats frequently 
arrived at the wrong place at the wrong time and in the wrong number. A change in 
personnel, laying a telephone line to the C Company base, and simplifying the 
channels of orders affecting boat operations soon rectified this situation. 
Back at Saidor the improved working area and roads had produced a greatly 
increased rate of discharge. To meet the shortage of hatch crews Companies D 
and E were required to train additional winch operators, and though every available 
man in the Battalion was put to work, still more men were needed. Through the 
G- r section of Division it was discovered that there were a few men who could operate 
ships' winches among the divisional units, and they were placed on special duty, which 
enabled the beachmaster to . organize and train four hatch crews from a tank de-
stroyer battalion and thus to keep the cargo moving an extra shift. Some 36,rgo 
tons of supplies were unloaded at Saidor during March and April, with a daily ton-
nage ranging from practically zero in the early days to a record in April of r,540 tons. 
No records of supplies sent up the coast are available, but from the number ofboats 
dispatched on such missions to forward stations it is estimated that such shipments 
averaged 50 tons a day during March. 
With increased demand and increased tonnage C Company began to run into 
maintenance difficulties, and on the 23d ofMarch an all-time low was reached when 
only nine boats were operating out of seventy-four assigned. This frightful state of 
affairs was the inevitable result of circumstances beyond the Company's control. Its 
fleet included not only boats that had been abused back at Goodenough and run 
hard daily for over three months, but also contained a score of wrecks that Company 
B of the 542d had turned over to C Company for cannibalization rather than risk 
moving back to Finschhafen when it was relieved. Replacement parts were short 
throughout the Theatre and what few there were were being hoarded by the 2d 
Brigade for pending critical operations. Finally, the conditions under which the 
boats were forced to operate were unspeakably bad. The beaches were continually 
pounded by surf and consisted in large measure of boulders. The impossibility of 
keeping bulk-loaded boats from broaching on the beach dictated the use of mobile 
loading - driving trucks empty aboard the LCM, loading the truck at shipside with 
a bare 3 tons, and landing the loaded truck from the LCM. This meant many more 
beachings per day to obtain the same tonnage and put particular strain on the ramp 
winch mechanisms which at this period contained many inherent defects. 
Part of the trouble lay in the inadequacy of the maintenance beach for hauling 
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out boats regardless of the tide; so Shore Battalion equipment and operators began the 
construction of the first of many semi-artificial beaches the Regiment was to build. 
At the same time the worst of the wrecks were condemned and stripped to obtain a 
meager supply of parts for the others. But division headquarters could understand 
only the superficial figures and waged a futile campaign of recrimination directing 
the Shore Battalion commander to relieve the two senior boat officers for wilful 
destruction of government property and preferring charges against seven coxswains 
who obeyed their Company commander's orders to bring damaged boats back to the 
base rather than aggravate easily repairable trouble by making additional landings. 
Prompt and vigorous representations by the commanders of the Boat Battalion, 
Regiment and Brigade caused reconsideration of this hasty action. The real cure 
came shortly thereafter as a few critically needed parts were released, and superhuman 
labors of mechanics and specialists of the C Company maintenance section and the 
platoon of the 563d conquered the deadline. By April g the Company was able to 
turn out 3 I of its 40 LCMs and 7 of its I o LCVPs which is not an impressive record by 
later standards but was a vast improvement over the past. As an example of the strain 
Loading miscellaneous gear aboard LCMs from a % -ton truck. 
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on the maintenance personnel, in a thirty-day period 274 propellers and 196 shafts 
were changed, and 310 ramp belts were repaired; .this was, of course, in addition to 
other work on a similar scale, and illustrates the difficulties which were met at this 
station. 
For both Battalions the period at Saidor was a very hard school, but the lessons 
learned were learned well and never forgotten. From a dismal start progress was 
made to very substantial accomplishments which in turn led to a record in the future 
of which the Regiment can always be proud. The pressure on lighterage, which 
caused such difficulty, seemed puzzling at the time to many, but it was later learned 
Test firing the after "fifty" on an LCM. 
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that the task force was under similar pressure to build up a supply base for the air-
borne supply of the Aitape-Hollandia task force with which the Regiment was later 
to work. 
In the middle of April the 40th Division and the 32d Division engaged in a tug-
of-war for the services of C Company; the former persuaded Sixth Army to issue 
orders under which C Company departed for New Britain, but the 32d Division 
secured orders first countermanding the move and then directing the Company to 
move less one platoon. C Company, however, had already moved but had been forced 
to leave behind nine LCMs and an LCV, which were in such bad condition that they 
could not undertake the trip, and the necessary maintenance men to put these boats 
into satisfactory operating condition. As a result of the conflicting orders this rear 
echelon became hostages for the platoon and at the same time was called upon to run 
some missions. When the 32d Division finally came to realize that nothing was being 
accomplished by keeping the hostages, and also as the result of some radio messages 
Part of the Shore Battalion's camp at Saidor. 
from Boat Battalion headquarters, which made rather free use of the persuasive name 
of Krueger, the rear echelon at last obtained leave to proceed to New Britain, arriving 
there during the first week in May. 
The Shore Battalion carried on at Saidor for a little longer, profiting in efficiency 
of operation from the headaches suffered in the early days. As of the 2gth of April it 
was relieved from attachment to the Saidor Task Force and assisted the Navy in 
loading out the 32d Division, and was relieved in turn from its beach work by an 
Australian docks operating company. On the 8th of May the Battalion, less F 
Company, consisting of 560 men and 32 officers, boarded the Liberty ship William N . 
Byers and joined a convoy of approximately sixty vessels supposedly bound for Aitape, 
where the task force assigned to seize Wakde Island was assembling. The Byers 
stumbled out ofher convoy and into another one during the night of the roth, arriving 
to everyone's surprise at Hollandia. As soon as the error was acknowledged, the ship 
put to sea again and arrived at Aitape on the 13th ofMay. 
CHAPTER X 
Aitape 
GENERAL MAcARTHUR'S operations to shatter thejap main line of resistance in Northeast New Guinea and the Bismarcks were successfully concluded with 
the seizure of the Admiralties early in March. The J aps were isolated in eastern 
New Britain and New Ireland, and their main New Guinea force, the XVIII Army, 
was feverishly bracing itself in the Wewak-Hansa Bay area to receive the next Ameri-
can onslaught. But once in the enemy backfield General MacArthur had no interest 
in assaulting J ap defensive strongholds. His eye was fixed on the end zone - the 
Philippines. H~s interest in New Guinea was confined solely to securing necessary 
staging areas and air bases, and the less J aps protecting these the better he liked it. 
Hollandia, at almost the center of New Guinea's north coast, and Biak Island, three-
fourths of the way from Milne Bay to the western tip were prize base areas and yet the 
Japs, lulled into security because they were so far behind the front lines, left them 
feebly garrisoned. Every effort was made to convince the J aps that the next American 
objective was Hansa Bay and Wewak, including the planting of faked diaries on life 
rafts dropped from planes attacking this locality, and the Jap commander bit-
hook, line and sinker. H e stripped Aitape and Hollandia to concentrate three first-
class divisions near Wewak, collected and rallied the units retreating from Saidor and 
the Markham Valley, and confidently expected to repulse the American assault and 
avenge himself for a long series of defeats in eastern New Guinea. 
In the darkness of April 22 the largest amphibious force yet assembled in the 
SWP A suddenly appeared over the northern horizon one hundred to two hundred 
and fifty miles behind Wewak and landed virtually without opposition at Aitape, 
The beach at Aitape was a narrow 
strip between the surf and the 
jungle. Scene from the D day landing 
April 22, 1944 . 
• 
At Humboldt Bay, Hollandia, doughboys of the initial landing force pass wreckage of 
Jap equipment as they seek a trail leading inland. 
Hollandia, and Tanahmerah Bay. This great end run at one stroke moved the 
Sixth Army nearly four hundred miles nearer the Philippines. Since previous 
amphibious attacks had never bitten off more than one hundred miles at a time, it is 
small wonder that the Jap forces were utterly bewildered and unprepared. Taking 
advantage of his initial success, MacArthur pressed the offensive using one of the two 
combat teams that had landed at Aitape to attack Toem and Wakde Island, a hundred 
miles beyond Tanahmerah Bay, and the balance of the 41st Division to seize Biak 
Island. It was as these attacks were being teed up that the 533d Shore Battalion 
came into the picture. Its move from Saidor had been timed to bring it to Aitape in 
time to load out with the r63d Infantry for Toem and Wakde, and so the men were 
informed when the Byers dropped her hook in Aitape Roads on May r 3· Immediately 
the staff began making hasty plans while the troops, except those needed to unload 
the ship, marched to a temporary bivouac near the beach. Late that afternoon, 
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however, it became apparent that the Battalion's heavy equipment could not possibly 
be unloaded in time to meet the loading schedule set up by the Wakde attack force. 
Accordingly the 593d EB&SR's Shore Battalion, which had taken part in the initial 
attack on Aitape, was assigned to the Wakde task force and the 533d Battalion's 
mission was changed to relieving the 593d and operating the Aitape beach installa-
tions. This was naturally a bitter disappointment for all ranks as they felt long over-
due for a combat assignment, but as events turned out the erratic navigation of the 
Byers which had kept them out of the Wakde show actually was responsible for their 
later participation in two of the three biggest operations in the Philippines. The 
593d Shore Battalion seemingly getting the good break was in fact heading up a blind 
alley that was to lead to many boring months on Noemfoor Island and no chance to 
get into action after July 1944· 
The mission of the force at Aitape was purely defensive: locally it was to protect 
the intermediate airstrip and, when and if the Jap XVIII Army reacted to its 
predicament, it was to repulse any effort by the Japs to move against Hollandia. 
In other words the huge base installations at Hollandia were to be kept free to prepare 
for the invasion of the Philippines while the troops at Aitape were to h<?ld the mainjap 
forces at a safe distance. Early in May the Aitape garrison consisted of the 32d Divi-
sion with normal attachments, and the Shore Battalion despite its difficulties at Saidor 
had sufficiently impressed division headquarters so that it received a warm welcome. 
As the Jap Army slowly recovered from its shock and faced about to attack to the 
westward, the Aitape garrison was steadily reinforced to meet the threat. But this 
involved many weeks, for the Japs, harassed by day by the RAAF and by night by the 
PTs, had an extremely difficult job moving 5o,ooo men and equipment a hundred 
miles over the miserable trails. The major battle which will be known to history as 
the Battle of the Driniumor River did not begin in earnest until mid-July. 
To return to the r 3th of May, the disconsolate Shore Battalion was allotted an old 
· J ap ration dump for its camp site. This spot had not been touched since the J aps 
abruptly abandoned their breakfast three weeks before and required several days of 
clearing and burying garbage; so the battalion commander decided to keep the men 
in their temporary bivouac using }1ngle hammocks and emergency rations while the 
new permanent camp was being established. Between the two areas lay an ammuni-
tion dump with both J ap and American shells piled in not too well dispersed bays. 
The second night after the Battalion debarked, this dump caught fire, whether by 
accident or by the hand of a J ap infiltrator will never be known, and soon was a raging 
inferno. Exploding shells and whining bullets made the temporary bivouac and the 
main unloading beach untenable for twenty-four hours and isolated the men who were 
working at the permanent camp site. Liberty ships in the roadstead hastily weighed 
anchor and moved out of range of the shells. The men working on the beach removed 
supplies to safety and carried on unloading activities on a new beach. When the 
ammunition fire burned out, the Battalion lost no time in establishing itself in the 
permanent camp site. Tents were erected, kitchens and latrines installed and screened 
against the flies. Water works were installed including showers and water piped to 
all company kitchens. 
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The principal mission of the Shore Battalion was the same old one of getting 
cargo out of the holds of the ships and into the appropriate task force dumps. At-
tached to the Battalion were a port company, a DUKW platoon, Company A ofthe 
593d EB&SR with forty LCMs, and a few LCTs. Extra labor and trucks were fur-
nished by division troops on the basis of daily requisitions by the Shore Battalion com-
mander. During the first few months relatively calm waters and dry weather made 
for smooth harbor operations and good tonnages, with the average daily off-loading 
amounting to 1200 tons in June and 1428 tons in July. The work was handled by 
three six-hour shifts except when round-the-clock operations were necessitated by criti-
cal shortages ashore. Experience proved that as much if not more tonnage could be 
The Shore Battalion's Can"Ip at Aitape. 
discharged by a given unit in this way in 18 hours than in a full 24 hours because eight 
hour shifts lost so much time in on-the-job feeding. In addition the shortage of 
supervising officers with only a small battalion staff to draw from made this shorter 
work day more efficient over a sustained period of many months. 
The engineer platoons and their equipment were steadily employed, but as was 
generally the case, their work consisted of a great variety of small jobs. One of the 
most difficult jobs, and one that required all dozers, was building LST ramps. New 
ramps had to be constructed for each echelon, for the surf made it impossible to build 
permanent jetties. They cleared and drained all dump areas, maintained all roads 
leading to and within dump areas, prepared beach roads and parking areas for out-
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loading task forces, assisted with the construction of the airstrip and operated a gravel 
pit for the I 18th Engineers. 
The Boat Battalion less A and B Companies, which had left New Britain for 
Aitape on the 23d of June, on the morning of the 26th caught its first glimpse of its 
new station, Seleo Island, a small island located three miles from the mainland and 
furnishing part of the meager shelter for Aitape Roads. As the convoy neared its 
Left: "Mobile loading" of a B Company LCM and a DUKW alongside a Liberty ship. 
Right: The beach at Lemieng, Aitape, was cleared and widened to handle heavy traffic. 
future home it passed hard by Angel Island, which was built up solidly with native 
huts, and the souvenir hunters acquired a new interest in life. The convoy lay to off 
the western shore of Seleo while a reconnaissance group went ashore. The island was 
small, and there was nothing to be found except the remnants of a J ap fuel dump, 
which had been efficiently bombed and strafed, and several wrecked Jap landing 
barges. A fringing reef from 40 to 100 yards wide surrounded the island, except for a 
small break at the northwest corner, which was occupied by the maintenance platoon 
attached to Company A of the 593d. It was at once apparent that the most serious 
problem would be a maintenance beach, and the only feasible solution was to build 
one out over the coral reef some ninety yards or more. With the experience from 
Saidor and New Britain, the work of building the maintenance beach and setting up 
camp proceeded smoothly. 
Left and upper right: Dipper stick filling dump trucks in borrow pit at Aitape. 
Louer right: A section of the arterial highway that eventually ran through the base atAitape. 
As usual the Battalion was informed that lightering would begin within the first 
twenty-four hours and the first six boats to be unloaded were dispatched to the main-
land to start a monotonous grind that was to last for six months. The beach where 
the lighterage was taking place looked ominous; the flat and shallow underwater 
contour promised considerable trouble for propellers, strut bearings, rudders, and 
water pumps, and so work on the maintenance beach was pushed forward with all 
possible speed. The lightering commitment was raised rapidly, and throughout its 
stay on Seleo the Battalion furnished the beachmaster all boats that were not either 
disabled or engaged in tactical missions. The boatmen were glad to find the eighteen-
hour day in effect, but of course this meant no six-hour shift for them. As long as 
there were enough serviceable boats they split the day into nine-hour tours, but the 
trip to and from the beach and delays at the end of each period extended this duty to a 
good twelve hours a day. As the pressure increased and the old boats began to col-
lapse under the strain, the boats that were fit to run lightered the full eighteen hours, 
which barely permitted a brief return to the island base once each night. 
During May and June the tactical situation shaped up about as expected. The 
32d Division established outposts of about company strength at Babieng and Y aka-
mul and an outer defensive line along the Driniumor River. Preparing for the worst, 
it laid out a final defense line including only a strip a few hundred yards deep running 
from the Nigia to the Raihu Rivers. This line barely took in the vital Tadji airstrip 
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Scenes from Seleo Island: Left to right, top to bottom: The anchorage; carryall building beach over coral 
shelf; hauling an LCM on the artificial beach; vistas of C Company's bivouac; the island's only highway. 
and left so little room to maneuver that the main hospital was moved out to Tumleo 
Island. The first inkling of the approaching onslaught came shortly after the Shore 
Battalion arrived, when the outpost company at Babieng radioed during the middle 
of the night that it had been by-passed and cut off by a large body of Japs. The 
Division decided to withdraw the company by sea rather than start a fight I 5 miles 
from its main lines. Four LCMs of Company A, 593d, and two LCTs escorted by two 
593d LCMGs effected the rescue without loss. 
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Knowledge that the J aps had substantial forces so far along the trail from Wewak 
to Aitape caused prompt acceleration of work on the main defences. The Shore 
Battalion not only cleared fields of fire and constructed coconut-log pill boxes and gun 
emplacements throughout the beachhead but was also assigned a sector of its own on 
the line. Under the direction of Brigadier General Stark of the 43d Division, which 
was en route to Aitape, the western half of the perimeter was assigned for the time be-
ing to available engineer troops on the possibility that the J aps might skirt the eastern 
defenses and strike at the "rear" of the beachhead. The Battalion's defense platoon, 
well reinforced, selected and organized its position in jungle so heavy that its 3 7 mm 
guns had to be dismantled and carried into position by hand. 
By the end of June the Jap 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions had arrived within 
striking distance of the American positions. Had they attacked at once using their 
entire strength it is not at all unlikely that they would have broken through and put 
the Americans in a desperate position. But as usual they dallied, thrusting here and 
there and driving our outposts back to Niumen Creekjust east of the Driniumor. At 
the same time the Aitape task force was growing rapidly. Control passed to XI 
Corps under Major General Hall, and the I I 2th Cavalry Regiment and the I 24th 
RCT ofthe 31st Division arrived to build up the Corps, while the 43d Division began 
to come in from New Zealand. Though still outnumbered, General Hall on July g 
decided to throw theJaps off balance and at least gain some time by having the 124th 
RCT make an amphibious attack at Naparake behind the flank of the Jap 20th 
Division. 
D day was set for July 13, and lightering operations were to be suspended while 
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all available craft of Company C and the 59 3d's Company A and the LCT group moved 
the combat team 20 miles down the coast for a surprise dawn attack, heralded only by 
a quick air strike and PT and LCMG strafing. Most of the Shore Battalion was 
attached to the landing force, and all 53 3d men eagerly prepared themselves and their 
equipment for the first amphibian assault in which both battalions would perform 
their standard functions as a team. Unfortunately--or perhaps fortunately-the Japs 
struck first, throwing several battalions across the Driniumor during the night of 
July I o- I r. Several I 27th Infantry outposts were cut off east of the Driniumor, and 
the I I 2th Cavalry at Afua near the inland extremity of the line was also for a time 
encircled. During the I I th plans for the attack on N aparake were pushed in the 
belief that it might be possible to force the Japs to withdraw in order to meet this 
attack, but when the seriousness of the Jap penetration was fully realized, the opera-
tion was called off, and the I 24th RCT hastily moved up the beach in trucks, DUKWs 
and on foot to Tiver to hold the point oftheJaps while the I 27th Infantry was directed 
to abandon most of its Driniumor defense line and retreat to Chalogi Creek, about 
halfway back to the final defense line. The fierceness of the fighting meant an unex-
pectedly heavy volume of artillery fire, and it was soon realized that unless unloading 
was stepped up the ammunition dumps would soon be dangerously low. So, for the 
bulk of the 53 3d, the direct result of this break-through was to put their noses back on 
the lightering and cargo handling grindstone, and to turn the crank harder than ever 
before. 
A minority ofthe 533d, principally men assigned to LCMGs, DUKWs and some 
LCMs saw considerable excitement in the next few weeks. The very afternoon that 
the attack on Naparake was canceled a cub plane spotted one of the lost platoons 
of the I 27th Infantry trying to cut its way out to the beach beyond the Driniumor. 
At that time four LCMs guarded by two LCMGs had just finished delivering supplies 
to the new front lines. The boats quickly set off down the coast taking their course 
from the cub plane. The pilot got slightly mixed up and led the boats toward the 
near side of the wooded point at the river mouth, and only by luck did one of the 
LCMGs, swinging wide on the turn, spot a colored smoke grenade several hundred 
yards to the east of the point. This boat immediately altered course and with some 
difficulty signaled the rest of the craft to follow. As the first gunboat drew near, 
doughboys could be seen running out of the woods and plunging over the low sand 
dunes while puffs of sand indicated plenty of J ap small arms fire. The boat did not 
wait for the others but beached immediately, and as the first doughboy scrambled 
aboard, the infantry platoon leader backed out of the woods spraying his tommy gun 
to indicate there were no more Americans to come. The gunboat's machine guns 
then began to rake the woods, and as the men closed in around the gunboat helping 
the wounded aboard, the 37mm piece belched cannister and HE into the trees less 
than 25 yards from the water's edge. The Japs were content to remain in the jungle, 
and though the gunboat was somewhat peppered with holes, no casualties were sus-
tained. The other boats arrived as it was retracting with its cargo of grateful and 
exhausted soldiers, and the little fleet gave the scene an intense strafing before retiring. 
The gunboats took station that night offTiver as an extension of the perimeter, a 
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function they were to perform for the rest of the summer. Not only did this afford 
the troops ashore security from attack from the sea or along the beach itself, but it 
also put a half dozen machine guns in excellent position to enfilade any banzai 
attack against the perimeter's first 100-150 yards. Early on the 13th the entire 
American force counterattacked to re-establish the line on the west bank of the 
Driniumor River. Along the beach the attack was spearheaded by a platoon of tank 
destroyers with the gunboats slightly ahead and as near the beach as the surf would 
permit (30-50 yards) . Radio contact over the SCR 300 linked the boats with the 
TDs and the rifle company that was following immediately behind. Every thicket 
and group of thatched huts was raked with machine guns and HE before the dough-
boys moved ahead. When snipers in tree tops made a nuisance of themselves the 
boats' 37s blew the treetop to pieces. All went well until about noon. Anamo had 
been recaptured and an obstinate group of Japs in Chakila was being plastered with 
small arms. Suddenly enemy artillery began to rake the beach. No one could see 
just where it was coming from, and seized by mild panic both tankers and doughboys 
hastily withdrew more than half a mile. · The boats quickly received full attention 
from the concealed Jap battery, and unable to discover its whereabouts they too 
adopted "evasive tactics" and scrambled to the westward at their full seven knots. 
A cub plane soon spotted the Jap battery 300 yards from where the boats had been, 
and our artillery silenced it. That afternoon the ground was regained by the same 
methodical methods with the additional support of 4.5-inch rockets from one of 
the LCMGs, and by nightfall the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, had dug in along the 
lower reaches of the Driniumor with the gunboats, unable to cross the shallow bar, 
standing guard at the river mouth ready to spray the surface of the river should the 
Japs attempt to counterattack across it. The units farther inland had not made 
such easy progress, and through gaps between companies the J aps launched a counter-
attack breaking through to the sea again three miles to the westward in the vicinity of 
our artillery positions. A savage battle raged throughout the evening with two 533d 
LCMGs dueling with Jap machine guns at point blank range. Here again the con-
centrated fire power of these improvised craft was decisive, and the rain ofHE 20 mm 
and 37 mm shells was more than the Jap party could stand, so it withdrew into the 
jungle, and the tenuous line of communications along the beach was re-established. 
For the rest of July things were relatively quiet on the seaward extremity of the 
line as units farther inland, dependent primarily on supplies dropped by air, struggled 
up to their assigned positions on the river and thejap units behind them were mopped 
up. Each night the LCMGs maintained their defensive station and during daylight 
made short runs forward to strafe or dump rockets on reported Jap concentrations. 
Though the J aps in battalion strength attacked the river line nightly for more than 
two weeks, they made no attempt to cross it near its mouth. Supplies and replace-
ments for the forward troops were brought up daily by LCMs, and express service 
was maintained by DUKWs which could make excellent time along the beach and 
swim around the unfordable creek mouths. 
During this period one small action involving the boats occurred, and though it 
was the only costly such encounter, it was completely unplanned and unnecessary. 
Top: A Shore Battalion DUK\V rushes reinforcements from Aitape towards the Driniumor. 
Bottom: Treadway bridge across a slew near Anan1o. 
Early one morning an ambulance and a jeep carrying a full colonel got their land-
marks mixed up and at low tide drove across the Driniumor, not only unaware that 
they were proceeding into enemy territory but also ignoring the orders to halt given by 
the local platoon leader. The infantry commander requested that the 593d LCMG 
which was standing by overtake the vehicles and order them to return, which seemed 
rather a hopeless task since the gunboat could only make 8 knots and the vehicles were 
by then far ahead. The gunboat picked up a cargo LCM that had just discharged a 
load of supplies and proceeded down the beach· until both vehicles were in view. 
Suddenly, near Parakovio, the ambulance stopped, and the driver started running 
back along the beach. Through the glasses it could be seen that the ambulance had 
been hit by small arms fire. This apparently finally convinced the colonel, and the 
jeep began to turn around. Halfway around, however, it bogged down, and the 
driver and the colonel evacuated promptly. While the gunboat moved in on the 
exposed flank, ready to open fire when a target appeared, the cargo LCM grounded, 
and the three men climbed aboard and headed back for safe territory with no worse 
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effects than the loss of the vehicles. The colonel, however, soon recovered his nerve 
and after transferring to a DUKW to continue homeward himself, he ordered the 
boats to return up the beach in order to salvage the jeep and the ambulance. A party 
of troops came aboard, and the boats headed back to the beach at the same spot where 
the men had been picked up. The second trip into the beach, however, was fatal, 
for as the cargo LCM reached the outer breakers a 75 mm gun, well-concealed but 
close to the beach, opened fire on it, getting <;1 direct hit that burst in the cargo well 
among the troops. The gunboat opened fire and strafed the beach, searching for 
the hidden gun, and although no damage was apparently done to the enemy gun, its 
fire was drawn away from the cargo boat which was thus enabled to withdraw from 
the beach. The enemy gun crew scored one hit on the gunboat, the shell exploding 
in a rocket launcher just forward of the engine room, but the continued heavy volume 
of fire from both craft prevented further hits, and the two boats were soon out of range 
where stock could be taken. The price paid for the colonel's stupidity was five men 
dead or dying and eleven wounded. The colonel was promptly relieved of his regi-
ment by the corps commander and later severely punished. 
A worse tragedy was nearly enacted when a jumpy corps staff officer became ex-
cited over a report that thejaps had collected barges for a sea-borne attack behind our 
Driniumor positions. In the middle of the night he abruptly altered the patrol zones 
carefully worked out between the 533d, the local PT squadron commanders and the 
destroyer division commander, informing only the PTs. As a result a PT skipper, 
believing that the LCMGs had been withdrawn opened up on one of them with a 
40 mm gun at 75 yards range, fortunately missing. Identities were established in the 
nick of time and a frightful battle, that would not only have pitted army gunboats 
against PTs but would also have involved our destroyers and artillery, was averted 
by an eyelash. 
On July 3 I the corps commander, sensing that the Japs had bled themselves 
white in futile piece-meal attacks, ordered a general offensive. The I 24th Infantry 
quietly assembled during the night behind the Driniumor and passing through the 
I 28th advanced eastward along the coast. The tank destroyers and gunboats, with 
PTs standing by a little farther off shore, once more paced the attack which in two days 
gained three miles. Then, as the boats deceivingly raked Yakamul and Parakovio 
A rocket barrage in the vicinity of Naparake fires a Jap dump. 
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with rockets and automatic weapons, the r 24th turned and drove straight inland 
with the other line units wheeling to the right in a finely coordinated maneuver 
that rolled up the Jap Army and penned it between the r 12th Cavalry and the im-
penetrable Torricelli Mountains. For ten days fierce fighting raged in the heavy 
jungle around Afua as six American regimental combat teams relentlessly chewed 
the Japs from three sides and the forbidding mountains blocked any escape. So 
ended the battle of the Driniumor River, one of the decisive battles of the War and 
the largest ground engagement in the Southwest Pacific prior to the fighting on Leyte. 
Its outlines have been included in this story, despite the fact that 533d played a very 
minor role in the actual fighting, for several reasons. Both boatmen and shore 
engineers were straining to the utmost to meet the logistical demands of this campaign 
and yet had pitifully little information about its progress and importance. The 
glamorous break-through of the Third Army in France and the well publicized cam-
paign in the Marianas captured all the headlines and news broadcasts at the time. 
Yet, had the battle of the Driniumor gone the other way or even been a prolonged 
stalemate, the invasion of the Philippines would have been postponed many months. 
Finally, the campaign itselfwas a military masterpiece in which the XI Corps, with-
out benefit of superior numbers and despite incredible difficulties of terrain, utterly 
destroyed an army of so,ooo as a fighting force. 
Back in Aitape Roads, where the bark of our artillery could be heard above the 
datter of bulldozers and cranes, the stress of the battle was brought home to the men 
working the ships by the frantic appeals of the corps staff for more tonnage. Am-
munition was being expended day after day at a sustained rate never before witnessed 
in the Theatre. Engineer materials to bridge the countless streams and strengthen 
the perimeter defenses were invariably in short supply, and the bombers and fighters 
based on the Tadji strips, setting new records in missions per plane per day, had an 
inexhaustible appetite for fuel and bombs. The 43d Division with 2o,ooo tons of 
equipment had to be unloaded in a hurry and, over the protest of the 533d, corps 
headquarters insisted that this be done over the beach nearest the Division's bivouac, 
.a nightmare of shallow sandbars pommeled by severe sur£ 
Though the shore engineers and their equipment felt the strain, it was the boats 
that produced the real crisis. The fleet of Company A of the 593d had been badly 
battered in the early days of the landing and was down to about 20% operable boats 
when the 533d's C Company arrived with its fleet of relics that had barely survived 
the ordeal of Saidor. These craft stood up pretty well at first, but the maintenance 
·crews soon fell behind as their small stock of spare parts and materials dwindled under 
the pressure of repeated breakdowns. Propeller blades were built up and hammered 
into shape so many times that they actually became limp, and coxswains could not 
gun their motors, for the propeller blades would bend under the sudden load. As the 
boats ground their way on and off the flat beaches, the propellers went completely out 
of shape, and the shafts bent like reeds. The shafts were worn so much at the strut 
bearing that it was necessary to turn them down on a lathe and fit them with sleeves 
made from iron pipe. When the supply of strut bearings was exhausted, wooden ones 
were turned out on lathes, but the combination of a high-speed shaft, a steel bearing 
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surface, a wooden bearing, and an inexhaustible supply of sand rendered this expedi-
ent vain, for such bearings wore out faster than they could be turned out. 
The maintenance men did what they could, patching and improvising and 
praying for a reasonable shipment of new shafts, propellers and bearings, and when 
the hulls of the boats gave way, they patched ramps and hulls with flattened oil drums 
until oxygen gave out. Then they were helpless. On the 25th of July after repeated 
reports as to the desperate condition of the boats went unheeded at Corps, the Boat 
Battalion commander condemned and laid up twenty hopelessly leaking boats so 
that the limited repair resources could be concentrated on keeping the least unsea-
worthy craft operating. This brought immediate constructive action from the Sixth 
Army Engineer, and a few days later twenty boat crews in three C-4 7 transports 
were winging their way 8oo miles to Milne Bay to draw new boats and bring them to 
Aitape under their own power. Sheet steel, oxygen, water-pump gears, shafts and 
other critical items were flown to Aitape from elsewhere in the Theatre. And the 
533d's B Company which had been sitting at Finschhafen since early in July while 
various base commanders wrangled for its assignment, was ordered to join the Bat-
talion at Seleo Island relieving the virtually inoperative 593d Company. Finally 
additional LCTs, far more suitable than LCMs for lightering under the prevailing 
conditions, were sent down from Hollandia. By mid-August, as the fury of the battle 
subsided, the critical lighterage situation improved, and for the next several weeks 
unloading operations went forward with relative smoothness. 
During August the Regiment for the first time since arrival overseas made real 
progress toward concentration. Regimental Headquarters after six months on the 
Nugudu Peninsula at Finschhafen loaded up in boats of B Company and the new C 
Company craft en route from Milne Bay, and moved via Bogia to Aitape, where it 
established its command post and assumed operational control of the theretofore 
virtually independent battalions. The B Company boats then made two round trips 
to New Britain to bring F Company back into the Shore Battalion fold. Thus by the 
first week in September the entire Regiment, except A Company, was located in the 
same task force area, though separation of the bivouacs by several miles of water did 
much to preserve the separatist sentiment in the battalions. As will be seen in the 
next chapter, no sooner was the Regiment reunited than it was alerted for a major 
attack on the Talaud Islands between Morotai and the Philippines. But after two 
feverish weeks of planning and preparation this operation was canceled, and the 
outfit with a bad feeling ofletdown went on with its routine work of discharging ships 
and constructing and maintaining roads and other facilities. 
At the end of September the surf suddenly and without apparent cause built up 
until the beach which had been used ever since April became unusable. Lightering 
operations were transferred to Aitape Cove where the sheltering headland took the 
brunt of the northwesterly swells. This involved great inconvenience, for the trucks 
had to run five miles to some of the dumps over a winding road and the boatmen had 
to make a seven-mile run from Seleo Island to the cove which added nearly two 
hours to their lengthy working shift. The new sea conditions soon washed away the 
artificial beaches built on what had been Seleo's sheltered side, so all maintenance 
Entrance to the regi-
mental CP at Aitape, 
November, 1944. 
Headquarters Com-
pany orderly room. 
Amphibian washing 
machine, a unique 
item prized by men 
of Headquarters COin-
pany. 
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activities were concentrated in the tiny cove recently evacuated by Company A of 
the sggd. 
Gunboat operations which had subsided when the climax of the Battle of the 
Driniumor moved inland, were revived late in August when the 43d Division relieved 
the XI Corps which departed for Morotai. The remnants of the Jap XVIII Army 
straggled back toward But and Wewak, and Major General Wing decided to give 
them no chance to reorganize within harassing distance of Aitape. First his 103d 
Infantry and later the I 72d Infantry were given the mission of aggressive patrolling 
to the east. These patrols were also intended to season the many replacements that 
had joined the Division in New Zealand after its costly campaign the previous year 
in the Solomons, and they made constant use of the 533d's flotilla now numbering 
six gunboats with armament up to 57 mm guns. During early September elements of 
the Iogd pushed through the Drimbol plantation and established an outpost at 
Babieng, and in the latter part of the month the I 72d fought its way against increas-
ingly vigorous resistance another twelve miles to Suain. An attempt to push on 
across the Danmap River to Cape Djeruan would have been a disaster had it not been 
for the support of the two 533d gunboats. The Japs let a platoon of Company F, 
I 72d Infantry ford the river and advance 1000 yards, and then they closed in. While 
the LCMGs helped this platoon battle its way to a point on the shore where it was pos-
sible for the boats to beach in the heavy surf and pick it up, a J ap battalion crossed the 
river further inland and attacked the rest of F Company near Luain. A rescue 
similar to that in the first days of the Battle of the Driniumor was performed by two 
gunboats of B and C Company with the additional obstacle of such heavy surf that 
the wounded had to be floated out on rubber boats. After this narrow escape Division 
prescribed a more conservative policy, and thejaps too seemed willing to leave a wide 
no-man's-land-provided their positions at But were not threatened; so the gunboats 
had no more excitement. 
One final exploit of the LCMGs came about because the PTs which had shared 
the Seleo anchorage had moved on. An old Walrus biplane of the RAAF took an 
intelligence officer on a risky mission to question natives on Karasua Island well 
within the Wewak stronghold. The natives turned out to have been pro-Japanese, 
and machine gun bullets promptly set the plane afire as it landed. An accompanying 
The beach in Aitape 
Cove used during the 
fall of 1944. Tumleo 
Island in the right 
background. 
Natural bridge along 
the highway leading 
east from Aitape Cove. 
plane thought the Aussies on the Walrus had escaped into the jungle and that if a 
boat could enter those waters they might be able to swim out to it. With no PTs 
available, four 533d LCMGs and a picket boat with newly installed radar immediately 
set forth with the understanding that they would lie to off the island until an hour 
after sunrise while RAAF planes scared the 5-inch and 6-inch batteries on nearby 
Kairiru and Cape Karawop into silence. Despite a series of rain squalls that drowned 
out the radar and reduced visibility to zero, the rendezvous was made before dawn and 
flares set off. The promised air cover failed to materialize, but the Jap batteries, 
probably uninterested in wasting ammunition on such small targets, remained quiet, 
and the boats after leisurely skirting the island with no sign of refugees, impudently 
splattered some knownjap installations with 40 mm HE and returned unmolested to 
Seleo. It is believed that no other Allied craft, army or navy, ever penetrated those 
well-fortified waters by daylight until well into 1945. 
As various problems began to find solutions, opportunity for recreation could 
also be found. The gentlemen from Kentucky and Tennessee, cut off from their 
native supplies, were forced to improvise from materials at hand, and alcoholic 
beverages whose parentage was subject to a great deal of question began to appear in 
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the tents of the Regiment. The amateurs were forced to resort to forcing raisins and 
sugar through the eyes of coconuts or to stirring canned heat, hair tonic, and after-
shave lotion with dried prunes and raisins. The more professional, however, pro-
ceeded with the aid of several Coleman stoves, some pilfered copper tubing, and a 
couple of five-gallon cans to set up a distilling operation which speeded production 
and increased potency to such an extent that after considerable consumption the 
consumer became a superman, as witness the following story. An ex-fisherman from 
C Company stocked himself up fully and, while in that condition, fell unnoticed off 
the stern of an LCM about four miles away from Seleo; unconcerned as the boat failed 
to slow down he began to swim to the island and found the water so refreshing that he 
swam right on past it and had to retrace his course some two miles after he discovered 
the error. This feat gave rise to many theories, the most plausible one of which is 
The native popula-
tion was cordial, 
worked well under 
proper direction, and 
was devoutly religious. 
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that so much of the water in his body had been displaced by alcohol that he floated 
three-fourths out ofwater, and his failure to correct his speed curve for this change in 
displacement caused him to over-shoot the island. 
The construction of stills, however, was not the only recreation. The Shore 
Battalion constructed a fine open-air theatre, large enough to accommodate neigh-
boring units, and film was thus secured for a picture almost every night. Once the 
schedules had been coordinated with the shifts at the beach so that the maximum 
number of troops could attend, a great deal of pleasure was had from this pastime. 
When Bob Hope's show arrived an even larger stage complete with dressing rooms 
was built. The show was held in the afternoon and work- except of the most essen-
tial variety- was suspended so that almost all of the Regiment was able to enjoy it. 
Softball came into its own for the first time at Aitape and provided a source of 
entertainment for a great many of the troops. Each company of the Regiment on the 
mainland had a team, and from these teams was selected an aggregation which repre-
sented the Battalion in inter-unit competition. On Seleo, too, companies, platoons, 
and even the officers had their own teams, and games were in progress whenever the 
work schedule permitted. Not only the players but the spectators were greatly bene-
fitted from the games. In June the Regiment began to receive monthly quotas of 
leaves and furloughs to Australia; the quotas were so small as to be almost invisible, 
but the thought that they might be increased, the fact that even so few were actually 
going on furlough, and the stories told by those who returned gave everyone a great 
boost in morale. 
In November the regimental commander, after several conferences with the 
battalion commanders, decided upon a reorganization within the Regiment which 
would give it a really workable T/0 and would more nearly equalize ratings with 
responsibilities. The boat companies with tables calling for 65 boats were actually 
operating 45, and the shore companies with tables calling for 3 dozers were actually 
manning 6 and many other pieces of equipment. Therefore, ratings were taken from 
boat companies and distributed to the shore companies. To give the Shore Battalion 
commander, who was ex-officio beachmaster, an adequate staff for round-the-clock 
operations, the regimental staff was pared down and officer and enlisted ratings given 
to Headquarters, Shore Battalion. Finally, the weapons sections and platoon of the 
Shore Battalion were abolished, subject to being reconstituted on a provisional basis 
during assault operations, and the shore companies were divided into an engineering 
platoon and a cargo platoon, thus recognizing a functional division which had in fact 
existed since their arrival overseas. Though this shake-up in ratings and organization 
inevitably worked against the interests of many individuals, the overall results proved 
excellent in suceeding operations. 
The final weeks at Aitape were absorbed in intensive preparation for participa-
tion in the invasion of the Philippines and are covered in the next chapter. As the 
monsoon season changed, even the relatively sheltered beach at Aitape Cove was 
buffeted by an increasingly bad surf. This caused frequent suspension of unloading, 
and brought the average daily tonnage for October and November down to less than 
I ooo as compared with nearly 1500 during the hectic days of August. But the 
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Bob Hope and Frances Langford wow 15,000 Gls from the Shore Battalion's stage at 
Aitape. 
unloading quota did not perceptibly relax as the 43d Division built up its supplies for 
the Philippine campaign and the 6th Australian Division with numerous service units 
moved in to take its place. An unfortunate result of this continued pressure despite 
bad conditions was that the new boats were soon nearly as dilapidated as those that 
had been condemned in July, and yet they had to be made to last through the Lin-
gayen Gulf operations. 
The tour of duty at Aitape can be summed up as nothing but a hard grind for 
nearly everyone in the Regiment. The instances of exciting combat participation 
were few, and the hours of drudgery were many, but the men of the 53 3d who sweated 
in the holds of liberties and in the conning towers of LCMs performed feats of endur-
ance' that, while not heroic, were none the less vitally essential to the success of the 
largest American force that fought in the jungles of New Guinea. 
CHAPTER XI 
Luzon 
T HE first embryonic plans for the reconquest of the Philippines were undoubtedly formulated by General MacArthur and his staff as soon as the gallant defense of 
Bataan became hopeless. The creation of the Southwest Pacific Theatre in March 
1942 was in large measure directed to that object. Once theJap offensive was blunted 
and turned back in Papua during the latter part of I 942, the New Guinea campaign 
had just one real objective- the liberation of the Philippines. 
There were some in Washington and Pearl Harbor who favored a strictly de-
fensive campaign in the SWPA, arguing that Japan could be defeated by a drive 
across the Central Pacific, by-passing the Philippines. But the MacArthur school, 
necessarily anticipating that Japan would not quit until her home islands were actually 
invaded, successfully maintained that such a tremendous invasion would have to be 
based on more than a few small islands and that, therefore, disregarding entirely our 
moral obligation to rescue the Filipinos, the reconquest of their Archipelago was an 
absolute necessity to our ultimate victory over Japan. 
The initial plan adopted by MacArthur called for successive leaps up the New 
Guinea coast to its western end, then to Morotai, the Talaud Islands, and Mindanao. 
This plan, which was carried out except for the last two phases, was dictated by the 
simple fact that in the SWP A as distinct from the Central Pacific, each new beachhead 
had to receive its air support from a previously secured land base. Three hundred 
miles thus represented about the maximum stride that our forces could make at one 
time. This was in sharp contrast with the Navy's Central Pacific Theatre where con-
trol of all aircraft carriers enabled Admiral Nimitz to move virtually as far as he 
liked in a single hop. 
Morotai was seized on September 15, 1944. The Talaud Islands, northeastern-
most group in the Dutch East Indies, were scheduled for attack on October 15 (Opera-
tion "Gossip Monger") and the initial assault on the Philippines proper was to be 
delivered November 15 at Sarangani Bay, Mindanao (Operation "K-1"). As far as 
amphibians were concerned these actions were to be strictly 3d Brigade affairs, the 
533d being attached to the 32d Infantry Division for the first one, and the other two 
regiments going into Mindanao with the 33d and 43d Divisions. 
Detailed planning for the Talaud show moved into high gear the first week in 
September. The plans made the maximum use of the Regiment's mobility and 
flexibility. The initial beachhead was to be made on Salababoe Island by the 127th 
and I 28th RCTs landing with the Shore Battalion from APDs, LSTs, APAs, and 
an LSD. 533d LCMs were to be carried to the limit of the shipping capacity. The 
balance of the Boat Battalion was to leave Aitape on October I and proceed under 
its own power to Morotai via Wakde, Woendi Lagoon, and Sansopar, a total distance 
of 1000 miles. The run from Morotai to the objective - 140 miles - was to be made 
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by the gunboats and part of the LCMs the night ofD-I in convoy with a PT squadron 
and at H + 2 hours these craft together with some LVTs were to pick up an infantry 
battalion on Salababoe and make a shore-to-shore hop to Karakelong. The seizure 
of the remaining islands in the group was to be accomplished in similar fashion as 
rapidly as possible. 
The logistics were all worked out and field orders drafted, when on the evening 
of September I5 came a radio message "operation canceled." Though the reason 
was not disclosed for many weeks, this sudden change resulted from a deal made 
between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz on the basis of Admiral Halsey's 
reports of the pitifully weak J ap air opposition to his early September carrier raid on 
the Philippines. Deciding that it was prudent to strike at the heart of the Archipelago 
relying initially only on carrier-based air cover, General MacArthur agreed to change 
his initial plan in favor of a major lunge at Leyte, provided the Third Fleet supported 
him and his Sixth Army was reinforced by the XXIV Corps. Admiral Nimitz like-
wise agreed to call off his projected attack on Yap in the Carolines, and the Joint 
Chiefs at Quebec promptly concurred. 
The revised strategy in the Philippine Campaign made possible by the reinforce-
ment of MacArthur's command was to split the J ap forces in two by seizing a vital 
island, whence planes could dominate most of the narrow seas. This would force the 
Japs to commit their reserves to a meat grinder, from the effects of which they would 
never recover. How well this worked is well-known history and is not part of this 
story. The Jap navy threw itself away in a brilliantly conceived but poorly executed 
endeavor to destroy the shipping of the Leyte task force. Their air forces, engaging 
in repeated suicide attacks for the first time, suffered a depletion they could never 
make up. And their army reserves including their crack I st Division were largely 
annihilated in a series of grueling slugging matches in the Ormoc Valley where our 
32d and 24th Divisions distinguished themselves. 
When the fate of Leyte was sealed early in December by the 77th Division's 
capture of Ormoc, MacArthur took a well-calculated long chance and threw part of 
the 24th Division past Cebu, Negros, and Panay to seize and hold Mindoro. As usual 
the chance worked beautifully, and the Japs on Luzon seeing Manila threatened 
immediately from the south began to move heavy forces toward Batangas and 
Tayabas. The stage was now set for the touchdown play - the taking of Manila 
from the rear by landing at Lingayen Gulf and sweeping down the now virtually 
unguarded central plains. 
This avenue ofapproach had not only been employed by the japanese in I94I, 
but had been decided upon in the original plans for the reoccupation of the Philip-
pines. The initial assault called for four divisions, the two on the left to land between 
Dagupan and Damortis, wheel slightly and push into the mountains to secure the left 
flank, while the two on the right were to land between Dagupan and Lingayen and 
drive rapidly down the broad plains to Manila Bay. Four other divisions were to 
follow as rapidly as shipping would permit to man the line that soon would extend 
I 50 miles from Damortis to Laguna de Baie. 
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Planning 
The 533d was first notified ofits assignment to this "M-1" task force and attach-
ment to the 43d Infantry Division in early October, but no detailed information 
reached the orphan task force at Aitape until mid-November. Even then, with 
loading-out less than three weeks off, it was impossible to make any real plans. The 
fact that Sixth Army which would control the show was still up to its neck in the 
Leyte fight while the 43d Division was at Aitape and I Corps, to which the 43d was 
attached, was at Hollandia, accounted in part for this, but the refusal of the Navy 
even to talk with any echelon lower than an army headquarters added materially to 
the confusion. 
One thing was painfully clear at the outset: most of the boats would be left out 
of the initial assault because of the insufficient LCM capacity ofthe transports assigned 
to the Division, plus the fact that the LSD would carry only LCTs. This latter was 
very annoying, as it was hard to see why the LCTs could not proceed on their own 
bottoms to Mindoro and join the convoy there. But the Boat Battalion received a sub-
stitute mission, and its novelty and possibilities of real excitement mitigated the disap-
pointment. The assignment called for the creation, along with the defense platoon of 
the Shore Battalion, of two provisional heavy weapons companies to form the back-
bone of the defense of the 5-mile beach perimeter. In previous operations in New 
Guinea the infantry had normally performed this function, but the 43d Division's plan 
called for a rapid drive inland to seize high ground up to eight miles from the beach 
the first night. Any by-passed Jap groups would thus be able to counterattack the 
beach installations at will unless shore party troops interposed. Hence the decision to 
use the surplus Boat Battalion personnel to man the key points of the perimeter. 
The problems facing the Shore Battalion were quite the opposite. As soon as 
the magnitude of the operation in terms of equipment and men to be brought ashore 
was disclosed, it was apparent that the Battalion would be swamped unless heavily 
reinforced. In addition the Division planned to land three regiments abreast on a 
front of nearly 3 miles and to keep supplies coming in over the two extreme ends of 
the beach indefinitely. This would spread the shore party's personnel and equipment 
to the limit and dictated decentralization of control. Moreover, several reserve divis-
ions were scheduled to land on the most suitable beach, and map studies indicated 
that this would be the 533d's. 
The logistical planning of a major amphibian operation is as complex as any-
thing in modern warfare. A shore party commander and his staff find themselves 
at the very nerve center of this planning. Since "M-1" was the first full scale effort 
of the Regiment as a unit, it will not be amiss at this point to outline in general terms 
how the problems confronting a boat and shore regiment are analyzed and dealt with 
before the task force even embarks. 
Naturally the underlying decisions as to what size unit will attack what point 
and when are made in higher headquarters. The shipping in which the force and its 
supplies will be "lifted" is determined in joint Army-Navy conferences. Based on the 
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anticipated difficulties of the campaign, senior supply officers issue orders as to how 
many " days of supply" of each class are to be brought in with the assault forces, and 
subsequently. These decisions, as a matter of experience, are never final, and 
changes are announced daily until the task force actually departs and not infrequently 
even after that. So when the division G-4 and the engineer shore party commander 
and staffs do their work, they start with the most fragmentary information and find it 
shifting with discouraging frequency. 
Despite these uncertainties they try to analyze their mission to see just how many 
tons of supplies must be brought across the beach each hour. In the initial assault the 
theoretical standard is the maximum that can be moved out of the transports' hatches 
and over the ramps of the LSTs. The reason for this is twofold: ships are always 
scarce and rapid turnaround is essential if the overall theatre requirements are to be 
met; secondly, ships are vulnerable to air and submarine attack, hence every effort 
of both services is bent toward discharging them in the shortest possible time. 
Having calculated, then, how many tons can be spewed out by the convoy 
hour by hour, the next step is to provide enough small craft, LCTs, LCMs, LCVPs, 
DUKWs, and sometimes ponton barges, to keep that tonnage moving to the beach 
and provide an empty craft at shipside as soon as one pulls away. The distance from 
transport anchorage to unloading point, surf and beach conditions, and many other 
factors affect this calculation. In actual experience almost all operations were more 
than adequately supplied with small landing craft, but they were none the less a 
potential bottleneck and had to be figured accurately. 
But cargo piled in landing craft, whether they be en route to shore or beached 
with ramp down, is no use to the advancing doughboys; so adequate labor and cranes 
must be provided at the water's edge to accomplish the unloading at the same speed 
as the loading at shipside. Figures based on experience show that a man can reason-
ably manhandle 6 tons a day and that a light crane and its crew can move I o- I 2 tons 
an hour from landing craft to truck. The efficiency of cranes as compared with man-
handling is such that all shore parties employ as many as possible. In the SWP A 
which had the lowest priorities of any theatre on all equipment, there were never 
nearly enough. Thus many hundreds of men had to be detailed from service and 
frequently from combat units to make up an adequate labor pool for the beach. 
The next item to be studied is transportation from the water's edge to the dumps. 
Piling supplies on the beach itself is justifiable only as a last resort, as confusion, 
congestion, and possible destruction inevitably result. A smooth flow of supplies from 
ships straight through to well dispersed dumps, each organized to receive and issue to 
using units separate classes of stores, is the ultimate objective of every shore party. 
Though the trip from the water's edge to the dump sites may be only a few hundred 
yards, the small capacity of the standard 6 x 6 truck, the time required to load and 
unload, and the unavoidable loss of time caused by operating in a new area, on 
"roads" that barely deserve the name, and among hundreds of vehicles, require a 
surprisingly large truck pool for the shore party alone. Experience in many opera-
tions has shown that the shore party should have at least 2 trucks per LCM and 4 
per LCT if it is to discharge them without delay. Not once did the 533d ever have 
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such a truck pool. Not only did shortage of shipping space severely curtail the entire 
task force's wheeled transport, but even after the shore party's requirements had been 
ruthlessly scaled down, it normally discovered once ashore that many of its trucks 
were taken for "priority" missions elsewhere. 
Finally, the unloading of trucks in the dumps by both cranes and manual labor 
must be geared to the overall flow of tonnage so trucks will not be wasted while idling 
in a dump. These dumps are normally run by the appropriate task force supply 
officer, but the shore party commander cannot neglect them at any stage of the plan-
ning or operation. 
The above outline touches only the high spots and omits such vital problems as 
radio and wire communications, engineering work such as erection of ponton cause-
ways, or sandbag jetties, making of roads, and clearing dump sites. When all these 
and myriad other items are considered and tentatively decided, beach layout plans 
are made and sandbox models constructed so all concerned can familiarize themselves 
as well as possible with the anticipated operation in advance of embarkation. 
For the Lingayen operation planning proceeded as above. To augment the 
shore party's manpower, various port, ammunition, ordnance, quartermaster, etc. 
companies were attached, bringing the regimental strength to 3500 officers and men. 
Most of these units staged from points hundreds of miles from Aitape which added 
materially to the difficulties of organizing a coordinated team. An M.P. company, 
two medical companies and a DUKW company rounded out the shore party. 
The question of adequate trucks was incapable of solution. After much careful 
calculation, the shore party stated that the minimum required to handle the peak load 
was 240 2 ;Y2-ton trucks. All that was actually received was a promise of 123, which 
would have been adequate if resort was had to some temporary stock-piling on the 
beaches. 
Loading Out 
The latter part of November saw all ranks involved in preparations for the big 
attack. While personnel clerks typed passenger list after passenger list only to tear 
them up as the embarkation plan shifted, motor pool mechanics checked vehicles and 
welded wire-cutters to front bumpers. Officers and men assigned to perimeter defense 
conducted intensive weapons training, including full scale night exercises on Seleo 
Island. New boats just in from the Boo-mile trip from the boat plant at Milne Bay 
were armed and readied. Old boats actually ripe for the graveyard were patched 
and strengthened. Spare parts for tractors and LCMs were brought in by air and by 
landing craft. In no class of supply other than rations was the Regiment adequately 
equipped, but that was such an old story that no one was particularly concerned. 
Meanwhile not for one second did the pressure of routine work slacken. In fact, 
in some respects it increased the closer the day of embarkation came. The incoming 
Australian 6th Division had to be unloaded completely by 533d boats and Shore 
Battalion, and each successive week surf conditions grew worse with heavier and more 
frequent damage to the boats. 
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Thanksgiving evening brought a good break for the Boat Battalion. The boat 
companies ofthe 544th EB&SR which had been attached to the 37th Infantry Divi-
sion announced they were unable to proceed to Finschhafen in time to meet their 
convoy for Bougainville whence the Division would stage for the Philippines. Conse-
quently I Corps directed the 533d to have a boat company ready to load out of 
Finschhafen (400 miles away) in 6o hours time. Since A Company had only just 
arrived from New Britain and was not yet unpacked, and since a large detachment of 
it had just left Milne Bay with new boats, its selection was natural. Not only did the 
company have to do a quick job of striking camp and embarking during the remaining 
hours of the night, but one-third of its 56' boats had to be exchanged for 50' craft of 
B Company. 
The trip to Finschhafen was made in the teeth of the southeast monsoon and was 
the finishing touch for some of the old boats which had to be replaced on arrival. 
Using SCR 284 radios with a normal range of 30-60 miles, company and battalion 
headquarters maintained contact with the detachment leaving Milne Bay 8oo miles 
away, with the result that it and the rest of the company entered Finschhafen sim-
ultaneously. The naval transport squadron which arrived to pick up A Company 
thought it was only to receive LCMs and their crews, and refused to be bound by I 
Corps orders to lift the entire company and its equipment. Only by fast talking and 
pleading with individual skippers did the company commander succeed in moving his 
unit virtually intact to Bougainville. There it was forced by the 544th EB&SR to leave 
almost all its organizational equipment behind in an indefinitely delayed rear echelon. 
The transport squadron to lift the 43d Division and attached troops arrived off 
Aitape at the end of November. Only by talking with each skipper was a definite 
statement finally obtained as to the number and size of craft they would carry. Thus 
another revision of plans was made less than a week before scheduled departure. 
Actually the Boat Battalion wound up with gg of its I I 7 LCMs in the operation which 
gave it nearly 6o% of the LCMs in the entire attack force, but it was too late to relieve 
it of responsibility for the perimeter defense. 
Loading out commenced December I with all boats scheduled for the attack 
attached to their respective ships. Though this gave the Navy operating control of 
the boats, it was essential, as all our shore maintenance facilities had to be packed and 
loaded. The first days of loading disclosed that only a miracle would permit the 
Division to embark and sail on schedule. High surf and a heavy ground swell in the 
anchorage were the principal causes, but the necessity of continuing to unload Liberties 
in order to get supplies ashore to complete the task force's stocks used up all the spare 
boats. Fortunately, the Jap position in Leyte could not be cracked without an 
amphibious assault near Ormoc which used shipping earmarked for Lingayen and 
thus "S" day for the "M-I" show was postponed from December 20 until january g. 
The three weeks respite permitted an orderly out-loading despite the increasingly 
vicious surf, and also made possible securing certain vital equipment which the 
Regiment would otherwise have sailed without. The last four LCMs needed to 
replace old boats that finally collapsed in the outloading were forcibly removed from 
Hollandia in a night raid on the Base G boat pool-illegal but unavoidable under the 
LSTs were loaded to capacity and then some, and as 1nany men as could find a perch were 
crammed aboard for the two-week trip. 
circumstances. Christmas eve found everything other than troops safely aboard the 
ships, and the day was devoted to consuming beer and turkey. Early on the 26th 
troops clambered up the landing nets. The next day a rather half-hearted rehearsal 
was held with no boats going within 200 yards of the beach. At I400 December 28 
the convoy got under weigh, and New Guinea dropped over the horizon forever for 
most of the Regiment. Left behind was a rear echelon of nearly 200 officers and men 
manning equipment and boats to be forwarded later from either Aitape or Hollandia. 
Some of these poor devils were not to rejoin the Regiment for five months. 
The Trip 
The 43d Division convoy in standard formation included I 8 large transports, 
3 LSDs, I 5 LSTs, g LCis, plus miscellaneous escort and auxiliary craft. The LSTs 
kept the speed down to seven knots - barely perceptible motion on a big ship. After 
crossing the equator a junction was made near Pelilieu with a similar convoy carrying 
the 6th Division from Sansopar. Still further along the Third Fleet ships carrying the 
4oth and 37th Divisions fell in astern. 533d personnel and equipment were scattered 
on more than forty vessels in these convoys. 
The first hazy view of the Philippines came on January 4 as the ships entered 
Surigao straits . From there on through the Mindanao Sea and up along the western 
coast ofNegros, Panay, and Mindoro the convoy was brazenly exposed to Jap air and 
submarine attack. Though all hands stood "GQ:' at sunup and sundown and at 
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Lingayen Gulf packed with all sizes and types of combat and cargo ships. 
special alerts during the day, the troop-carrying convoys were hardly more than 
annoyed. Up ahead the bombardment force of seven battleships and many cruisers 
and destroyers had already entered Lingayen Gulf and was receiving plenty of 
attention from the kamikaze planes. Serious damage was suffered by I 7 warships 
in their first day in the Gulf. The main convoy received enough sample attacks to 
keep the troop passengers on their toes. A transport and a tanker took direct hits 
from suicide planes. A couple of midget submarines made a daring attack first on 
the cruiser division and then on the White Beach attack group, being sunk by ram-
ming within a few lengths of several LSTs after narrowly missing a brace of ships. 
Probably the most spectacular, if least menacing, entertainment of the trip occurred 
when ajap light cruiser emerged from Manila Bay and headed right for the convoy. 
Three American destroyers engaged her, using star shells, and in a matter of seconds 
sent her to the bottom. 
Men of the Regiment manned guns throughout the fleet; some served the .5os 
on their own LCMs, others manned 20 mm pieces of their ship's battery. Gunboat 
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The Landing 
Down the cargo nets into landing 
craft scramble the assault troops on 
the morning of January 9, 1945. 
MB1 aboard a Liberty received 
credit from her skipper for a 
major share in bringing down a 
suicide bomber. 
Shortly after midnight January g the mighty armada deployed in Lingayen 
Gulf; 40o,ooo soldiers and sailors - considerably more than were involved on Ameri-
can beaches the first day in Normandy - gulped early breakfasts and donned combat 
equipment. Before daybreak the transports were anchored in their appointed areas 
and were shedding their landing craft and debarking troops. From Damortis to 
Lingayen the twenty mile shoreline was pricked by orange bursts as 16-inch shells and 
lighter thudded into suspected pill boxes and earthworks. 
At White Beach No. 3, San Fabian, troops wade ashore over the gently sloping beach-
scenes of wave ll at H + 48 minutes. 
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Daybreak was hard to detect for the normal haze and shadow cast by the moun-
tains was intensified by the pall of smoke that covered the fleet and the shore. More 
than a thousand small landing craft circled off the quarters of their mother transports, 
moved on signal to the net-draped sides of the ships, and received their quota of 
troops and equipment. As soon as a wave was loaded it moved off in single file toward 
the control craft at the line of departure 4000 yards off shore. Though the smoke and 
haze caused some of the boats to miss their assigned positions by a few hundred yards, 
the landing went off remarkably smoothly. 
The first amtracs (LVTs) crawled out of the moderate surf at 0930 to be followed 
by four or five waves of LCVPs at five minute intervals. Then came the LCMs 
followed by LCTs, LSMs, and finally the LSTs. A Company landed at Crimson 
Beach just west of the Dagupan River and encountered no opposition. The rest of 
the Regiment went in on the White Beaches running northward from the Bued 
River past San Fabian to Mabilao. On the northernmost of these there was consider-
able enemy reaction with mortars and light artillery. Many of our boats were hit 
and some of our men wounded, but no boat was more than temporarily disabled. 
Clearing the Bued River was the mission of a Boat Battalion detachment of 
three LCS(S)s which had been carried in LST davits. The river formed the boundary 
between the 43d and 6th Divisions, but no one knew in advance whether the bar at 
its mouth could be crossed by landing craft, and if so, how far up stream it would be 
navigable. The three little support boats moved shoreward on the right flank of the 
first assault waves and bumped their way over the bar at H +I 5 minutes. As they 
rounded the first bend, a J ap machine gun on the south bank of the river opened up 
and scored direct hits on the turret of one boat, but caused no casualties. Immediate 
.50 calibre return fire from the boats silenced the gun, thus permitting not only the 
boats but also a halted Ist Infantry patrol to resume their advance. The craft con-
tinued upstream as far as they could, keeping abreast of the infantry points but en-
countered no further opposition. After making a quick hydrographic survey and 
reporting to the naval beachmaster the desirability of landing much of the bulk 
supplies in the calm of the river, the detachment came out of the river and moved 
northward where it operated in flank support of the I 72d Infantry. Here the boats 
were exposed to mortar and light artillery fire, and were fairly well peppered with 
fragments until they withdrew beyond effective range of their own machine guns. 
On the beaches themselves the enemy did little to interfere except at White I 
and 2 where frequent concentrations of accurate mortar and light artillery fire inter-
rupted work and for several hours kept LSTs and LSMs off the beach. Unfortunately 
this was by far the most suitable beach from a hydrographic standpoint, so there was 
nothing to do but keep on pouring supplies across it and accept the inevitable toll of 
casualties . 
All the other beaches beginning with White 3 and extending on around the 
gulf to Lingayen were so fiat that even LCMs grounded way off shore. LSTs stuck 
hard and fast almost a quarter mile out. In addition to the deeps inside the sand bars, 
craters made during the bombardment constituted fatal traps for vehicles and men 
attempting to wade ashore from the boats. Not even waterproofed tractors could get 
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in from the larger landing vessels, and the result by mid-morning was a messy picture 
of drowned vehicles- their cabs barely awash- and LSTs and LSMs stuck well off 
shore, while small boats were already bringing in bulk stores to a beach that was 
unprepared to receive them. 
Gradually order developed from confusion as Seabees struggled to put enough 
sections of ponton cube causeways together to reach the beach from the LSTs. Small 
boats and DUKWs brought ashore the most critical personnel from the big landing 
ships, and all artillery and engineer dozers that could be collected went about salvag-
ing the drowned vehicles in the surf. Dumps were reconnoitred and marked accord-
ing to plan, but so few trucks got ashore on schedule that most of the bulk was handled 
by human chain from the boats' ramps to a temporary heap above the high tide mark. 
With less than three hours of daylight remaining the LSTs finally started to 
discharge across both White 2 and White 3 beaches. A heavy smoke screen and some 
good fire support from destroyers had quieted the enemy fire on White 2, and the Sea-
bees on White 3 at last pooled all their resources and bridged the gap from the number 
one priority LST to White 3 beach. From then on through the night things went 
reasonably well on both beaches. 
The boatmen began a grueling g6 hours of incessant runs from shipside to beach 
and back again. The inability of LCTs and LSMs to land within workable distance 
On White Beach 3 even the little LCVPs ground well off shore as the LSTs fail to reach 
within ponton causeway range of the beach. Lower right: LVT being loaded from LCM. 
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Beach White 3: Top: Human chains unload LCVPs grounded far out on the flat beach. 
Bottom: Two ponton causeways enable vehicles on LST to reach fordable depth. 
of the water's edge placed an unusually heavy strain on the small craft. Our go-odd 
LCMs shuttled vehicles and then bulk cargo from the ships that had borne them from 
New Guinea. As soon as these parent ships were empty, the boats were directed to 
other ships of the same transport division and continued the same grind. When the 
"Trans Div" was discharged, the LCMs turned to on any other naval attack trans-
port, and finally when these were done, there was a gulf-full of liberties with high 
priority cargo to be sped ashore. As all cabins had been destroyed on Seleo prior to 
embarkation, the boat men snatched what had to pass for a rest on the throbbing 
studded steel of the LCMs' decks, and for shelter from the blistering daytime sun or 
night rain squalls they had nothing. 
139 
Beach White 2: Smoke pots conceal unloading operations from enem.y observers in the 
hills and work continues despite intermittent shelling. 
Besides its LCMs the Boat Battalion took over 25 of the transports' LCVPs. 
This transaction had been arranged without warning after the convoy had been at 
sea a week. With the Battalion having 99 LCMs, a fair sized rear echelon and 5000 
yards of perimeter already charged to its responsibjlity, it had a problem setting up 
25 boat crews. But cooks, motor pool mechanics, clerks, typists, as well as machinists 
from the 1461st eagerly volunteered for the job, and demonstrated that the essentials 
of landing-craft seamanship could be learned by mere association and exposure. 
These men and their LCVPs brought many thousands of troops ashore and handled 
the vital little flank missions, ferries, and other jobs that would otherwise have wasted 
the priceless capacity of an LCM or bigger craft. 
The prime terrain characteristic of the initial beachhead was the maze of water-
ways that crisscrossed and meandered throughout its breadth and depth. During the 
first days, before adequate bridges were built, LCM and LCVP ferries provided the 
only egress from their initial footholds for many units. Physical contact between 
I Corps and Sixth Army, and between 43d and 6th Divisions, for example, depended 
on the 533d ferry in the Bued River. 
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The organization of the perimeter defense was badly delayed by the failure of the 
LSTs to land. The reconnaisance parties landed with the early waves and pushed 
inland with the infantry to lay out the straightest possible line. Several forward dis-
placements of this protective line had to be made because high ranking hospital COs 
etc., who did not like the area assigned for their installations within the beach peri-
meter, moved forward to a nicer grove. The weapons were finally all unloaded 
about sunset, and the line organized after a fashion. Luckily thejaps made no attempt 
that first night to penetrate it. 
During the hours of darkness work continued as usual, with lights being doused 
only under actual fire from artillery. Shortly after midnight a character who was 
later to become known all too well introduced himself with appropriate gusto. He 
was "Pistol Pete" later identified as a 320 mm ( r 3 inch) Krupp howitzer cleverly 
"Pistol Pete" Krupp 320 mm howitzer which shelled the San Fabian area from the 
mountains near Rosario for n1.any nights. 
hidden in a ravine between Damortis and Rosario. His line of fire was such that he 
could enfilade the beach while none of our ships could either see or reach him. A 
couple of dozen of his r6oo pound shells fell each night in and around San Fabian, 
and though doing surprisingly little total damage, served to acquaint all hands with 
the full meaning of the textbook phrase "harassing fire." The society for the im-
provement of foxholes sprang full-blown into life within a few seconds after the first 
awe-inspiring burst in the area. 
The second day saw drastic revision in all shore party plans occasioned not by 
anything the J ap did, for he put up no resistance at all save in the hills at the north end 
of the beachhead, but by a heavy northerly surf. These breakers building up un-
hindered from the China coast crashed onto the virtually flat beaches extending from 
San Fabian to Lingayen. All types of landing craft were virtually impotent as they 
were alternately victims of a towering breaker and stuck hard and fast in only a foot 
or two of water in the; troughs. At Blue Beach even an LSM broached and the ponton 
causeways leading to the LSTs were smashed and tossed in the sands. LCMs con-
tinued to work the beaches but more often than not had to be helped off with dozers 
or salvage boats. The superlative demonstration of seamanship put on by the cox-
swains of A Company on G_rimson Beach was the subject of many laudatory statements 
Pages 142-3 Scenes from Crimson 
and Orange Beaches between Dagu-
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by captains of navy transports; nonetheless the volume of tonnage moving over these 
exposed beaches dropped to a trickle. On the initiative of A Company officers the 
Dagupan River was reconnoitred and buoyed, so that supplies could be unloaded 
in the protected waters of the Dagupan town waterfront, and the Navy at last con-
sented to our running our own boats into the Bued rather than onto the churning face 
of White 3· Only on White 2 were conditions suitable for landing LSTs and for 
using any kind of boat on the open beach. So a great transfer of ships from all the 
other beaches to White 2 commenced. 
There was no semblance of order or system to this shift. In some cases the skipper 
of the landing ship, completely fed up with fighting to keep his vessel from broaching, 
and seeing little or no progress in discharging his cargo, just retracted on his own 
initiative and proceeded to White 2. Again, the local shore party commander on 
his own responsibility closed down all or a portion of his beach and told the craft to 
move to White 2. Or the naval commander on his command ship receiving reports 
of the hopelessness of all beaches other than White 2, directed all shipping under 
his command to discharge over White 2. However it started, the stampede to take 
advantage of the relatively good gradient and modest surf of White 2 soon assumed 
such proportions that to all intents and purposes it could be said that, except for three 
of the initial assault divisions, Sixth Army and the bulk of supplies for 200,000 men 
landed over the 533d's rooo yards of beach. 
Bearing in mind that this beach had been originally expected to land two regi-
mental combat teams, and that therefore its shore engineers consisted of two shore 
companies plus part of Shore Battalion headquarters, it is a wonder the shore party 
was not completely obliterated. None of the headquarters or individuals who caused 
this transfer bothered to inform the regimental CP or the navy beachmaster of the 
change. The 533d shore party merely consulted its landing tables a few times, threw 
At the busy Beach-
Inaster's CP on 
White Beach 2 Capt. 
Smith, Shore Bat-
talion S-3, receives 
a report from~ Lt. 
Walton of E Com-
pany. 
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them away in disgust, and began to handle in turn each new craft that slapped its 
ramp on the beach. Only because each man from the battalion commander to the 
weary men of the beach squads rose magnificently to the challenge did the beach 
succeed in handling this new load. Intermittent fire from the hills continued to land 
in the crowded beach area, and the medics worked incessantly. 573 casualties were 
treated in the beach aid station in the first five days. 
The confusion necessarily incident to such a huge flow was further heightened 
by the bewilderment of the troops coming ashore. For example, a tank unit attached 
to XIV Corps expected to land near Lingayen and had its plans and maps all set for 
such an event. Instead it found itself 20 miles away in the zone of I Corps with no 
means of communication and no route yet open by which it could proceed to its 
assigned area. Similarly the entire signal section of GHQ which was meant to land 
near Dagupan found itself, complete with multi-tonned trailers, on the extreme left 
flank of the beachhead some 1500 yards from the Jap gun positions. All such units 
that could not proceed over the light bridges to their proper areas had to be corralled, 
organized, and then shipped by landing craft to where they belonged. Thus after a 
few hours there was an out-loading problem of considerable proportions to complicate 
further the tangled beach. Sixth Army headquarters was still afloat; the two corps 
headquarters were busy trying to collect themselves and get established; 43d Division 
headquarters had its hands more than full in pushing the J aps from the hills dominat-
ing the beach. But each element of the invasion rolled in over this narrow strip of 
beach, fanned out, found its proper place, and did its job virtually without assistance 
or interference from any headquarters higher than a regiment. A tribute indeed to 
the initiative and intelligence of the junior officers and men. 
On S+2 a whole new convoy arrived bearing the 25th Division and other rein-
forcements. This division unloaded its vehicles and equipment entirely over the Bued 
River part of White 3 - a strip of beach not over 50 yards wide - in the course of 
three days. Company F plus organic division troops formed a remarkably efficient 
shore party. It is doubtful if any division ever came ashore through a narrower 
bottleneck. 
In the few days after S day the 533d's Shore Battalion's tonnage handled exceeded 
Beach White 3: Cranes expediting unloading and tractor towing disabled % -ton truck. 
" ·--- --· 
Above: White Beach 3 showing control point, temporary bivouacs and a roller conveyor in 
action. 
Below: Supplies are stacked in temporary dumps on Beach White 3 as shortage of trucks 
prevents transfer to designated dumps. 
l 
' 
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Ponton causeway 
broached between 
White 2 and White 3 
is turned in to bridge 
across mouth of slew. 
that handled across Omaha Beach in Normandy during the comparable days. 
Omaha Beach had a shore party of two full Engineer Special Brigades, reinforced, 
aggregating over 20,000 men! 
The perimeter defense line was relocated early on S+ I and thoroughly prepared 
with good fields of fire and excellent communications to meet an attack by anything 
up to a battalion. A patrol was sent out to comb the gap left between the 6th and 43d 
Divisions to be sure no undetected counterattack was launched from there. This 
patrol led a merry chase for several days, engaging in several sharp fire fights with 
small J ap parties in which the score in killed was I 3 to o for our side. 
Shortly after OIOO the second night a Jap infiltration party ran smack into the 
portion of our line just southeast of the San Fabian railroad station. A sheet of flame 
and lead from everything from .30 calibre machine guns to 37 mm mountain guns 
Machine gun nest manned 
by men of B Company on 
perimeter south of San 
Fabian Railroad Station. 
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Railroad Station at 
San Fabian. 
firing cannister killed or wounded more than half the J aps, and the balance withdrew. 
Several days later when a suicide battalion was liquidated well inland, its captured 
orders disclosed its mission to be "destroying enemy strong points east of the railroad 
and north of the Bued River," a good indication that the Jap field commander re-
alized that ifhe wanted to raise havoc in the dump areas he would first have to breach 
a pretty substantial inner defense line. A few days after the first attempt, another 
was made at the opposite end of the line near Mabilao. TheJaps sneaked undetected 
to within arms length of one of our machine gun nests, but were repulsed after a brisk 
grenade-tossing melee. 
As the infantry units continued to make progress, the threat to the beach area 
diminished rapidly, and on S+ 5 and again on S+ ro the defense line was drastically 
thinned out, being converted in effect into a line of listening and warning posts. 
The LCS (S)s were joined by three ofthe LCM gunboats on S+2 and continued 
to support the r 72d Infantry's left flank near Rabon. While their light armament and 
high angle rockets did little damage to the well dug in J aps, the boats drew fire and 
spotted several gun positions which were eventually taken under fire by the larger 
naval vessels. 43d Division Artillery sent a special observation party on an LCMG 
well behind the J ap lines to try to spot "Pistol Pete" but without success. Later 
several Alamo scout patrols were landed in the bay above Damortis for the same pur-
pose. In these night missions no enemy opposition was encountered, but many hair 
raising moments occurred for those aboard, as the Navy, though notified hours in 
advance, never seemed to be able to notify the screening destroyers of our intended 
mission. It is hard to blame the larger ships for being wary, considering the menace 
of "Q:' boats with their deadly charges of TNT. Yet everyone aboard an LCM as a 
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Fletcher class "can" swoops out of the night at 30 knots with five 5 " ;38's trained on it, 
wishes he were elsewhere. 
The pressing need of the infantry units pushing into the mountains around 
Rosario and Pozzorubio for qualified guides caused Sixth Army to order the guerrilla 
forces operating in the vicinity of San Fernando to detach a battalion for service with 
the 43d Division. Scouts landed by boats of the 533d and from PTs contacted guer-
rilla headquarters and a rendezvous was made for S+ 10 at Aringay, I5 miles beyond 
the American lines. Two trips were made to bring out the 2 d Battalion, I 2 I st 
Filipino Infantry, all without interference on the part of the Japs. 
Although the commanders of the major service units who were to assume respon-
sibility for supply of Sixth Army after S+ 10, could not make up their minds until the 
last minute as to where they would locate the principal "ports," the Regiment con-
cluded that the White 2 area was the only feasible one and so set about getting 
organized. 
At Aringay, 15 miles behind the Jap lines, a battalion of the l2lst Philippine Infantry 
boards LCMs to join the American forces to the south. 
Bued River - first CP of the Boat 
Battalion on Luzon. 
The Boat Battalion began intensive development of the southwest bank of the 
Bued River which provided a nearly perfect site. Starting at the head of navigation 
the companies extended down the river bank leaving enough room for each boat 
to have its berth in 8 feet of water while its ramp rested flush against the bank- the 
most convenient landing-craft base imaginable. The r46rst set up on a slightly muddy 
bank but one which could be used to haul boats at all tides. The progress was slow 
for several reasons. Much vital equipment was on rear echelon shipping, and much 
that had been advisedly loaded on S+2 and S+4 ships was not unloaded until two 
weeks after S day, because of higher headquarters' habit of slapping on revised un-
loading priorities several times a day. Also the usual amount of tentage, etc. had been 
pilfered and some destroyed. Finally, all hands had so much to do with their primary 
tasks that establishing the bivouac received belated attention. Native craftsmen 
erected thatched huts for tentless units such as Company A and Boat Battalion Head-
quarters Company, and when at last housed, these units had the best quarters of all. 
Only one company kitchen was available for the whole Battalion, and that had to be 
subdivided so that a unit could be sent to A Company, 6 miles away on the Dagupan. 
Regimental Headquarters and the Shore Battalion also took over a fine area 
between White 2 and White 3 and despite pressure of beach work were soon well 
established and comfortably isolated by slews of salt water. Native workers, while 
not very industrious and invariably inconveniently in the way, made themselves 
more and more useful with the result that ere long all hands were living better than at 
any time since Fort Ord. 
A Company officers' mess on the 
Dagupan River. 
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Top four scenes: Initial bivouac of Regimental Headquarters Company back of White 
Beach 3. Bottom: Views of Headquarters Shore Battalion (left) and Regimental Head-
quarters toward the end of the stay on Luzon. 
~ --~ 
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Operations Under Base M Control 
The two months from January 20 to March 20 saw the Regiment enmeshed in 
the operations of a gigantic base which furnished the entire supply and administration 
for an army of 2oo,ooo in constant aggressive contact with the enemy. Though 
much of the fighting was scores of miles to the south, the presence of fighting within 
sight and hearing immediately to the north was a great stimulant to those engaged in 
service activities in the beach area. 
I 
i 
I 
' 
.I 
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Left: Colonel Johnson, Executive Officer Base M, argues with Col. Moore, Lt. Cols. Mc-
Lallen and Amory, and Capt. Kelchak over best location for the future base. 
Right: Major General Hugh Casey, Chief Engineer SWPA, visits Col. Moore a few days 
after the landing. 
In theory, Base M took over all responsibility for discharge of shipping and hand-
ling of supplies and assigned "sub-port" commanders to control these functions at 
the three unloading points - White 2, Dagupan, and the Calmay River. Inas-
much as more than three- fourths of the total tonnage was to come in over White 2, 
the 533d - though nominally relieved of all functions other than furnishing lighter-
age and beach labor - soon found out that its burdens were drastically increased 
rather than diminished by the advent of Base M. The Base was woefully under-
manned at first, being unable even to take care of its own communications. Its top 
personnel were experienced in handling ports with adequate piers and other facilities, 
but were totally unfamiliar with the problems of moving supplies via landing craft 
across an open beach. Consequently they organized the job on a horizontal basis 
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with one person in charge of port companies aboard the ships, another in charge of 
lighterage, another in charge of the beach labor, another with control over all trucks, 
and so on. As a result no one below the base commander himself was responsible for 
the movement of a box of rations from hold to dump, and the bickerings and back-
biting between the various facility commanders were incessant. 
The Regiment was in an unenviable position - it was the largest unit attached 
to the Base and the most conspicuous one, but it had no authority and could only 
work to improve the situation through persuasion and behind the scenes maneuvers. 
To almost every man in the Regiment and in the 543d EB&SR, which came under 
operational control of the 533d, the results of the organization, or lack thereof, were 
painfully apparent. LCM coxswains carried an average of I .6 pay-loads per 24-hour 
day, pounding on the beach for 8-Io hours while IO tons of supplies were unloaded. 
Shore Battalion crane operators twiddled their thumbs while a sling-load dangled 
20 or 30 minutes waiting for a truck. Dump truck drivers with full loads waited 
for hours in dumps in which there was no labor. 
After I o days of thorough snafu, various reorganizations were adopted and 
efficiency gradually improved. All LCMs were unloaded at one part of the beach, 
larger landing craft at another, and DUKWs at a third. Truck control was decentral-
ized more to the beachmasters, and the flow of tonnage kept reasonably steady. 
During the second week in February the 543d, less its reinforced boat company, 
was relieved and shipped out to participate in the Zamboanga landing. The 534th 
EB&SR, less its boat battalion, replaced them in the White Beach set-up. Company 
A of the 533d was at last relieved from attachment to the 544th EB&SR and moved 
to the Bued River, thereby concentrating the entire Boat Battalion for the first time 
in I5 months. 
Including the 543d boats, the Boat Battalion now had a fleet of I 50 cargo LCMs 
plus nearly 40 LCVPs and overhead boats. Of these 85% were kept operating at all 
times despite severe wear from the fine silt of the beach and the excessive age of many 
of the boats. IOO LCMs each day lightered cargo onto White Beach, while coastwise 
trips kept the balance busy. Boat control was developed to a high degree with a 
ponton barge surmounted by a tower anchored 200 yards off the landing beach. 
The LCM part of 
Beach White 2 in full 
operation with Filipi-
no labor, February, 
1945. 
~ ---- -
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From this tower all loaded boats were directed to beach slots, and empty boats to 
ships, thereby cutting to a minimum the wear and tear of idle boats on the beach. 
In addition to the dispatchers, clerks filled out forms feverishly, covering every boat 
trip as the first stage in a process of report fabrication that had to be set up to satisfy 
the statistics-crazed gentlemen of Base M and higher headquarters. 
The Shore Battalion took full charge of the LCM beach while the 534th handled 
the LCTs. As the fighting moved inland, native labor became more plentiful, and 
actual labor by men of the Battalion was reduced to such skilled work as rigging. 
Privates bossed gangs of 25 Pangasinans through their capitazes and did their best to 
get a half-dozen honest man-hours out of each hour the 25 worked. Though Base 
originally undertook to handle the administration and financial matters connected 
with the Filipino labor, it shortly turned this problem over to the Regiment. A full 
time labor section complete with interpreters and fistfuls of pesos kept tabs on the 
more than 6oo laborers who worked each day. 
Every piece of mechanical lifting equipment that could be obtained with a 
semblance of legality was employed on the beach as the proportion of heavy lifts far 
exceeded anything in the Regiment's previous experience with one- and two-division 
size task forces. But, as always, the beachmaster could have used three times as many 
cranes. To keep those few operating most steadily and most effectively, short piers 
were constructed at intervals along the beach. Not only did this eliminate the wear 
and tear on cranes incident to crawling about on the beach, but it kept the crane 
level, out of the surf, and off the tender ramp hinges of the LCMs. The piers were 
built without pile drivers, using jetting equipment improvised from fire pumps, and 
the effort expended on them was repaid many times over in the performance of the 
cranes and general efficiency of the beach. 
By the end of the period cargo handling was highly effective with the exception 
of movement in trucks from the beach to the dumps. The local base authorities con-
trolled the available trucks well, but there just were not enough for the job. The 
shortage was in large part caused by destruction of the railroad and the far greater 
than anticipated damage to port facilities in Manila. Consequently, truck companies 
which had been expected to operate exclusively in the San Fabian-Lingayen area 
found themselves running hundred-mile convoys in a desperate attempt to get supplies 
to troops east of Manila which should have been supplied over the Manila waterfront. 
Despite all shortcomings and difficulties the performance of the White Beach 
group set new records for the Pacific. The quota of 6ooo tons a day set by Sixth 
Army was regularly exceeded by nearly one third. The gooo tons handled on peak 
days were divided almost evenly among roo LCMs, 28 LCTs, and 300 or more DUKWs. 
No enemy shellfire could reach the beach during this period, but nights were 
requently enlivened by nuisance air raids. The two best remembered include the 
night of February 20 when a bomb landed flush in a pile ofland mines which deton-
ated, showering the Shore Battalion area with 240 mm (fortunately unfused) pro-
jectiles and demolishing E Company's kitchen. Few will ever forget the night a stick 
of 6 bombs crashed into the Rabon ammunition dump. The area for miles around 
was illuminated as 2500 tons of ammunition, including multi-colored flares, tracers, 
and HE, went up in an awe-inspiring display which lasted for many hours. 
Token regimental 
formation at which 
decorations for hero-
ism and meritorious 
service during the 
Lingayen Gulf land-
ing were presented by 
Colonel Moore, Febru-
ary, 1945. 
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Coastal Missions 
Though virtually the entire effort 
of the Regiment during these two 
months was devoted to the glamor-
less grind of getting supplies ashore, 
the Boat Battalion added new 
friends and laurels in a series of 
supply runs to points up the coast 
of Luzon far behind the enemy 
lines. It all developed quite by 
accident in the course of working 
out arrangements with the local 
PT squadrons so there would be 
no unfortunate clashes during night 
patrol actions. The PTs were find-
ing barge hunting along the north-
west coast of Luzon absolutely 
profitless and could not strafe J ap 
positions because of the danger 
of killing Filipinos. They figured 
good hunting could be had off 
the north coast around Aparri, 
but their cruising radius did not 
permit them to reach there from 
any base within American con-
trolled territory. So the 533d 
agreed to move an LCM fuel boat 
to Dirique inlet, I I 3 miles north-
ward of the most advanced Ameri-
can positions and on the extreme 
northwest corner of Luzon, and to 
keep it replenished by running 
cargo LCMs with drums of IOO-
octane gas up there in periodic 
convoys. This was done for several 
weeks and, though no particular 
excitement developed other than 
with our own airforces, it did re-
sult in the distinction of maintain-
ing the northernmost outpost in the 
Theatre. 
Toe-to-toe fighting along the Villa Verde Trail- 32d Division doughboys battle for one of 
the countless ridges in central Luzon. 
In the course of coordinating this mission with the guerrilla forces that would 
screen it from the neighboring Jap garrisons, the Regiment became acquainted with 
Colonel Volkmann, leader of all guerrilla forces in northern Luzon. The brilliant 
record of his Division did much to pave the way for the reconquest of Luzon, but his 
men had been operating with virtually no outside assistance in the way of supplies 
and by February were in desperate need of many items, ranging from guns to radio 
tubes. Air drops in the steep jungle-clad mountains were not too successful. The 
Navy could not spare escorts for LSMs and LCTs and would not permit them to 
operate beyond Lingayen Gulf without escort. The problem was a natural for the 
Boat Battalion, and after securing permission of Sixth Army it undertook responsibil-
ity for all water-borne supply of the northern Luzon forces and to provide the neces-
sary escort with its own gunboats. A liaison radio station manned by 533d men was 
established at Volkmann's CP to eliminate the delays incident to using army, corps, 
or similar channels, and a regular convoy run was established to the beaches at Duri-
gayos, Santiago, and Currimao controlled by guerrilla units. In five weeks 1000 tons 
of essential equipment and supplies were placed in the hands of this hard pressed 
unit, and its subsequent spectacular successes in seizing San Fernando and cutting 
Route 5 in the Cagayan valley were materially assisted by that support. 
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Heavy northerly winds and seas were the principal obstacle to these missions, and 
the risk of a disabled boat's falling into Jap hands was not inconsiderable, but the 
hospitality of the populace at the ports of call made assignment to one of these convoys 
coveted by all men of the boat companies. 
Because of the dominance by the Navy of the waters west of Luzon, the Japs 
generally avoided digging in on the coast, so the type of support the LCM gunboats 
gave east of Aitape could not be utilized. Yet several night patrols of the 33d Division 
and the I58th RCT were landed in the Caba-Aringay area to obtain prisoners and 
information. The predilection of the J ap forces for caves in the mountains made 
these tame affairs, but one never failed to get a thrill making a midnight landing 
miles behind the enemy's front lines. 
A small detachment of Boat Battalion men put the techniques they had developed 
on gunboats to good use far from salt water. When the 40th Division ran into ex-
tremely stubborn resistance in the Zambales mountains west of Fort Stotsenburg, 
they sent a hurried call to the 533d for rocket batteries. Launchers were quickly 
transferred to light trucks and a provisional battery organized and dispatched south-
ward to the scene of the mountain fighting. The 4.5-inch rockets were employed 
with fair results, but the officer in charge concluded that the weapon really needed 
was the T-32 portable 37 mm cannon which he had mounted on gunboats back at 
Aitape. When these were brought up they proved just the thing for blasting at 
otherwise masked cave mouths, and the amphibian engineers had qualified as experts 
in mountain artillery! 
Where Next? 
No sooner had the Regiment caught its collective breath after the initial landing 
than rumors of its next assignment popped up at every turn. Most of these had some 
basis of fact, because GHQ backed and filled for several weeks before final allocation 
of amphibian units to succeeding operations, and Sixth Army and even division 
headquarters for a long time were not sure that an "end run" to take Baguio from the 
northwest would not be necessary. During February I Corps plans to pull the 25th 
Division out of the lines near San jose and throw them into a shore-to-shore operation 
from White Beach to San Fernando reached the stage where boat allotment tables 
and wave diagrams were being prepared. On March 4 the 33d Division decided to 
make a regimental combat team landing at Aringay on March 7 but canceled it 
when a drive up the coastal highway met surprisingly light resistance. Sixth Army 
had the 53 3d scheduled for a XIV Corps task force with I st Cavalry and I I th Air-
borne Divisions, but called off the show. 
Meanwhile, at the exalted levels of inter-army and GHQnegotiations there was 
much wire pulling. All brigades wanted to get the best assignments, but without 
prejudice to their being available when the lineups were announced for the assault on 
Japan later in the year. The decision ultimately made was that all three brigades 
would be concentrated as well as possible for employment against Japan, but that the 
assignment to intervening operations would be dictated by considerations of present 
location and available shipping. Thus the 2d Brigade, which was spread in the cen-
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tral Philippines from Leyte through Mindoro to Subic Bay, would be employed in the 
Visayan landings under Eighth Army, the 3d Brigade, nearly half of which was still 
in New Guinea, would furnish the amphibians required by Eighth Army for the 
recapture of Mindanao, and the boat elements needed by the Aussies in their attacks 
on Borneo. The 4th Brigade already concentrated on or en route to Luzon fell heir 
to the Manila assignment by the process of elimination. To some in the Regiment 
this was a blow, but Manila turned out to be pretty grim and involved pure service 
troop functions, while the Mindanao tour was to contain plenty of surprises and 
enough action to make the last few months of hostilities pass quickly. 
As a consequence of the knowledge that the next assignment would be in an active 
campaign, advantage was taken of the proximity of a huge base to procure many 
items always wanted but never before had. Conversely both Battalions sloughed off 
T IE and S.L.O.E. equipment which was obviously not worth its weight and space. 
New cranes, tractors, and dump trucks increased the effectiveness of the Shore Bat-
talion, and at the same time it unburdened itself of such little used items as the saw 
mill, track press, and well-drilling rig. The Boat Battalion foraged far and wide to 
capitalize on lessons learned in recent campaigns. 40 mm guns were obtained for the 
LCMGs, and each company built a new one incorporating all manner of new im-
provements. 1 20-tube rocket launchers permitted construction of single purpose 
rocket LCMs, and some fast talking to a 4th ESB supply officer wangled 100 new 
twin .50 calibre Heintz mounts for the cargo LCMs. Spare parts were procured 
from floating supply ships in quantities undreamed of in New Guinea. A few replace-
ment boats, deck-loaded from the States, replaced utterly worn-out craft, but a sub-
4·3d Division's memorial service at San Fabian, February 24, 1945; Top left: contingents 
from all elements of the reinforced Division form around the cemetery; top right: Guard 
of Honor from 12lst Filipino Regiment; bottom left: General Krueger, Major Generals 
Swift and Wing, commanding Sixth Army, I Corps, and 43d Division respectively, arrive; 
bottom right: ruins of 17th century abbey at San Fabian. 
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stantial majority of the vehicles and boats that were to participate in the last campaign 
of the war had seen extensive service in New Guinea. 
On the 20th of March the 533d was officially relieved from duty with Base M, 
but in order not to cause any more disruption than necessary, normal functions were 
continued until March 26, just two days before the final farewell to Luzon. 
Manila- next to Warsaw the most devastated city in the world- was visited by many of the 533d. 
CHAPTER XII 
Mindanao 
FROM the point of view of grand strategy the Mindanao campaign was strictly a 
clean-up affair. The island ofMindanao was not required as a jumping off place 
for the attack on Japan, but the Southwest Pacific forces had been assigned by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff the positive mission of destroying the Japanese forces in all the 
Philippine Islands and re-establishing the lawful government throughout the Arch-
ipelago. This mission was identical for the western Visayan Islands, and the order 
in which the assaults were made on the various islands of the Southern Philippines 
was dictated primarily by MacArthur's genius at keeping theJap garrisons bewitched 
and befuddled. The campaigns in the spring of I 945 in this area were known collec-
tively as the Victor Operations: V-I was to free Panay and Negros; V-2, Cebu; V-3, 
Palawan; V-4, Zamboanga and the Sulu Archipelago; and V-5, Mindanao less the 
Zamboanga peninsula. 
In order that our air arm might range over the South China Sea to North 
Borneo and Indo China, Palawan, westernmost of the Phillipines, and Zamboanga, 
nearest to Borneo, were attacked first. Then came the V-2 and V-I campaigns in the 
central Visayas, leaving by early April the main part of Mindanao as the only sub-
stantial land mass in the Philippines where the J ap garrison was not under relentless 
attack. 
Planning 
Mindanao, about the size ofPennsylvania, is the largest of the Philippine Islands. 
It is also the most rugged, least populated, and generally least civilized and developed. 
With the exception of Davao it has no city worthy of the name. Its "road net" is 
limited essentially to an east-west road from Lake Lanao thru Malabang, Parang, 
Pikit, and Santa Cruz to Davao, and a north-south track (the Sayre Highway ) 
which wanders northward from Kabacan to Bugo on the north coast. 
The defending garrison, composed of the Japanese 30th and I ooth Divisions plus 
a miscellany of naval troops and service personnel aggregating about so,ooo effec-
tives, was deployed in the principal towns and controlled the roads. Especially at 
Davao were they emplaced in strength with elaborate defenses and large quantities 
of automatic weapons and artillery. A frontal assault on Davao Gulfnot only would 
expose the attacking troops to murderous fire but would, in addition, require the forc-
ing of what the Navy considered the most vicious mine fields in the Theatre. So 
Eighth Army was ordered to "hit 'em where they ain't" by landing in the Moro Gulf 
and then moving overland more than IOO miles to take Davao in the rear. 
The force designated for this campaign was X Corps consisting of the 24th and 
3 Ist Infantry Divisions and 2o,ooo assorted attached troops, including the 533d 
EB&SR. Planning the attack, set for April I 7, commenced at Leyte on March I 5, 
and as will be seen, continued at Luzon, Mindoro and at sea right up until a few hours 
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MINDANAO 163 
before the first craft hit the beach. The Task Force's princiP.al components staged 
at points ranging from Luzon, Leyte, and Mindoro to Morotai, and were not to meet 
until the last moment. Since the 24th Division was to make the assault and the 31st 
not to come ashore until five days thereafter, the Regiment was attached to the 24th 
and operated exclusively under its control during the planning stages and through 
the assault and initial exploitation. 
The primary objectives in the assault on the shores of the Mora Gulf were the 
airstrip at Malabang and the town of Parang at the head of Polloc Harbor, which 
appeared to be the most satisfactory spot for the corps base of operations. Since air 
photos showed Polloc Harbor had nothing vaguely resembling a decent landing 
beach and, in addition, was believed to be fairly well fortified, X Corps and 24th 
Division commanders decided to land initially along the Malabang beaches and to 
take Parang from the rear by moving 35 miles along the road. The possibility of a 
sea-borne attack on Parang in conjunction with the overland attack was discussed, as 
was the problem of clearing the Mindanao River delta. But no detailed decisions 
were reached at the corps conferences at Leyte, and so the Regiment left Luzon 
hardly knowing more than above set forth. 
The movement to Mindoro from San Fabian was accomplished by the Boat 
Battalion on its own craft and by the rest of the Regiment on four LSTs. The Boat 
Battalion planned to move in three company serials, commencing on March 28 and 
successive days. As no fuel could be guaranteed at Subic Bay by units stationed there, 
arrangement~ were made to have a tug move the two organic fuel barges to Subic Bay 
with the first serial, and from Subic Bay to Mindoro with the last. Typhoon warnings 
caused the naval port director to refuse clearance for the convoys until March 31; 
consequently the plan of moving by serials a day apart was abandoned, and the entire 
Boat Battalion, consisting of one 63' command boat, five LCMGs, 27 LCVPs, and 
106 LCMs, departed from Lingayen at 0700, arriving at Subic Bay 1200 April 1. 
A naval escort, consisting of an LCI, was furnished for this part of the voyage in 
deference to the presence of a large tug, but the port director at Subic Bay, because of 
a shortage of escort vessels, designated one of the 533d's LCMGs as the escort for the 
tow for the run to Mindoro. Band C Company departed Subic Bay at 0700 April 2, 
and arrived in good order at Mangarin Bay, Mindoro, at ogoo the following day. 
Company A left Subic Bay a day later, and made the same schedule. A temporary 
camp and maintenance beach was set up on the eastern shore of Mangarin Bay, 
adjacent to the Boat Battalion of the 532d EB&SR. 
Four LSTs arrived at Lingayen on April 1 and were loaded on the following 
day, providing ample room for all authorized and informally acquired equipment. 
This convoy departed Lingayen on April 4 and arrived at Mindoro forty-eight hours 
later. Regimental Headquarters Company and the Shore Battalion debarked and 
set up a temporary bivouac approximately one-half mile inland from the LST beach. 
Representatives of the Regiment, meanwhile, had proceeded to Mindoro via 
command boat and were busily working out plans and orders with the 24th Division 
staff and the staff of Naval Task Group 78.2. In many respects this operation looked 
much simpler than Lingayen; in others it would be far more complex. The most 
I 
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obvious difference was that no large navy transports, APAs, AKAs, or the like would 
be involved. This would ease the shore party load but would make the Boat Bat-
talion's job more difficult in requiring a long run on its own bottoms and probably 
considerable ramp-to-ramp unloading. 
The scheme of maneuver was essentially dictated by conditions of beach and 
inland terrain. Opposite the airstrip and town ofMalabang the beach was apparently 
suitable only at high tide for craft no larger than LSMs. The beach at Parang was 
doubtful at low tide for any craft and probably useful at high tide only for LCTs and 
small boats. Moreover, if the enemy had gun positions on the capes protecting Polloc 
Harbor, a landing at Parang would be too hazardous for the ships involved. Only at 
the extreme left flank of the objective area, at Baras Plantation, was there a beach 
positively capable ofreceiving LSTs satisfactorily. Given these conditions, there was 
no alternative to the Division's plan of attack, which was as follows: 
Red Beach (Baras Plantation): Land one battalion to secure the beachhead and 
follow it with all LSTs. 
White Beach (Airstrip): Land two battalions in column with small craft, with 
the mission of seizing the airstrip and assisting in capture of the town. 
Blue Beach (Malabang Town): Land one RCT in column ofbattalions, with the 
dual mission of destroying the garrison of 700 in the town and of pushing rapidly 
down Route No. I to take Parang in the rear. 
Green Beach (Parang): To be secured if possible by overland envelopment and if 
not, after reconnaissance by PTs, L VTs, and gunboats, to be assaulted with units 
previously landed on Malabang Beach or, if the latter were unexpectedly engaged, 
by elements of the combat team in floating reserve. 
Under such a scheme, beach control rather than beach labor was the difficult 
problem. With three beaches stretching over more than five miles of coast to be 
handled on R Day, and a fourth beach twenty-two miles distant to be operated on 
R + I, the control sections of the Shore Battalion had to be spread extremely thin. 
The general plan for employment ofthe Shore Battalion was to divide one com-
pany between White and Blue Beaches, to assign one company to operate Red Beach, 
and to have one company land at Red Beach to reinforce the company assigned to 
that beach if necessary, the last company to be prepared to move by LCM to Green 
Beach at the earliest opportunity. 
For tactical purposes the Boat Battalion was required to furnish only two waves 
of LCVPs, IO boats each, and one wave of 8 LCMs, but it was recognized by the 
division commander that additional LCMs were essential if the light vehicles, small 
dozers, and boat maintenance equipment of the Regiment were to be available when 
needed. Moreover, the possibility of subsequent shore-to-shore movements made the 
presence of all available army landing craft desirable. The 533d was, therefore, 
encouraged to take all craft possible, provided the Admiral approved. He insisted 
that the Navy's LCTs be towed by the larger landing ships but agreed to allow all but 
I8 of the LCMs to proceed as the 533d saw fit. The acquiescence of the naval com-
mander in the unescorted movement of 99 small craft nearly 350 miles, and in the 
rendezvous and junction of these craft with the naval convoy for the final one hundred 
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and thirty miles of the approach, reversed Seventh Fleet's long established policy of 
not tolerating long distance moves of army craft in connection with assault operations. 
As will be seen hereafter, the presence of these extra craft was the principal factor in 
the initial rapid progress of the campaign. 
The final questions determined at Mindoro dealt with the subsidiary landings 
and reconnaissances. The Division adopted the recommendations of the Regiment 
as to scouting Ibus and Bongo Islands early in the game and assigned appropriate 
missions in the reconnaissance along the coast to Parang. Initially under the impres-
sion that the opening of the Mindanao River would be a navy task, the General 
refused to specify this as a mission of the 533d EB&SR. After the naval commander 
stated that the shoal water in the river might preclude his LCIGs and PGMs from 
accomplishing this task, the division commander tentatively assigned this mission 
to the Regiment, reinforced by one rifle company, but stated that final orders would 
be issued only after the securing of Parang. 
The Trip 
A rehearsal was held on April I I. It included the prescribed maneuvers for all 
ships and boats engaged in organized waves, except those army boats that were 
already enroute to Zamboanga. Assault troops went ashore, but neither vehicles 
nor bulk cargo were discharged, and heavy amphibious shipping merely crossed the 
line of departure and then returned to the anchorage. The small boats performed 
well, but it was found that the time allotted between deployment of the convoy and 
H Hour allowed for absolutely no mishaps. In fact, the LCMs, after casting off their 
tows, had to run I I miles at top speed in order to cross the line of departure at the 
prescribed time. A critique aboard the flagship later that day resulted in the Navy's 
consenting to increase the time cushion by moving the deployment area nearer the 
beach. There is no doubt but that the holding ofthis rehearsal was of great value to 
the boat crews and wave leaders, who had had only one previous ship-to-shore opera-
tion in two years. Moreover, this particular operation was far more complicated than 
the normal ship-to-shore attack from naval transports, because 95% of the boats 
picked up their troops not only from ships other than those towing or carrying them, 
but also from ships which, in the transport area, lay many miles from the point at 
which the boat coxswains were put on their own. 
The embarkation presented no noteworthy difficulties, though cancellation of 
some of the promised LSTs meant that a fair sized rear echelon had to remain at 
Mindoro awaiting the turnaround shipping. Lack of time required all sorts of short 
cuts. The Shore Battalion actually had less than 48 hours between the time it de-
barked at Mindoro and the beginning ofloading out. Thus the standard program of 
carefully worked out field orders issued in lengthy briefing conferences by each head-
quarters was necessarily telescoped into the preparation and rapid distribution of a 
single field order, followed by short skull practice sessions for such key personnel as 
could be spared from the work of out-loading. The experience at Lingayen, where the 
shore party successfully handled an emergency of unforseen magnitude, tended to 
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give all hands a feeling of confidence and of indifference to formal orders. "Just tell 
us where we're to land -we know the rest" was the general attitude. How little 
they knew the extent to which events were to put this glib assurance to the test! 
Except for a command and communications group loaded in 6 LCMs, Regi-
mental Headquarters Company was left for the R +I I turnaround. The Boat 
Battalion was allotted LST space for its tractors and shop trucks, and carried the bulk 
of its personnel and equipment, including that of the I46Ist EM Company, in 46 
LCMs. The Shore Battalion had all its DUKWs loaded in I3 LCMs of the assault 
waves, as well as its weapons section and light dozers. In addition, its light vehicles 
and 2;Y2-ton trucks not loaded in LSTs were carried in 26 LCMs. 
The LCMs were loaded on April 8 and g, each one carrying, in addition to its 
cargo, IO individuals, including the crew, on the general theory that IO men on an 
LCM would be less acutely uncomfortable than 500 men on an LST. The truth of 
this assumption was proved by the experience of personnel on the LSTs. The LSTs 
were loaded on April g, IO, and I2. At their davits swung 3 LCS (S)s and 2I LCVPs 
of the 533d. 
The LCM trip from Mindoro to Zamboanga was blessed with ideal weather and 
glassy seas, as three separate convoys left at daybreak on April 10, I I and I2. Not 
only did this division make the run easier on coxswains and control officers, but it also 
would be less apt to tip the hand of the whole Task Force should a casual Jap plane 
spot the boats. The run of 338 miles was actually non-stop with each boat carrying 
enough fuel in drums to keep it going. En route the Cagayan Islands were visited 
and the expected evacuation of the Japs confirmed. 
After an average passage of 52 hours the boats tied up along the T wharf at 
Zamboanga. There 2 to 4 days were spent on refueling and minor repairs, exercise 
and recreation ashore, and getting acquainted with and sizing up the first of many 
Moros we were to meet. The 543d EB&SR, which had landed there a month previ-
ously, were fine hosts during this stay, and the relaxation was only slightly upset by 
receipt of a secret radio message froni the flagship saying "Be prepared for alternate 
plan eliminating landings at Blue and White Beaches and substituting a I300 assault 
landing on Polloc Harbor itself." Since there was no possible way to " be prepared" 
any better than had been done, there was nothing to do except await the junction 
with the naval convoy two days later. 
The naval convoy left Mindoro at I300 April I4. Aboard the flagship, informa-
tion was received that the Japanese garrison at Malabang had been evacuated by 
boat to the Cotabato area, and that guerrilla forces controlled most of the Malabang-
Left: C Company convoy moves out of Mindoro bound for Zamboanga 338 miles away. 
Right: The entire flotilla of the 533d tied up at Zamboanga two days before the attack. 
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Parang area. Confronted with this situation, the task force commander made a 
radical change in his attack plan. Only the Red Beach assault was left unchanged; 
the elements originally assigned to assault Blue Beach were ordered to attack Parang 
(Green Beach) at H+6o, to be followed by the elements originally assigned to White 
Beach. All of the LSTs, except for 7 carrying aviation engineers, and 8 carrying air 
force units, were to land at Green Beach, and all but two of the I 5 LSMs originally 
designated for White and Blue Beaches were diverted to Parang. 
The wave structure remained unchanged, with the White Beach waves following 
on call those originally assigned to Blue Beach. The occupation of Ibus Island was 
left to the 533d, which was charged with a new mission of conducting a reconnais-
sance in force of Bongo Island at the earliest possible time. 
This was no minor adjustment but rather a drastic revision in the whole assault 
operation. In military doctrine it had always been axiomatic that an amphibious 
operation once launched could no more be redirected than an arrow once the bow 
string is released. It is doubtful if such a change was ever hazarded in any other major 
sea-borne operation. The decision not only indicated great flexibility and daring in 
the minds of the admirals and generals, but more important, sublime confidence in 
their subordinates' ability to grasp new orders quickly and to execute them without 
too great confusion. Naturally the change affected the 53 3d more drastically than 
any other unit in the task force, and General Woodruff opened his shipboard confer-
ence in which he issued the new orders with the sober words "We will now have one 
minute of silent prayer for the 533d." 
The naval convoy was due off Zamboanga at 0940 on R- I, where it was to drop 
off the R + 2 shipping and be joined by task force elements from Leyte. Because of 
the strong currents in Basilan Strait, the 533d directed its small boats to join the con-
voy well east of the Strait off Malanipa Island at noon. The naval convoy, unfortu-
nately, was approximately two hours behind schedule, so its predicted speed of advance 
of 6. 7 knots would not enable it to meet H Hour. So the Boat Battalion, which was 
already at its rendezvous, at noon was ordered to proceed ahead keeping to one side 
of the track of the convoy, and to join it four hours later than scheduled, thereby 
shortening the time during which it would have to strain its engines to maintain 
station. 
Part of the 533d fleet of LCMs in Basilan Straits off Zamboanga awaiting the passage of the 
naval convoy it was to trail across Moro Gulf. 
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At noon on R- I aboard a PC screening the convoy the details of the new plan 
of attack were learned for the first time by Colonel Moore and his staff. The next 
two hours were devoted to a careful study and final revision of the amended regi-
mental order which had been drafted singlehanded by the 533d liaison officer. 
All this was accomplished in the time it took the regimental command boat to reach 
the Boat Battalion convoy, which was still preceding the naval convoy east of Basilan 
Straits. The commander of the Boat Battalion had meanwhile been directed to 
assemble his mission leaders aboard his command boat, and in the period I 400-
I 500 necessary instructions were issued to the boat commanders. The most serious 
problem arose from the fact that, whereas the original towing bill insured that all 
towed LCMs reach their proper rendezvous area, the revised destinations of the major 
amphibious shipping diverted five towed LCMs with Red Beach shore party person-
nel and equipment from the Red Beach group to the new Green Beach group. In 
addition, the assault force on Bongo Island had to be organized from mechanics, 
cooks, and miscellaneous passengers aboard the LCM convoy, and this personnel 
transferred to selected boats. Finally, the proposed division of the naval convoy after 
dark required a new disposition of the boat companies within the convoy. 
The regimental command boat next pulled alongside the subchaser on which the 
Shore Battalion commander was embarked and advised him of the new plan. As to 
getting information to other Shore Battalion elements aboard LSTs, the regimental 
command group could do nothing but rely on the general briefing that the task 
force commander directed be held on each ship. Inasmuch as the distribution of the 
new orders was not completed to all ships in the convoy until after dark, this briefing 
was extremely sketchy and left many key personnel completely in the air. 
About I6oo the stately convoy covering 25 square miles drew up to the waiting 
flotilla ofLCMs at 8 knots- more than a knot faster than scheduled because of its two 
hours' tardiness. The wide screen of destroyers slipped by on both sides ofthe LCMs, 
followed by the light cruisers Cleveland, Denver and Montpelier and the five APDs. 
Then, led by the command ship Wasatch, came the phalanx of thirty-odd landing 
ships each towing an LCT or an LCM. Along the flanks were strung the mine-
sweepers, LCis, rocket and gunboats and at the tail came the tugs and minor auxil-
iaries. Small it was indeed compared to the armada which entered Lingayen Gulf 
three months before, but frightfully potent looking when viewed from the deck of a 
36' J boat or even one of the line-of-battle 56' gunboats! 
The coxswains and wave leaders maneuvered as close as they could to the passing 
naval vessels, but even so they had to move 2000 yards laterally to reach their proper 
station in the convoy which was moving at the maximum speed their LCMs could 
attain. To make matters worse, the main convoy doubled up, with the Red Beach 
group increasing speed to move out to port and abreast of the main body. At the 
same time a series of sharp easterly squalls slapped the stub-nosed craft head on, and 
as a finishing touch the Navy increased speed another halfknot. It was soon apparent 
that the LCMs could not physically keep up and that if they tried to, extensive engine 
damage would result. So orders were issued to reduce speed to standard cruising 
(7 knots) and to proceed to the objective area independently of the naval convoy. 
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The rest of the night was a tough grind for all in the Boat Battalion. Black 
squalls cut visibility to inches. Head winds made it difficult to maintain even 7 knots. 
And the run was further complicated by the naval convoy's failure to adhere to its 
revised courses and its turns and speed changes made without signal of any sort. 
Nevertheless (with the exception of a single boat which took a 150-mile detour) the 
boat company convoys - B Company heading for Red Beach and A and C Com-
panies heading for Parang- remained in good order and within dubious visual 
contact until daybreak. At that time all boats opened everything wide, including the 
tool box, and reached their rendezvous areas on schedule. 
The Landing 
The Ibus Island force, consisting of four LCMs and one DUKW, supported by 
one LCMG, reached the island's coral shelf at 0730, precisely on schedule. It found a 
suitable landing point seven minutes later and was able to report fifteen minutes 
before the eight o'clock H Hour that the island was free of enemy. 
Wave I at Red Beach, consisting of ten LCVPs, picked up its troops from two 
LSTs and landed them on time. Wave 2 contained four LCMs towed by LSMs, 
each carrying a DUKW for Wave 4· Unfortunately, the wave leader's boat was 
As from large trans-
ports, troops scram-
ble down cargo nets 
from LSTs before 
going ashore in 
LCVPs. 
f 
astern of an LSM diverted to Parang, but a staff sergeant completed the wave by 
commandeering another boat, which had been towed contrary to plan to the Red 
Beach area, and launched the DUKWs and picked up his troops. The ramp cable 
of one LCM broke under the weight of the DUKW, allowing the ramp to fall vertical 
in the water, but the same staff sergeant re-rigged it in time to land his wave on schedule 
though to do so he had to skip crossing the line of departure, to the chagrin of the 
naval control officer. Wave 3, consisting of seven LCMs which had traveled under 
MINDANAO 171 
their own power from Mindoro, crossed the line of departure in good order and ar-
rived on time. Four of the eight DUKWs in Wave 4 were in LCMs towed to Parang, 
but the other four landed as they should. Thus the Red Beach phase of the landing 
and the boat operations were completed successfully despite the confusing change in 
plans. 
Meanwhile, the Bongo Island mission embarked in two LCMs, supported by 
two LCMGs, made its landing at H- 15, and after contacting guerrillas, was able to 
report to the flagship by H + 30 that the island was free of J aps. 
At Green Beach the waves all landed on schedule on the right beach, despite the 
fact that no coxswain had any idea of his destination until R Day. Three LCMs had 
their tow cables part during the night of R Day, but proceeded independently under 
their own power and succeeded in joining their waves during the deployment. 
Coastal reconnaissance missions mounted in L VTs, supported by LCMGs, 
LCIGs, and LCS(S)s, proceeded both north and south of Green Beach, covering the 
coast prior to dark from Tugabangan Point to the Simuay River. One LCMG pro-
ceeded twenty miles down the coast to a point below the Mindanao River to pick up 
guerrilla liaison officers. 
Neither on any of the beaches nor on these coastwise missions was contact made 
with the enemy; in fact, the only opposition encountered by the entire Task Force 
during R Day was a small sniper party near the town of Parang. 
Company D, which comprised the bulk of the shore party at Red Beach, had 
loaded its reconnaissance elements, beach marking equipment, and communications 
equipment in DUKWs, and its engineering equipment and part ofits reconnaissance 
team in LCMs of Wave 3· The latter arrived on schedule, but the diversion of half 
of the DUKWs to Parang deprived it of all its beach marking equipment and im-
portant communication items. The beach was excellent from a hydrographic point 
of view, but the sand was extremely heavy and loose. Heavy vegetation limited the 
beach to a depth of I 5-20 yards, and lateral traffic was practically impossible. Slots 
were cleared directly inland from each LST landing point to the good ground. The 
shore party had two D-4s, one D-6 , and a D-8 , and the LSTs contained a number of 
bulldozers belonging to engineer units; so the work of towing vehicles through the 
loose sand and of clearing slots proceeded rapidly. Landing mat in quantity would 
have assisted materially, but efforts to obtain it had as usual been unsuccessful. One 
roll of cyclone fence was carried on each alternate LST and was useful as far as it 
went. Some LSTs beached absolutely dry, others required a short ramp no longer 
than twenty-five feet. The eight LSTs, which were designated to beach on R Day, 
were all discharged and retracted by 2200. In addition, the seven LSTs scheduled 
for R + 1 were beached late on R Day and were completely unloaded by early the 
following afternoon. Because of the soft beach egress roads, nearly 70% of the bulk 
was discharged on the beach by hand, and thereafter was moved as quickly as possible 
to the dump areas. The total tonnage discharged during the first 30 hours at this 
beach was 4940 tons of mobile cargo, 3750 tons of bulk, and 150 tons of bulk back-
loading, a total of 8840 tons. 
F Company and elements of R egimental and Shore Battalion H eadquarters 
The shore at Parang is scanned from 
LCMG MAl as it leads an early wave 
to the well bombarded beach on 
April 17, 1945. 
Companies, which arrived at Red Beach, were immediately moved 25 miles to 
Green Beach, using the B Company LCMs which had been assigned to Red Beach 
for ramp-to-ramp lightering in the event that LSTs could not beach. 
The shore line of Polloc Harbor, except for Green Beach, is generally useless 
for all types of landing craft because of steep cliffs or flat, soft mud beaches, mangrove 
swamps, or a combination of these. Green Beach itself is a soft, sand-covered coral 
shelf approximately three hundred yards in length, with one foot of water over the 
shelf at low tide and five to seven feet at high tide. The only egress was a steep road 
off the north end, and a solid row of houses immediately at the high tide mark blocked 
LSMs and an LCI on Green Beach, Parang. 
Green Beach, Parang, as seen from the Beachmaster's CP on the second day of 
the campaign. 
two-thirds of the area available for lateral traffic. The jetty, approximately two 
hundred yards north of the beach, had been rendered totally unserviceable by un-
necessary last minute air bombardment. 
By a fortunate coincidence, high tide occurred at H +go, with the result that all 
small craft were able to beach and retract without difficulty. The LSMs and LCis 
got over the shelf on their way in, but many were unable to retract until the succeed-
ing tide. The only shore party elements to arrive early on R Day were those on the fifth 
wave, carried in LCMs. This group reconnoitered dump areas and with one D-6 and 
two D-4s as the sole engineer equipment at their disposal prior to the arrival of F 
Company from Red Beach, proceeded to clear the huge quantity of debris resulting 
from the demolition of the houses on the beach by naval gunfire, and to repair large 
craters in the existing road at the north end of the beach until it was capable ofhand-
ling the flow of mobile traffic. 
Troops assembling on Green Beach 
after debarking from LSMs and 
LCis. 
. l 
I 
I 
Makeshift unloading of LSTs- Left: Heavy equipment is brought ashore on sections of 
ponton causeway; right: Ramp-to-ramp discharge using LCM. 
Test landings of LSTs disclosed that they could approach no nearer than five 
hundred feet from the beach, and as there were only four strings of ponton cubes 
with the Task Force, LSTs had initially to be discharged solely by lightering. Even 
this could not be commenced until the evening flood tide because of the congestion 
on the limited beach where many of the LCis, LCTs, and LSMs of the assault waves 
were unable to retract, and, as will be seen later, a substantial portion of the LCMs 
were at that time diverted to a tactical operation. Early on the morning ofR + r, 
three of the ponton strings were installed as extensions of the undamaged portion 
of the jetty, enabling three LSTs to discharge there simultaneously. Immediate ad-
vantage was taken of the arrival of additional ponton cubes on R+z, and a jetty was 
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A section of ponton 
causeway is floated 
into position by an 
LCM. 
Jetty at Parang, as 
seen from the old 
Spanish Fort, after 
ponton cube exten-
sion enabled it to 
receive LSTs. 
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Jetty of ponton-cube sections accommodates seven LSTs at once. 
constructed at the north end of the beach, which extended 4 70 feet from shore and 
by R + 3 possessed a frontage of 400 feet with a capacity of eight LSTs. 992 ponton 
cubes were employed in this jetty. After the construction of the jetty, LSTs were 
handled rapidly, with the result that the Navy's return convoy schedules were met. 
Looking across Pol-
loc Harbor from be-
hind Green Beach. 
~ 
, 
Top left: Green Beach as seen from the partially ruined steamer wharf. Bottom left: A 
battalion of the 21st Infantry moves inland from Parang to support the 19th Infantry. 
Right: Two views of the initial beachmaster's CP on Green Beach. 
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The Mindanao River 
Though the 533d's field order included provisions for the assault on the lower 
reaches of the double-mouthed Mindanao River, the division commander would not 
commit himself to the operation until Parang was secured. At I 700 R Day the Gen-
eral decided to seize the Cotabato-Tamontaka area by an amphibious assault, be-
cause a succession of blown bridges was slowing the I gth Infantry's southward prog-
ress along the highway. For the operation he created an informal task unit consisting 
ofthe 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, and the gunboat elements and such other 533d craft 
as were needed. Since the infantry commander was confronted with the problem 
without any forewarning, the general scheme previously studied and recommended 
by the 53 3d was readily accepted, and tactical control of the operation was given to 
533d officers. The initial objective was set as a line not more than a mile east ofthe 
two towns. 
The plan of attack was a simultaneous forcing of both river mouths, using inde-
pendent gunboat teams, aggregating five LCMGs, one LCM rocket, and three 
LCS (S)s, to be followed by the landing of one reinforced rifle company at Tamontaka 
and of the remainder of the infantry battalion at Cotabato. No assistance from the 
Igth Infantry, advancing along the highway from Parang, could be expected until 
R+2. One cruiser, one destroyer and two flights ofB-25s were to support the opera-
tion, controlled through JASCO units on the leading gunboats. 
In previous planning, it had been expected that the ground forces would arrive 
at the north bank of the river and be ferried across, using a minimum of boats, so this 
new, completely amphibious assault which required twenty-four cargo LCMs and 
fourteen LCVPs, presented unforeseen problems in collecting and organizing assault 
waves. This was further complicated by the fact that the planning conference did 
not break up until after dark, by the heavy rain which set in at sunset and continued 
Looking forward on 
LCMG MCI; note 
theJap25mmauto-
matic cannon in the 
after cockpit. 
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all night, and by the crowded condition of the beach, arising from the pressure of 
ramp-to-ramp lightering of the LSTs. By virtue of frantic efforts and considerable 
luck the boats were rounded up and beached, the infantry with its jeeps, trucks and 
self-propelled howitzers were sorted out and loaded over, among, and around the 
troops and materiel still pouring ashore across the beach. The waves were organized 
on the backs of envelopes, and officers and sergeants were assigned as leaders as they 
could be found. Finally at 0030 the last boat pulled off the beach and the little 
flotilla of 46 boats anchored while the troops got some damp, cramped sleep until 
daybreak. 
A final check was made at dawn to see that key personnel was embarked accord-
ing to plan, and the mission divided into two convoys which proceeded independently 
to the river mouths. Each convoy was headed by a gunboat team: the north branch 
group including 2 LCMGs, r Rocket LCM and an LCS(S), all C Company boats; 
the south branch force was led by 3 LCMGs and 2 LCS(S)s from the other three 
companies of the Battalion. The troops followed in LCMs and LCVPs: a rifle com-
pany up the south branch and the rest of the infantry battalion up the north. 
Meanwhile, the general area bombardment by the USS Cleveland and Sigourney 
had been underway since daybreak. Promptly at ogoo the two assault groups started 
upstream and reached their initial objective without encountering opposition. A 
final intensive bombardment was laid on the two towns, including naval shell fire, 
The landing at Cotabato, 5 miles up the Mindanao River, on April 18, 1945. 
~ 1!~ ... 
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five hundred-pound bombs, aerial and boat rockets, and automatic cannon fire from 
the gunboats. Troops landed at both Cotabato and Tamontaka without making 
contact with the enemy, and fanned out to secure the area between the two river 
branches. Sensing that the enemy was totally disorganized and unprepared for a 
move up the river, the task unit commander decided to exploit the opportunity before 
the enemy could react and establish defenses further upstream. Gunboats were 
ordered to proceed up stream to the river junction and the division CP notified of this 
action. Orders were immediately received to transport one reinforced rifle company 
upstream with the gunboats. This movement was opposed only by a handful of J aps 
on the south branch, all but one of whom were killed in a brief fire fight. Guerrillas 
reported fifty Japs intrenched at Tumbau, just south of the river junction, and plans 
were made for an assault landing at this point, but the J aps fled into the swamps upon 
approach of the gunboats. 
The two gunboat teams arrived simultaneously at the river junction at I 350, 
followed almost immediately by the infantry battalion commander and the reinforced 
rifle company in LCMs. A quick reconnaissance of the area indicated no suitable 
defensive position for such a small unit at this point, and so a further reconnaissance 
upstream was ordered. About a mile above the junction, local residents reported two 
hundred Japs dug in at Lomopog with automatic weapons. Orders were issued to 
assault this town, inasmuch as it controlled the first road-river junction above Cota-
bato and would enable our troops to attack from the rear the Japs opposing the 
advance of the Igth Infantry eastward along Route No. I, which connects Parang 
with Davao via Fort Pikit. By this time the air support had been withdrawn, and the 
naval guns were out of rahge, so the gunboats were massed in line abreast to bring the 
maximum number of 40 mm and 37 mm guns into action simultaneously. The 
LCS(S)s and one LCMG protected the troop-carrying craft. A total of one hundred 
rockets were dropped on the town, and automatic cannon fire poured into it at maxi-
mum rate, but the only opposition was some machine gun and knee-mortar fire from 
the opposite bank, which was quickly silenced. Two launches and a landing barge, 
camouflaged under the bank, were sunk for good measure. While in the town itself 
no enemy were found, the presence of still-warm fires and numerous papers and arms 
in excellent condition indicated that the enemy had withdrawn very shortly before 
the landing. 
A perimeter was organized, the gunboats deployed in its support, and a recon-
naissance patrol, accompanied by engineer officers, pushed out to determine the 
condition of the road and the presence or absence of enemy forces. Radio orders 
were issued by the infantry battalion commander, on recommendation of the task 
unit commander, to move the balance of his battalion from Cotabato at crack of 
dawn in order to exploit further the enemy lack of preparedness in the river valley. 
At the same time, a radio message was sent to Division advising them of the situation 
and urging that reinforcements be dispatched immediately so that the drive could 
continue without slackening, until Fort Pikit could be secured and the enemy along 
Highway No. I completely trapped. 
During the night the J aps crossed the river in canoes retreating northward both 
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Just before the landing at 
Lomopog- Jap fire from 
right hank is silenced and 
leading gunboats pour 
rockets and 40 mm shells 
into the town around the 
bend to the left. 
upstream and downstream of the task unit, but displayed no desire to test its fire 
power. Enthusiastic Moros brought in much valuable intelligence of enemy move-
ments and dispositions further upstream, as well as enough duck eggs for a really first 
class breakfast. 
No answer was received to the above radio message until o83o, when orders were 
received for the infantry to hold Lomopog "at all costs" and reconnoiter the road 
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north to Serenaya, and for the gunboats to reconnoiter the river to Ulandang, a mere 
five miles upstream. No mention was made of reinforcements, nor was any indication 
given that those in authority were aware of the possibility of exploiting the penetra-
tion. The reconnaissance to Serenaya had been completed the previous evening, but 
in accordance with the message was ordered repeated, and one platoon of infantry 
embarked to accompany the gunboats upstream. This party arrived at Ulandang 
at I 030 to find that the J aps had left ninety minutes previously, abandoning a large 
store of arms and supplies. A quick reconnaissance was made three kilometers north 
along the road and a somewhat more limited probe made in the Dulauan area on 
the opposite bank. As this road was found to be in poor condition, thus reducing the 
value of Ulandang as a jumping-off point for further operations, and in view of the 
obvious continued demoralization of the Japs, the decision was made to push on to 
Paidu Pulangi to secure it as a beachhead for a drive on Fort Pikit. 
As the force was being re-assembled and re-embarked, a message was received 
from the Commanding General, 24th Division, directing that Ulandang be held and 
that the force proceed no further upstream. It was obvious that the division com-
mander was not aware of the extent to which the J aps were disorganized in the valley, 
so the radio message was ignored, and the little force proceeded to Paidu Pulangi 
where, after a briefbombardment, a landing was effected at 1300. Here again, evi-
dence was found of a precipitate withdrawal on the part of the enemy, who left file 
baskets full of operational papers and arms with shells still in the chamber. A peri-
meter was organized and a strong radio message dispatched to the division command-
Scenes at Dulauan and Ulandang 36 miles up the Mindanao River. 
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er, explaining the desirability of holding this beachhead and attacking Fort Pikit 
with a minimum delay. This message was never answered, and so it was decided to 
guide the balance of the 2d Battalion, 2 Ist Infantry, which had been ordered upstream 
as far as Lomopog, directly to Paidu Pulangi. Upon arriving at Lomopog at I8I5, 
it was learned that the assistant division commander had that morning counter-
manded the order for the battalion to move upstream and had directed that the in-
fantry be withdrawn to Lomopog. 
This was indeed a bitter blow. The infantry battalion commander felt he would 
be court-martialed if he did not obey, and so he took his doughboys downstream to 
Lomopog. The boats had not been mentioned specifically in the order, and it was 
senseless to evacuate Paidu Pulangi so that thejaps could reoccupy its well constructed 
defenses and exact a heavy toll for its recovery. The decision was therefore made to 
hold Paidu Pulangi with the crews of3 LCMGs and 2 LCS (S)s until a personal appeal 
could be made to the division commander to exploit the breakthrough. Thus on 
the night of R + 2 36 officers and men were deployed in foxholes and on gunboats 
holding an essential road-river junction I 3 miles ahead of the rifle company holding 
the crossing at Lomopog, which in turn was 25 miles beyond the nearest support. 
Scattered throughout the valley were 2000 Japs streaming east and north, their 
prepared hill positions by-passed and outflanked. 
The night passed quietly and the next day the commanders of the two river 
garrisons ordered aggressive patrols partly to disguise their own weakness. A foot 
patrol ranged eastward from Paidu Pulangi spotting J ap bivouacs on the road to 
Pikit and even repairing a bridge between 
Guerrilla leaders in canoe approach 
gunboat near lnogog. 
-l the Jap rear guard and main body, only 
to have it destroyed again by a B-25. On 
the strength of native reports that a guer-
rilla headquarters was located only a few 
hundred yards upstream, two gunboats 
were sent out to make contact and get 
reinforcements if possible. The few hun-
dred yards grew to I 8 miles before the tense 
gunboat crews (on the verge of shooting 
their Moro guides) located the CP of the 
2d Battalion, I I 8th Infantry (Filipino) 
Regiment, at Inogog, and made a deal for 
a joint operation against Fort Pikit if the 
American infantry did not show up next 
day. 
Down at Lomopog a patrol on the 
south bank flushed about 8o J aps and 
soon two platoons were heavily engaged 
with mortars, machine guns on both sides, 
and barrage rockets from the supporting 
gunboat. The fight ended as a draw, with 
MINDANAO 183 
our infantry retreating in boats across the river and the J aps using darkness to 
move upstream and across the river in canoes. 
Back at Parang, it was learned that the Division was rushing reinforcements 
upstream as fast as they were disembarked from the R + 2 shipping, and plans were 
made to concentrate these troops at Paidu Pulangi during R+4 for an attack on Fort 
Pikit the following day. The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, got as far upstream as 
Dulauan and continued to Paidu Pulangi early on R + 4· 
A brief conference with the amphibian garrison which had remained at Paidu 
Pulangi established that the river was clear of J aps as far as Inogog and that the road 
at least halfway to Fort Pikit was not defended, so it was decided to make a simul-
taneous overland and amphibious move on Fort Pikit, using one company afloat and 
the balance of the Battalion overland. Both elements moved out at I IOO. The river 
force was now reinforced by three Navy PGMs* which had been working their way 
upstream for the past thirty-six hours. They had been sent into the river by the 
Admiral only on R + 2 and had stopped for the night at the fork in the river. From 
Paidu Pulangi on army officers piloted them, and they operated under the tactical 
control of the 533d throughout their stay on the river. 
The river force arrived at Inogog for a conference with the regimental command-
er of the I I 8th Infantry at I400. An officer patrol sent out by this organization two 
hours before reported that six hundred Japs were dug in on the east bank below the 
ferry, and that two hundred enemy were emplaced above the ferry with two 2.95" 
mountain guns. As this was not the first pessimistic report that had been received 
from guerrillas in this campaign, orders were given to carry on, except that the 
*Patrol Gunboat , Medium; converted 1 101 subchasers. 
LCMs embark 34th Infantry Regiment troops and equipment to exploit the opening of the 
Mindanao River. 
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Guerrillas swarm 
over the LCMGs at 
lnogog while plans 
are made for the 
assault on Ft. Pikit. 
infantry company was to be landed a mile and a half down stream from the ferry to 
avoid their being taken under fire while debarking, by the reported enemy concen-
trated on the opposite bank further upstream. The gunboats formed in two columns, 
each headed by a PGM, and proceeded upstream to the first reported enemy position. 
A maximum barrage was laid down, including 3"/50 from PGMs and the convoy 
received no return fire. The PGMs were unable to proceed above the ferry, because 
of the wrecked bridge, so the LCMGs drew ahead and covered the second reported 
Bursts from the 3" 
guns of the PGMs 
open the bombard-
ment of reported 
enemy positions 
just below Pikit 
Ferry. 
THE ASSAULT ON 
FORT PIKIT 
Approaching the 
fort, gunboat crews 
scan shore intently. 
LCMG 12 sets a 
small patrol ashore 
right under the fort. 
Patrol in the old 
Spanish fort raises 
flag on boathook to 
advise infantry ap-
proaching from the 
west that the Japs 
have departed. 
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concentration area with maximum fire of all weapons. Light small arms fire was 
received and quickly silenced, and the four gunboats proceeded directly to the town 
ofPikit. The dominating position of Fort Pikit atop a hundred-foot hill was obvious, 
so a patrol of gunboat crew members quickly occupied it at r6oo, once more finding 
valuable stores of arms and equipment, including go mm mortars. Meanwhile, the 
infantry company which had landed below the ferry, reached the ferry landing and 
was ordered to dig in for the night. The main ground force advancing overland 
from Paidu Pulangi began to register artillery on the Fort Pikit area, but by bringing 
an SCR 300 to the top of the hill, contact was made with them while they were still 
three and a half miles away and identities established before any damage was done. 
That night another battalion of the 34th Infantry, and its regimental head-
quarters, arrived at Fort Pikit in LCMs, and plans were made for reconnaissance in 
the direction of Kabacan for R+5, to be followed on R+6 by a joint land and 
amphibious attack on the town. The tactical command ofthe river campaign passed 
from the 533d to the Commanding Officer, 34th Infantry at that time. * 
At daylight of R + 5, three gunboats proceeded up stream with considerable 
difficulty as the boats dragged bottom almost continuously. By noon, the infantry 
had advanced rapidly along the road and were directed to proceed to the town of 
Kabacan prior to dark. Radio orders directed the boats to make all possible speed 
in order to join the infantry at the town. Late in the afternoon, the infantry battalion 
ran into approximately one hundred twenty J aps in the vicinity of the road junction 
Route 1 - Route 3 and, after a brief skirmish, dug in for the night. The gunboats 
encountered a party of J aps below the ferry, killed three and scattered the balance, 
and arrived at the ferry expecting to find the infantry either there or shortly to arrive. 
Contact with them over SCR 300 disclosed the fact that the infantry would not re-
sume its advance until the following day, and that the gunboats would have to hold 
the ferry during the night, so once more a perimeter, consisting of a handful of cooks, 
radio operators, enginemen, and official observers from higher headquarters, was 
established across the line of retreat of the estimated Jap company which had halted 
the infantry battalion. Though no concerted attack was made on this position, 
several infiltration attempts were successfully repulsed, and three Japs killed. The 
commendable coolness of this detachment is proved by the fact that, despite the 
exposed conditions, only eighteen shots were fired during the entire night, and 
seventeen bullet holes were found in the three J aps. 
Early the next morning the infantry occupied the town of Kabacan and, as this 
was the head of navigation for landing craft, the tactical phase of the river operation 
was concluded. 
The planners in Eighth Army had predicted 14-30 days would be necessary to 
dislodge the J aps from the Mindanao River Valley and secure the critical Kabacan 
area. The job had been done in six. Any analysis of the map on page 165 cannot 
fail to indicate the strategic importance of the move upstream. The progress of the 
rgth Infantry along the road was hampered not only by Jap resistance but also by 
*It is amusing to note that the unofficial history of the 24th Division, Children qf Yesterday by Jan Valtin, gives entire 
credit for this advance up the Mindanao River to "scouts of the 34th Infantry Regiment" and states that they constructed 
their own gunboats! 
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demolished bridges often at intervals of a few hundred yards, and at times promised 
to be delayed indefinitely by lack of bridge materials and equipment and too few 
engineer troops. The comparison of the progress of the amphibian column and the 
road column speaks for itself. The Japs in western Cotabato Province were a disor-
ganized, ineffective rabble largely because they had neglected one obvious avenue of 
attack, and that avenue had been decisively exploited by a force that was outnum-
bered ten or twenty to one. 
No account of the river operations would be complete without mention of the 
magnificent performance of the communications personnel who, in addition to hand-
ling organic traffic efficiently, provided the only reliable communications between 
infantry units in the river valley during the first days of the operation. 
The Boat Battalion was charged with local security of the river route, and during 
the succeeding weeks deployed its gunboats at intervals along the stream. These 
boats not only checked convoys against their schedule, but made patrols in their 
sectors in an effort to prevent any Jap stragglers from crossing the river by native 
canoes. The only contact with the enemy came in the vicinity of the river junction 
on April 30, when seven armed Japs were discovered in a bamboo thicket. After an 
intense bombardment of the thicket, a patrol, hurriedly assembled from crews of 
passing LCMs, went ashore and after a brief fire fight in a waist-deep swamp, killed 
six of the seven Japs. 
The delay in clearing the road, and the large scale destruction of bridges, put 
the bulk of the burden of reinforcements and supplies on the river. The channel was 
too narrow and some places too shallow to risk the use of LCTs, so the entire task fell 
to the Boat Battalion. For this, after providing for lighterage at the main beach-
heads, there was available one and two-thirds boat companies (C and 2 platoons of 
B), with an effective strength of fifty-five LCMs of which nine operated continuous 
ferries. The boats worked night and day, plying principally between Cotabato and 
Fort Pikit, with only sufficient time between trips to refuel and reload. During the 
period April 2 o to April 2 8, three RCTs, plus a division headquarters and an extra 
battalion of field artillery were ferried the 68 miles from Parang to Pikit, together 
with three to six days of supplies. 
At first the trips on the river were a pleasant novelty - fascinating scenery, 
cheery greetings from each barrio, and dead calm, but a little went a long way. The 
heat was the most oppressive the men had experienced overseas, night runs were a 
terrific strain on the helmsmen, and snags and flotsam caused much damage. The 
worst job of all was that of ferry boat at any of the busy points like Cotabato, Pikit, or 
Carmen Ferry (Kabacan) . After the roads were completed to these points, the ferries 
ran 10-12 trips an hour 24 hours a day. Ramp mechanisms and clutches soon col-
lapsed under such strain, but repairs were made on the spot and service kept up. 
An F Company detachment with a couple of dozers improved the landing sites 
upstream and kept them and the nearby roads in as good shape as possible. The flow 
of cargo over these points rivaled that of salt sea beaches with tonnage averaging 
better than 300 tons a day at Pikit and exceeding 500 on peak days. In the first 
twenty days of the campaign 313,920 ton-miles were chalked up on the river alone. 
Right: Ammunition loading point in 
Cotabato. 
SERVICE OF SUPPLY ON THE 
MINDANAO RIVER 
Top: Loading ammunition by roller 
conveyor. 
Center: The busy ferry landing just 
above Cotabato. 
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Throughout May the river commerce continued under high pressure and under 
increasing difficulty as the water level dropped and the boats available for work on 
the river were reduced to those of C Company alone. But with its base at Cotabato 
and ingenuity at licking the river currents and shoals, the flow of supplies was kept 
above requirements of the troops slugging up the Sayre Highway toward Del Monte 
and those moving eastward to Davao. 
By June bases opened at Davao and Bugo, and highway traffic became impossible 
on account of the rains, and so the stock piles at Pikit and Kabacan and the service 
troops in that area had to be brought downstream again. Civilian government work, 
patrols into the Lake Buluan area and miscellaneous missions of all sorts kept at least 
one platoon of C Company on the river until the end of the War. 
Operations at Parang 
While a small minority of the regiment was having its novel excitement on the 
Mindanao River, plenty of hard routine work was the lot of most of the companies. 
The period from R+2 to R+g was one ofvirtual inactivity at Red Beach. The 
shipping discharged in this period included only three LSTs and three LSMs. An 
average of a hundred tons cargo per day for Green Beach was backloaded on LCMs. 
During the succeeding week, R+g to R+ I5, one Liberty ship was discharged of 
equipment for airfield construction and supplies for the Marine Air Group. Com-
pany D organized fifteen skeleton hatch crews, which were supplemented by combat 
troops. Thirty trucks were available for twenty-four hour service, and approximately 
ten B Company LCMs worked around the clock during this period. The average 
daily discharge was 8oo tons. Upon completion of the Liberty ship, Red Beach was 
closed down, and its shore party then moved to Parang by LCMs. 
Green Beach at Parang was worked initially byE Company, and over it flowed 
all the supplies needed for the rapidly advancing Corps. The combination of steep 
grades, reasonably heavy rainfall, and unstable soil rendered imperative extensive 
road construction in the immediate beach area. F Company was therefore employed 
exclusively on this work. A total of 2. 7 miles of road was constructed in the first 
5 days, in addition to the ponton jetties and clearing of large ammunition and fuel 
dumps. No engineer equipment, other than bulldozers, cranes, and dump trucks, 
was available until the arrival of the turnaround shipping on R +I I, yet the shore 
facilities were developed sufficiently to handle the traffic and tonnage brought ashore. 
During the initial stages of the operation, available lighterage in the Green 
Beach area consisted of twelve LCTs, A Company's thirty-six LCMs, and, after R+ 5, 
one DUKW company with an average effective strength of thirty DUKWs. The 
naval task force commander's natural concern for a prompt discharge of LSTs 
caused him to retain complete operational control of all lighterage in the harbor until 
the last echelon ofLSTs was discharged on R +I 7. This control, which was exercised 
from a command vessel afloat (through army liaison officers insofar as LCMs were 
concerned) undoubtedly did provide maximum lighterage for ramp-to-ramp dis-
Green Beach, Parang, flooded by a high run of tides (above) and during and after the 
feverish efforts to raise its level (below). 
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The beach1naster's 
command post built 
on the hill above 
Green Beach after 
the latter had been 
widened and raised. 
charge of LSTs, but seriously hampered the effective dispatch of lighters to liberty 
ships, which commenced discharging on R + 3· 
The damage caused to LCMs during early emergency attempts to use the beach 
at other than high tides, reduced the operable percentage by R + 2 to so%. With the 
establishment of A Company's bivouac and boat repair base at Quidama Bay on 
R + 3 this situation was rapidly remedied, and thereafter over So% of the LCMs were 
available for lighterage, but only for approximately twelve hours out of each twenty-
four during the periods of high tide. LCTs lost much valuable time waiting empty 
on the beach for succeeding high tides. As soon as the major LST echelons were 
discharged, holes were cut in alternate cubes in the pontonjetty, and these were filled 
with water, thus reducing the freeboard of the jetty to approximately eighteen inches, 
and enabling LCTs to land ramp-on and work intensively around the clock. At 
about the same time, a tidal schedule was set up, under which the LCMs worked 
mobile loading six or seven hour shifts around the high tide, and all DUKWs worked 
during the lo~ water period. Since the bulk of the tonnage consisted of rations and 
ammunition, and the shortage of labor was extremely acute, this arrangement con-
stituted the most efficient use of available facilities. 
The necessity for water shipment of the bulk of the supplies going to the two 
infantry divisions imposed a severe backloading burden on the beach (averaging 430 
tons per day) with a proportionate reduction of off-loaded tonnage. 
Tonnage handled despite handicaps was not inconsiderable. A total of I 26 
LSTs were discharged in the first r8 days, and 9 Liberty ships were simultaneously un-
loaded. At no time was the task force short of required levels of supply ashore, and 
no convoy failed to meet its predicted departure date. Total tonnage over this beach 
for the period was 38,488 mobile and 54,698 bulk, or an average of 1924 tons mobile 
and 2735 tons bulk per day. 
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LCMs left high and 
dry at Green Beach, 
Parang. 
Early in May Company D and two platoons of Company C of the 54 3d EB&SR 
moved from Zamboanga to Parang to fill the gap left by the departure of B and F 
Companies of the 533d for Davao Gulf. With the tapering-off of shipping arrivals, 
the month's work was handled with no particular difficulties. A succession of spring 
tides coupled with heavy rains inundated the beach for several days; consequently a 
major construction project was undertaken whereby the level of the beach was raised 
several yards and the surface graded and stabilized. When completed, Green Beach, 
which had been one of the worst unloading points ever operated by the Regiment, 
became a show spot and almost a pleasure to work on. 
Meanwhile an engineer construction 
battalion was slowly repairing the old 
jetty to enable it to take small steamers, 
and at the same time driving piles so that 
the ponton jetty built by the Shore Bat-
talion could be converted into a floating 
Liberty ship dock. 
As the fighting moved farther and 
farther away to Davao and the Bukidnon 
Plateau, the usefulness of Parang as a 
base dwindled. But not until bitter ex-
perience proved that the 31st Division 
strung out from Silae to Del Monte 
could not be supplied by truck over the 
bottomless quagmire called the "Sayre 
Highway," did Corps finally decide to 
pull up its stakes and shift its base to 
Macajalar Bay on the north side of 
the island. By the time orders for this 
move came through, there was such 
a shortage of shipping for the move 
and so many tons of stores to be back-
loaded that the task of closing out Parang 
A typical Moro - reputedly a fierce warrior, 
certainly a lazy, indifferent worker. 
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dragged wearily on into July. Boat Battalion Headquarters, A, and E Companies 
moved out on May 30 enjoying a pleasant 400-mile boat ride via Zamboanga. 
Regimental Headquarters followed on June 19, leaving Shore Battalion Headquarters 
and D Company to preside over the dying port of Parang. 
PARANG 
Regimental CP as seen from Shore 
Battalion motor pool. 
Radio shack viewed from the movie 
theatre. 
Regimental Headquarters Company 
barber shop. 
Colonel Moore outside his tent. 
I 
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Davao Gulf 
The progress of the Igth Infantry southeastward along Highway No. I from 
Kabacan to the shore of Davao Gulf was extremely rapid. Except for minor skir-
mishes with unenthusiastic Jap rear guards, and delays incident to repairing de-
molished bridges, the doughboys moved as rapidly as their feet would take them 
along this 75-mile track. By April 26, nine days after the landing at Parang, the 
infantry points stood only ten miles from the shore ofthe gulf at Santa Cruz. Natur-
ally, as soon as they reached the sea, it was essential that supplies be brought directly 
to them by water in order not only to expedite their attack against the Japanese in 
and around Davao, but also to relieve as much of the strain on the Mindanao River 
traffic as possible. 
It was the wish of the 53 3d to greet the doughboys as they came out of the jungle 
on to the beach at Santa Cruz with an LCM convoy load of rations and ammunition, 
and to be able to assist their advance up the gulf shore from the outset. The Navy, 
however, was extremely concerned about the presence of mines and coastal batteries 
in the whole gulf area, and procrastinated for several days. Finally the 533 d decided, 
with the approval of the corps and division commander to move a boat platoon 
ofB Company on their own initiative to Santa Cruz, a total distance of well over 300 
miles. News of this reached the navy flagship, and in accordance with his authority, 
the Admiral flatly forbade such a move and insisted that the opening of Davao Gulf 
be accomplished by a naval task force. This force included a group of LSMs, a 
command ship, and an escort of a cruiser and three destroyers. In order to save time, 
the LCMs departed on April 30 and proceeded alone, protected only by LCMGs, to 
Sarangani Bay, where they made contact with a company of guerrillas and awaited 
the passage of the naval task force . 
.. 
--
B Company convoy 
moving into Davao 
Gulf May 3, 1945. 
[___ -~ ---
B Company LCMs 
moving the tanks 
from Santa Cruz 
to Talomo 
to the fascination 
of the inhabitants. 
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Shortly after sunset on May 2 the LCMs fell in astern of the naval convoy north-
east of Sarangani Island, and moved up into the Gulf during the night. At daybreak 
on the 3rd the LSMs and LCMs landed on Santa Cruz beach where the 24th Division 
had been awaiting them for several days. Under pressure of the Navy's insistence 
that its landing ships move out ofDavao Gulf prior to dark, a rapid job ofunloading 
the LSMs was accomplished by Company F. 
After the naval ships had departed, a group of LCMs embarked four medium 
tanks, with orders to move 20 miles northward to Talomo, to which point the Igth 
Infantry had that day advanced. The landing at Talomo was not actively opposed, 
but the elaborate J ap defenses erected along the beach were a considerable obstacle, 
and served as a reminder of the wisdom of GHQ in not ordering the original assault 
to be made on Davao Gulf. 
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Early the next morning 4 LCMs, accompanied by 2 LCMGs proceeded along 
the coast to Davao and went up the shallow, tricky Davao River a mile and a halfto 
establish a ferry so that the 1 gth Infantry could bring up heavy equipment and 
weapons to bolster its assault on the ruined city of Davao. This ferry, which was 
operated for several weeks, came under intermittentjap small arms, mortar, and artil-
lery fire for several days. Continuous infiltration by the Japs throughout the period 
required the boat crews to stand vigilant security watch. On May 6 the Division 
established Talomo as its main base of operations, and F Company and the platoon of 
B Company established permanent bivouacs on that beach, closing down for good the 
beach at Santa Cruz. 
The Davao River with its wide entrance almost blocked by obstacles (upper left) has a 
treacherous channel, but a ferry service was established to replace the demolished bridges 
leading into Davao. 
BLACK BEACH, 
TALOMO 
LCMs in front of B 
Company's bivouac. 
LSMs bring ammuni-
tion and fuel from 
Parang. 
The monument to 
Rizal adds something 
not found on the 
beaches in New 
Guinea. 
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It was soon apparent that the Japs, who had been putting up surprisingly in-
effective resistance to our drive across the island of Mindanao, had at last determined 
to make one of their typically fanatical stands in the hills immediately north and west 
ofDavao. Though they did not attempt to dispute control of the shore line with our 
forces, they dug in such a short distance inland that for several weeks the shore and 
anchorage were within range of their light artillery and improvised rockets. In addi-
tion, they resorted to their customary tactics of night raids both by sea and by land. 
The remainder of Company B, reinforced by all of the regiment's LCMGs, moved 
from Cotabato to Talomo in the middle of May, and such equipment ofF Company 
as had been left behind in its initial move was forwarded at the same time. The 
unexpected intensity of the fighting required a far greater tonnage of ammunition 
and supplies than had been anticipated, and F Company put in an extremely stren-
uous two months. Not only did it virtually alone handle the cargo unloaded across 
the beach, but in addition it was called upon to reinforce the Division's 3d Engineer 
Battalion. F Company's equipment operators found themselves building supply and 
access roads on ground taken by the rifle companies but a few hours before. Each 
dozer was naturally a prime target for Jap snipers, who infested the 10-foot high grass 
in the area, and operators learned to run their machines with one hand and two feet 
while keeping a carbine ready for instant use in the other hand. 
The Navy insisted, in view of the menace of Q boats and human torpedoes, that 
all ships move to the open sea at sunset each night, so only half the normal number of 
hours were available to discharge the ships. Even so, one FS boat was sunk, and 
several times the shipping was driven out of the anchorage by accurate field artillery 
fire from the hills. 
One night in particular in the middle of May will not soon be forgotten by men 
of B and F Companies. Taking advantage of a heavy rain storm, a substantial body 
of J aps armed with large loads of picric acid, swarmed down to the beach and at-
tempted to demolish gunboats, dozers, and LCMs. After a wild free-for-all, most of 
the Japs were killed, but a few escaped by swimming. Not much equipment was 
destroyed, and by a miracle the 533d suffered no casualties, although other troops in 
the same area had several killed and wounded. LCMG MB1 had the closest escape: 
a J ap swimmer hung 40 pounds of picric acid over a bitt and swam away, holding on 
to a string tied to a hand grenade as a detonator. Fortunately the string was a bit 
weaker than the grenade pin, so morning found the boat serenely at anchor with the 
high explosive harmlessly bobbing against its frail skin. 
Tactical support ofthe infantry by the boats was somewhat limited by theJaps' 
reluctance to hold any position within range of the gunboats' automatic weapons. 
The presence of the boats, however, was in no small measure responsible for this 
refusal of the enemy to stand near the water's edge. Soon after Davao was secured, a 
shore-to-shore landing was made on the island of Samal, using LVTs, LCMs, and 
2 LCMGs. TheJap garrison of the island had retreated to its rugged interior and had 
to be hunted down by the doughboys. 
From Davao the Division fanned out, with the I gth Infantry working northeast 
to the head of the gulf, which was held by a regiment of guerrillas, and the 34th and 
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2 rst Infantry worked northwest into the mountains back ofTalomo. In order to give 
the guerrillas the wherewithal to resist the Japs so they could not retreat indefinitely 
up the valley above the head of the gulf, supplies were run by LCMs through Pakipu-
tan straits. For several days this mission required running the gauntlet of small arms 
and light artillery fire. As the rgth Infantry moved northeast, its long lines of com-
munication became strained so thin that trucks and ambulances were frequently 
ambushed. As a result, the land line of communications was temporarily abandoned, 
and the infantry were furnished all necessary supplies and evacuation by boats operat-
ing through the straits. In this way their advance to a junction with the guerrillas 
along the Tagum River was materially expedited, and the Jap forces north ofDavao 
cut off from the valley leading to the headwaters of the Agusan River. 
Point Piso on the eastern shore of the gulf was the principal J ap Q boat base. 
These Q boats, tiny speed boats about 20 feet long with high-explosive bows, were 
concealed by day in caves and bunkers, protected by concentrations ofjap automatic 
cannon, and they constituted the most serious threat to the shipping in the gulf. 
Attempts to wreck this base by air attack, long-range naval bombardment, and night 
strafing attacks by PTs were not wholly successful, and the LCMGs and rocket boats 
were called upon to make daylight attacks on this point. In addition, all-night patrols 
in the straits and around the anchorage were maintained by LCMGs for several weeks. 
Toward the end ofMay the Navy decided to clean out the threejap radar sta-
tions around the mouth of the gulf. A small task force, consisting of a destroyer, DE, 
PTs, LCMs, LCMGs, and an LCM rocket plus Company K of the I 62d Infantry 
of the 41st Division, was established under the senior naval officer in the area. This 
force assembled in Malalag on the afternoon of May 3 I, and during the night made 
an 85-mile run to Luayon Point, on the southwest of Davao Gulf. After a brief skir-
mish, the J ap garrison was killed or dispersed to the hills, and the entire installation 
destroyed. The force re-embarked that afternoon and proceeded during the night 
85 miles around to Glan, where guerrilla guides were picked up for the assault on 
Balut Island. Two landings had to be made on this island, one of which was made 
by the infantry, and the other was made by a body of 533d personnel who were con-
vinced from a previous visit to the island and discussion with guerrillas that the objec-
tive was not accessible from the original landing point. This latter beach turned out 
to be the right one, yet despite the fact that the amphibians had been there for a 
couple of hours, the task force commander ordered them withdrawn so he could lay 
down a one-hour bombardment before permitting the infantry to make its landing 
and destroy the radio and radar installations on the hill in back of the beach. After 
considerable difficulty in embarking and withdrawing the boats over the coral reef 
at low tide, the task force departed at sundown June 4 for a 7o-mile run across the 
mouth of the gulf to Cape San Augustin. The landing there took place the following 
noon and was unopposed, but yielded a rich prize in radio equipment, ammunition, 
and fuel dumps, all of which were destroyed. This five-day raiding party, covering 
400 miles of sea, concluded tactical water-borne operations in Davao Gulf. 
On June rg B Company dispatched a platoon ofLCMs plus an escort ofLCMGs 
on a 500-mile run up the east coast of Mindanao, through Surigao Straits to the mouth 
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of the Agusan River to join with A Company in offensive operations up that river, 
which are described later. This run was made against a strong current and extremely 
heavy seas, and without any possibility of refueling other than from oil drums carried 
on the decks of the boats. In addition the craft were well loaded with supplies for 
the guerrillas on the northern tip of Mindanao. After unloading these supplies at 
Placer, they embarked a battalion of guerrillas for use in the coming river operation. 
These boats returned in July by the same route. 
F Company departed from Talomo on July 10 enroute to its staging area for the 
invasion of Japan. Its two months at Talomo had demonstrated its capacity to per-
form the work and assume the responsibilities normally given to an entire shore 
battalion. 
B Company remained at Talomo until October 15, at which time it departed 
with the 24th Division to participate in the occupation of Japan. In July this com-
pany played a major role in the final amphibian operation of the entire War- the 
invasion ofSarangani Bay. As soon as theJap resistance around Davao was broken, 
and the remainder oftheir forces were driven into the impenetrable mountains north 
of Mt. Apo, the 24th Division was able to spare a reinforced battalion to help clean 
out the lastJap garrison in the southern part ofthe island. Coordinated with troops 
moving overland from Lake Buluan in the upper Mindanao valley, this battalion, 
to be landed at the head of Sarangani Bay, constituted the southern prong of a pincers 
movement. The landing itself, on July 12, was reasonably uneventful, but the two 
days' reconnaissance preceding the landing, which was carried out by guerrillas and 
gunboat elements ofB Company, had its moments of excitement. The total distance 
run as well as the importance of the objective and the smooth manner in which the 
operation was carried out, made it serve as a fitting climax to the assault operations 
of the 533d. 
The remainder of the summer at Talomo was relatively quiet. A long trip of 
1000 miles to Batangas on Luzon was made in September to obtain replacement 
boats, but aside from this the months of August and September produced nothing 
worthy of note. 
Macajalar Bay 
The Bukidnon plateau in north central Mindanao, through which runs the 
Sayre '·Highway" was one of the principal objectives in the main Mindanao cam-
paign. As the 31st Division worked northward along the "Highway," running into 
moderately serious Japanese opposition, Eighth Army on May 10, launched an assault 
at Bugo on the shore ofMacajalar Bay, using the 108th RCT of the 4oth Division and 
a battalion of the Americal Division, and including a boat platoon and a shore com-
pany of the 542d EB&SR. This landing met virtually no opposition, and the infan-
try pushed rapidly southward to a junction with the 31st Division in the vicinity of 
Malaybalay. The miserable condition of the Sayre "Highway" made it imperative 
that the 31st Division change its line of communication from the Mindanao River-
Sayre "Highway" route to one running south from Bugo. 
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As the elements of the 542d who had landed there were too small to handle a 
major base, the 533d was ordered to move a battalion headquarters and a boat and a 
shore company to Bugo early in June. This move, which has been mentioned before, 
shifted Boat Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Company A, and 
Company E from Parang via Zamboanga to Bugo the first of June. When X Corps 
itself displaced from Parang to Del Monte, Regimental Headquarters moved on 
June 19 overland via the Lake Lanao road to Bugo. These elements of the Regiment 
found an almost ideal bivouac site here in a palm grove with a steeply sloping, surfless 
beach, and entered upon normal unloading functions immediately. 
The Lake Lanao road, over which most of the vehicles previously used at Parang 
had been moved, was impassable beyond Initao, 30 miles west of Bugo, so a large-
scale ferry service, using LCMs and LCTs was inaugurated to bring these to the Bugo 
area. In addition, the necessity of getting the supplies southward over the Sayre 
"Highway" called for substantial road improvement on the gorge-scarred Bukidnon 
plateau. Equipment operators of E Company, in conjunction with their colleagues 
of the 542d and the 1 o6th Engineers went far inland, filling washouts and removing 
large landslides. In addition, many hundreds of feet of bridges were installed or 
repaired to take the heavy traffic. 
Bridge on the Bugo-Cagayan road built byE Company. 
["' 
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The Agusan River 
When the 108th RCT and gist Division joined forces, the Jap garrison was at 
last cleared from all major port and highway centers of the island of Mindanao. For 
the most part the J aps were scattered in the ragged jungle-dad mountains in groups 
too small to constitute a serious threat. However, one large group which still main-
tained its cohesion was observed by aerial reconnaissance to be heading eastward 
through various mountain passes to the fertile valley around the headwaters of the 
Agusan River. If these forces could have concentrated there, they would have been 
able to live indefinitely and would have remained a potential threat. To pursue them 
and destroy them in their retreat would have been unthinkable, because the narrow 
defiles through which they were withdrawing would have enabled a handful of men 
to hold up a regiment for days at a time. Consequently the corps commander, with 
the example of the Mindanao River fresh in mind, determined to beat the retreating 
Japs to this area by moving an infantry regiment IOO miles up the Agusan River and 
securing the outlets from the passes before the Japs arrived there. 
The Agusan River was a far cry from the broad, deep Mindanao. For most of its 
length it averaged barely 40 yards in width, was lined with steep banks rising from 
I o to 6o feet, had a depth that barely exceeded three feet, and a current that ran close 
to 5 knots. The inhabitants, the most primitive people in the Philippines, were known 
to be either friendly to the J aps or in such a low state of savagery as to be useless as 
guides or sources of information to our troops. Despite the hazards, the operation 
was ordered, and as related above, the necessary additional boats were moved all the 
way from Davao. The I55th RCT was embarked at Bugo and moved 75 miles 
eastward to Butuan in the mouth of the river. 
The initial movement upstream was made by a small advance scouting force 
of gunboats, followed by a reinforced battalion in 20 LCMs. Aside from the delays 
caused by the strong currents and damage to boats by floating logs, the movement 
was uneventful until the force arrived at Lapaz. After considerable difficulty, the 
convoy moved another thirty miles upstream to Sagunto and established a strong 
perimeter at that point. On June go the river was at last high enough to enable 
them to push on to Langasian, where guerrillas were in contact with the enemy. As 
the boats neared Langasian, the guerrillas fell back under superior fire from the J aps. 
The LCMGs and rocket boats opened up and laid down an effective rocket barrage 
which dispersed theJaps and enabled the infantry rapidly to reoccupy the ground lost. 
The infantry in the next few days fanned out and occupied key positions denying 
the entire area to the retreating Japs, while the waterway approaches were guarded 
by 2 LCMGs and an LCS(S). Although this ended the tactical phase of the river opera-
tion, the succeeding days and weeks of resupply and reinforcement of the garrison 
IOO miles from the sea were a sore strain on the boats and boatmen. Two full days 
of high speed running - and sometimes three - were required to make the trip 
from the mouth of the river to the landing point at Langasian. Flotsam, snags, and 
shifting shoals wreaked heavy damage on all boats involved and made the task of 
-...... " ~ 
.. 
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A Company's maintenance section, located in a mud hole at Butuan, a heartbreaker. 
Nevertheless the job was accomplished and the strategic objective achieved with a 
minimum of casualties and fatigue for the infantry elements. 
This task dragged on for Company A for two months, and the presence of J ap 
stragglers along the densely overgrown banks made even the routine trips nerve-
racking. It was on one of these runs, long after the Japs had surrendered, that 
a member of Company A engaged in a skirmish withJaps who did not know the War 
was over, and became one of the last Americans to be killed in action in the Pacific 
War. 
With the departure of the Shore Battalion and Regimental Headquarters from 
Mindanao in mid-July, the Boat Battalion became, to all intents and purposes, in-
dependent. As stated before, B Company remained attached to 24th Division at 
Talomo, and A Company and Battalion Headquarters were based at Bugo operating 
lighterage there and on the Agusan River 75 miles to the east. Company C, during 
most of this period, was split, with part of it at Bugo and part still at Cotabato engaged 
in evacuating no longer needed supplies down the Mindanao River. One of its 
missions took an LCMG and 2 cargo LCMs all the way to Morotai and back - the 
only time during the War that the Celebes Sea was crossed from New Guinea to Min-
danao by craft as small as LCMs. 
Runs to Leyte, Cebu, and Batangas Bay on Luzon were made from time to time 
principally for the purpose of obtaining new boats for the occupation. These runs 
extended the operations of the boats to every major island in the Philippine Arch-
ipelago. With tactical operations finished and a distinct reduction in lighterage 
commitments, all hands turned to improving. the bivouacs and making them show 
places. The Bugo encampment with its marine railway, theatre, chapel, baseball 
Boat Battalion Camp at Bugo after VJ day - Officers' Row and the Theatre. 
..... 
r 
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park, and huts of all sorts turned out to be so impressive that the corps commander 
labeled it a model for all troops in the Corps and required all company commanders 
and r st sergeants to model their post-V -J Day bivouacs on it. 
The Mindanao campaign, which had been looked forward to by many with 
foreboding, had turned out to be a magnificent opportunity for the Regiment. 
Probably in no other campaign of the War had a single amphibian regiment played 
such a decisive part, both tactically and logistically, as had the 533d in the operations 
of X Corps. It is safe to say that without the use of landing craft on rivers, the cam-
paign would never have been concluded, as it was, in a brief ten weeks. 
The marine railway at Bugo, built by A Company under the direction of T /3 Henry Moeller 
with the 50-ton 63-foot regimental command boat getting a new coat of paint. 
CHAPTER XIII 
Japan 
T HE conquest of the Japanese home islands by traditional methods of ground war-fare was planned, if necessary, for the fall and early spring of 1945-46. Though 
it was apparent that the B-29 and carrier task forces were raising havoc with japanese 
war industries and cities, the effective secrecy surrounding the development of the 
atomic bomb led inevitably to the belief that the Japanese would not surrender until 
decisively defeated in ground combat on their home islands. The proposed strategy 
consisted of a two-phase assault: a preliminary attack by a full army of approximately 
I4 divisions on the southern tip of Kyushu on November I, I945, and a landing in 
the early spring of I 946 by 3 full field armies on the plains of Honshu north and east 
ofTokyo. The first assault, to be made by the veteran Sixth Army, had two primary 
objectives: one, to secure airfields from which our light and medium aircraft could 
range over the vital southern halfofjapan; and two, to draw the japanese defending 
forces southward, thus making easier the task of the final assault forces. The parallel 
between this and the strategy used in the Philippines and elsewhere in the Southwest 
Pacific is obvious. 
Operation a 0 lympic'' 
The attack on Kyushu was labeled "Operation Olympic." Sixth Army was to 
consist of four full corps : the V Amphibious (Marine), I , IX, and XI. The Marine 
Corps was to land on the southwestern face of the island, I and XI Corps on the south-
east face, and IX Corps on the extreme southern tip at Kamondake. 
All three amphibian brigades were assigned to this Army, with the 2d and 4th at 
full strength with XI and I Corps respectively. The 3d Brigade was assigned to IX 
Corps, but the 593d, which was still involved in the Borneo campaigns, was not in-
cluded. Furthermore, IX Corps being carried partially by Fifth Fleet could only 
employ one boat battalion because Fifth Fleet had not employed army landing craft 
in its Central Pacific operations. This meant that the Boat Battalion of either the 
543d or the 533d would not participate in this operation. 
IX Corps was to consist of the veteran 77th and 8 I st Divisions and the 98th 
Division, which had seen no action. Sixth Army directed that the 533d, as the most 
experienced amphibian regiment, be attached to the green 98th Division. Though 
this decision amounted to a nice compliment, the fact that the 98th Division was to 
stage from Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands and be carried by Fifth Fleet transports 
meant that the 533d Boat Battalion was the one to be passed over. By the time the 
Regiment received its first inkling of the proposed plan, the matter had been decided 
beyond argument, and all efforts, even though supported by Sixth Army, to have 
GHQ include the Boat Battalion in the IX Corps troop list were unsuccessful. It 
later turned out that in the course of redeployment the 532d's Boat Battalion was so 
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drastically weakened that the 533d Boat Battalion would have been employed as part 
of the XI Corps landing force at Ariakawan. 
The Regiment received its first warning orders on June 25, and immediately 
laid plans to concentrate its scattered companies other than those of the Boat Battal-
ion at Bugo. Headquarters Company Shore Battalion and Company D moved from 
Parang to Bugo by LSMs on July 8, and F Company loaded out of Talomo the next 
day. A small group of the regimental staff left for Oahu by plane on July 15. In 
view of the probable non-employment of the Boat Battalion, the Shore Battalion 
transferred to the Boat Battalion all personnel with over 85 points, and received in 
return enough men with less than 85 points to bring it up to full strength. These high 
point men, nearly I 5% of the Regiment, departed for their homes, the first group in 
mid-July and the balance a month later. 
Movement of the Shore Battalion and Regimental Headquarters Company to 
Oahu produced the weirdest and most inexcusable snafu of the whole war. Less than 
goo men were involved, and because the bulk of the equipment was not in good 
enough condition to justify its movement to the rear staging area, a relatively small 
tonnage had to be moved. It was soon apparent that this little nontactical shipping 
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problem was more than the combined brains of Eighth Army, GHQ, and Pacific 
Fleet could handle. It was first decided that this move would have to commence at 
Leyte, which was an official USASOS base, and so preparations were made to move 
200 miles northward by landing ships. Instead oflanding ships, however, the trans-
port Lew Wallace arrived at Bugo. This meant many hours of hold loading and 
unloading for a trip requiring less than a day's running time. Consequently permis-
sion was requested, and soon granted, to use the Lew Wallace for the entire trip, and 
she was rationed and outfitted accordingly. As soon as she was,allloaded and ready 
to sail, the Regiment received a message that since she was assigned to the SWPA she 
could not go into Central Pacific waters and she would, therefore, have to discharge 
at Leyte. No amount of logical argument could overcome this technicality, and on 
July 16 the troops and equipment debarked and went into bivouac in a miserable 
swamp back of Dulag, Leyte. The 533d was advised that its stay would be only a 
matter of hours or a few days, and that GHQ had arranged for a large transport 
which would arrive almost immediately. 
The large AP A President Hayes was currently due in Leyte Gulf, and the appro-
priate army authorities at Manila and Leyte assigned her to carry the 533d troops, 
plus Company C of the 262d Medical Battalion to Oahu, on her way back to the 
States. Meanwhile the Liberty ship Bowditch was loadedwith the bulk of the equip-
ment. Three days later Base headquarters at Leyte directed the troops to embark 
aboard the President Hayes next morning. An early morning tour of the anchorage 
disclosed no Hayes, and a check at the port director's office produced the information 
that she had sailed under Navy orders during the night - empty! 
After 24 hours of frantic radio messages to half a dozen different headquarters, 
the Navy was prevailed upon to send orders to the Hayes, now goo miles at sea, to 
return and pick up the stranded troops. She duly returned to Leyte, and the 533d's 
bivouac was struck for the second time and the troops marched to the beach to await 
her boats. Once more she could not be located and was found to have sailed for the 
U.S. again empty on orders issued by a junior naval officer on duty at the port direc-
tor's headquarters. When, after more appeals to Army authorities, the Hayes was 
again ordered to backtrack, her skipper just plain ignored the orders and proceeded 
dead-head to San Francisco. 
At this turn of events the Base and Eighth Army movement officers washed their 
hands of the problem and referred it to GHQ Manila, where the best that could be 
offered was the little AKA Artemis capable of carrying only 200 men. The Regiment 
was in addition, gratuitously informed that this was its "last substitution." Regiment-
al Headquarters Company and the Medical Company embarked on the Artemis and 
sailed July 30, leaving the 750 men of the Shore Battalion still squatting in the dismal 
swamps back of Dulag Beach. 
Against the advice of Eighth Army's Chief of Staff, who did not wish to antago-
nize GHQ, a long radio plea was sent to Manila, and at last things clicked. The APA 
Montrose embarked the Shore Battalion and sailed on August 4· The delay of three 
full weeks was not only exasperating to all ranks, but prevented the 533d's participat-
ing in the practice landings held by the g8th Division, on which it counted so heavily 
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to produce the essential teamwork required in the difficult assault landing that lay 
ahead. It also gave an insight into the local conditions that caused the tragically 
high toll when, a few weeks later, the sinking of the Indianapolis went unnoticed in 
Leyte for several days. 
Meanwhile, at Fort Hase on Oahu the regimental planning group was busily 
analyzing the forthcoming operation. IX Corps was to land at Kamondake with 
two divisions abreast on a 2;!/z-mile beach. The 81st Division with the 543d EB&SR 
as the nucleus of its shore party was to be on the right and the 98th Division with the 
533d attached on the left. The 77th Division in floating reserve was to land as 
needed. The grimmest feature of the proposal was Mt. Kamondake, which reared 
its densely wooded and doubtless cave-pocked mass 3000 feet almost perpendicularly 
from the water's edge on the right flank of the beach. Until its last defender was 
burned or blasted from his cave, no spot on the beach would be safe from direct 
plunging machine gun or 25 mm fire. Moreover, the initial objectives of the 98th 
Division were two airfields several miles inland; so the shore party would have 
another major perimeter defense problem. This time every man would have to 
assume that every inhabitant was a potential infiltrator ready to blow himself to 
kingdom come if in so doing he could take an American or a pile of American am-
munition or fuel with him. 
Altogether it looked like a "rough go." But the lessons of previous operations 
had been well learned by higher headquarters, so that at last the shore party was 
made large enough to handle its logistical tasks. The following breakdown of the 
98th Division shore party is interesting to compare with those set up for the 533d's 
previous operations, 
Unit 
533d EB&SR (Less Boat Battalion) 
259th Engineer Combat Battalion 
Detachment 294th Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO) 
328th Quartermaster Battalion (3 Service Companies) 
Quartermaster Battalion (to be designated) (3 Truck Companies) 
1 99th Port Battalion (5 Port Companies) 
Company C, 262d Medical Battalion 
Company A, 6o8th MP Battalion 
492d DUKW Company 
1st Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad 
Total 
Number 
of Men 
936 
637 
150 
666 
429 
1128 
130 
156 
180 
7 
-
4419 
Number 
of Vehicles 
194 
186 
30 
15 
180 
53 
15 
17 
s6 
3 
-
749 
This shore party, all attached to the 533d, constituted 20% of the reinforced 
98th Division, whereas at Lingayen the shore party troops (exclusive of the boat 
elements) numbered less than 2300 or only w% of the reinforced 43d Division- a 
significant commentary on senior commanders' mounting emphasis on auxiliary 
beach troops. The strength and vehicle figures alone do not indicate the full expan-
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sion in the capacity of the shore party, for newly developed equipment and adequate 
quantities of standard cranes and dozers were available for the first time. To take a 
single example, the 533d had had 5 cranes when it landed at Lingayen and was to 
have 23 cranes and r8 tractors with crane attachments on the Kyushu beachhead. 
Despite the obvious implications ofthe news of the atomic bombing ofHiroshima 
and Russia's entry into the Japanese War, the report on August ro that the Emperor 
of Japan had thrown in the sponge was at first incredible. As the Boat Battalion at 
Bugo clustered around company radios and the Shore Battalion, ploughing through 
the mid-Pacific, listened to ships' loud speakers, hardly a man could avoid thinking 
of the many false reports of Germany's surrender he had heard. But this time there 
was no mistake. By the 14th of August when Japan accepted President Truman's 
conditions, all hands were completely mentally demobilized. At Bugo, realization 
that a big job remained of bringing the thousands of J ap stragglers and defeated 
small remnants out of the interior kept the Boat Battalion from too wishful dreams of 
immediate departure for home. But aboard the Artemis and Montrose hopes soared. 
How easy it would be for these ships to skip the Hawaiian Islands and proceed di-
rectly to the Golden Gate! Labor Day at home or at least attendance at the opening 
of the football season were the fond hopes of nearly every man aboard those transports. 
As they realized their ships would definitely dock at Oahu, they merely anticipated 
a brief Hawaiian rest-cure before being homeward bound. 
Oahu- Wakayama 
Planning for Operation Olympic gave way to watchful waiting when the Japs 
first sued for peace, but less than 24 hours after President Truman announced that 
the War was over, orders arrived from Manila designating the g8th Division and the 
533d as components of the occupation force. This was a bitter pill for the men of 
Regimental Headquarters Company, who debarked on August 14, and of the Shore 
Battalion who landed four days later. Resignation followed annoyance, however, 
when it became apparent that the units ordered to Japan included many whose men 
had seen far longer and more arduous service than had the 533d. 
The scant fortnight spent on Oahu was a hectic one particularly for those in the 
supply sections. The vehicles and other equipment which had been pronounced 
serviceable and brought from Mindanao were condemned outright by officers of 
Central Pacific Base Command who had never even imagined the kind of equipment 
with which the Southwest Pacific forces had struggled along throughout their cam-
paigns. In fact one driver was arrested as a menace on the highway for operating a 
jeep that was considered one of the prize vehicles of the Regiment! Thus with the 
war over replacement equipment without stint was at last received - from blankets 
to bull dozers, tents to twenty-ton trailers, Regimental Headquarters and the Shore 
Battalion were virtually roo% re-equipped. 
Never had men of the 533d enjoyed such luxurious billets. Quadrangle C of 
Schofield Barracks and the surrounding recreational facilities of the post put even 
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Fort Ord to shame. Honolulu with its fabulous prices and total lack of legitimate 
sources of liquor was a disappointment, but all hands made the most of their limited 
freedom in civilization for the first time in 20 months. 
Though the Japanese surrender was taken at face value, the chance of a ruse 
could not be completely ignored; therefore all divisions moving into Japan for the 
initial occupation were ordered to arrive "combat loaded" and prepared, if necessary, 
for an assault landing. Thus the plans differed little from those made for previous 
operations and more recently for "Olympic". The shore party was reduced drastical-
ly in size, but still included the 25gth Engineer Combat Battalion, the DUKW compa-
ny, and, for purposes of beach labor, three rifle companies and a field artillery battalion. 
Loading out from the unheard of luxury of a macadamized beach at Iroquois 
Point commenced exactly seven days after the Shore Battalion arrived. With the 
exception of a few D-7 dozers and a handful of personnel on APAs, the entire shore 
party embarked on six LSTs and three LSMs. The LST convoy sailed on August 31, 
but the vessel carrying F Company threw a propellor and had to go into drydock for 
repairs. On September 4 this LST and the LSMs got under weigh, and were followed 
two days later by the large transports. 
Four solid weeks on the LSTs were pretty grim, for they had three times as many 
passengers as bunks and the ponton causeways they carried forced water constantly 
over the weather deck. A stop at Saipan with a chance to stretch a leg helped a bit, 
and ideal weather favored the voyage. The destination was Wakayama, Honshu, a 
minor port on the eastern entrance to the Inland Sea. The g8th Division was to 
occupy Osaka, but fields of American pressure mines prevented shipping from reach-
ing that port. Just ahead and landing at the same beach were I Corps troops and 
the 33d Division destined for Kyoto and Kobe. There were no decent maps or photos 
and no orders more explicit than to get ashore and get the convoy unloaded expedi-
tiously. . 
On the cold morning of September 27 through fog and a misty rain the 533d had 
its first sight of Japan. At 0730 the advance reconnaissance elements of the shore 
party landed and quickly appreciated that it was in for more than the usual snafu. 
All the good part of the beach was pre-empted by the 33d Division's shore party, and 
the only jetty at which LSTs could land was theirs by Sixth Army order. Back of the 
First CP in Japan on Wakayama 
Beach, Septen1ber 27, 1945. 
LCTs crowd the beach west of W akayama during the second day of the occupation. 
g8th Division beach the land consisting of swampy, feces-fertilized gardens, was 
impassable for vehicles and useless for bivouac sites. Thus the shore party was con-
fined to the immediate beach I ooo yards long and 50-7 5 yards wide with only a 
single narrow lane leading off it. 
At 0830 (H hour) troops commenced landing and immediately marched to the 
railroad station at Wakayama for transportation inland. At ogiO vehicles started 
coming ashore, but many of these had to be towed out of the surf by four shore party 
dozers. LCMs and LCVPs sometimes grounded on the bar 8o yards off shore and 
Temporary roadway 
of cyclone wire fenc-
ing is laid over the 
dunes to part of the 
dump area. 
,, 
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Vehicles ~of the 98th 
Division ·1 start to 
jam up the limited 
beach. 
LSMs grounding 
some distance off 
shore wait for low 
tide before discharg-
ing vehicles. 
Lack of trucks 
causes piling of 
stores just above the 
high water mark. 
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never got nearer dry land than 25 yards. A vehicle assembly area was established 
at the extreme right flank of the beach near the only road available for egress. Since 
I Corps denied g8th Division permission to move over the roads, all vehicles were 
left in the assembly area on the beach until ogoo on the second day. This effectively 
blocked nearly one-third of the suitable beach-dump area. 
Refusal to allow the LSTs carrying the 533d equipment to land during the first 
day and inability of vehicles to wade ashore from the LSMs on the outer bar until 
A battalion of heavy 
tanks adds to the 
congestion on the 
beach. 
the afternoon's low tide left the shore party desperately short of vehicles, cranes, and 
even manpower. Meanwhile the transports pushed bulk cargo on to the shore in 
small craft, and these had to be painfully unloaded by human chains stacking the 
supplies just above the high tide line, which further congested the beach. Just before 
dark the LSMs disgorged a complete tank battalion into the melee. Added to the 
griefs was the miserable weather - 1 5 degrees colder than the coldest the Regiment 
had been exposed to in nearly two years, and a driving rain which soaked and numbed 
after a softening month afloat. The sum total made the first night in Japan about the 
most miserable the unit had ever experienced. 
Largely because things could get no worse, the second day saw considerable 
improvement in the condition of the beach. The 533d's LSTs at last got their turn 
at the jetty and discharged the trucks and cranes so badly needed. Corps opened the 
roads to g8th Division vehicles, so they moved out of the way. The 533d took over a 
not too badly damaged iron foundry and set up a crude temporary bivouac in it. 
Jap jetty, extended by strings of 
ponton cubes, is used to discharge 
LSTs at first three at a time, later six 
at once. 
On the third day of the occupation, the beach was still badly crowded but there was a 
semblance of order. 
Beach labor was put on a shift basis after 24 hours of steady work for all hands, and 
those off duty followed some much needed sleep with a visit to the ex-city of Wak-
ayama which constituted a completely sufficient lesson in the effectiveness of the 
B-2g's fire-bomb raids. 
The second night ashore was far more comfortable than the first, and the progress 
of unloading was fairly satisfactory. But a typhoon warning, quoting wind velocities 
of over Ioo m.p.h. in 48-6o hours, required that all the bulk stores be rehandled from 
the lower part of the beach to the top of the dunes. Despite this extra work and the 
other difficulties mentioned, the first 48 hours showed all I 2 AP As unloaded and 4 
AKAs two-thirds unloaded, a total of over I 4000 tons of which 8ooo was bulk. 
About mid-afternoon of the third day as the shore party was at last confident that 
it would complete the job before the typhoon struck, Admiral Noble, commander of 
all naval forces in the area, casually inquired if the 53 3d would be ready to load on 
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Regimental Headquarters Company's 
bivouac at Wakayama in the shell 
of a gutted steel mill. 
schedule. Puzzled at his meaning, the regimental commander was startled to find 
that the Admiral had orders to supply 12 LCTs, 5 LSMs and 3 APDs to move the 
Regiment 300-odd miles to Kure commencing that very night! Though a Sixth 
Army officer had dropped a hint of a move "early in October" to Kure to rejoin 
X Corps, the casual inquiry of the Admiral was the first and only " order" received 
for this move. 
A hectic scramble ensued during the evening as trucks and DUKWs were 
rounded up and reloaded, and hasty plans made to squeeze into the limited shipping 
space allotted. By instinct the 12 LCTs were loaded at the midnight high tide and 
the LSMs at the early morning low. A small rear echelon to watch over the equip-
ment for which there was no room remained in the factory for ten days, while the 
rest of the troops, after less than 72 hours ashore, re-embarked and headed back out to 
sea. The few thousand tons of g8th Division supplies on landing ships and LCTs not 
yet discharged were left for the 25gth and the 544th EB&SR to handle, and it was 
a joy to be rid of one of the worst unloading problems ever thrown at the 533d. 
The unseemly haste of the departure was followed by three full days at anchor 
in the lower bay, while the typhoon that devastated Okinawa approached and then 
veered out to sea. At last on October 4 the convoy worked its way against high winds 
and steep seas westward around the outside of Shikoku and into the other end of the 
Inland Sea, where it joined forces with the transport squadron bearing the 41st Divi-
sion, X Corps, and the 533d's Boat Battalion from Mindanao. 
Hiro - Kure 
In the week following the Japanese surrender, Sixth Army alerted X Corps with 
the 41st and 24th Divisions for movement to western Honshu and Shikoku as part of 
the occupation force. The 533d Boat Battalion received orders attaching it to X 
Corps for this job on August 24. The attention of 3d Brigade headquarters was 
immediately directed to the serious understrength ofthe Battalion and the thoroughly 
worn out condition of most of its boats. 310 low-point replacements were soon shipped 
to the Battalion at Bugo, and during the second week of September it obtained 6o 
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brand new LCMs from the 52 I Ith Steel Hull Battalion's new plant at Batangas and 
rushed them to Mindanao. 
Company C moved to Zamboanga on September I 3 and in the succeeding days 
loaded the 4ISt Division aboard Transport Squadron I6. This squadron then moved 
up to Bugo where Company A and Boat Battalion Headquarters Company embarked 
with X Corps Headquarters. A rear echelon had to wait until October 7 before 
embarking in LSTs. B Company at Davao embarked with the 24th Division and 
left Mindanao on October I5. 
The convoy with all of the Boat Battalion except B Company left Mindanao 
The trip around Shikoku through the tail end of a typhoon was a wet thrash especially for 
those aboard LCTs and LSMs. 
September 20 and after a brief stopover at Leyte proceeded to Buckner Bay, Okinawa. 
During the typhoon that wrecked that place, the convoy maneuvered at sea and 
suffered no material damage. It finally resumed its voyage on October 3 and two 
days later, in conjunction with the little group oflanding vessels bringing the rest of 
the 533d from Wakayama, entered the Inland Sea between Shikoku and Kyushu. 
Pressure-type mines sowed in july by B-2gs prevented the ships from proceeding 
all the way into the harbor of Kure, where the bulk of the occupation force was to be 
stationed. So the transports anchored in Hiro Wan and prepared to lighter some 
troops and supplies through the narrow shallow Ondo Seto channel to the docks of 
Kure and to unload all vehicles and most of the bulk at the Hiro seaplane base. 
Not only did the 533d's shore elements join the landing force without orders, 
maps, or data of any sort as to the troops and materiel to be debarked, but in addition 
their arrival was a complete surprise to the corps and division commanders. Since 
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a provisional shore party had already been organized from 4rst Division troops, it 
was agreed that the 533d would merely support that shore party during the initial 
landing. 
To insure a smooth handling of the beach, the shore party, including the 533d, 
was put ashore at Hiro during the afternoon of October 6 to get things organized 
prior to the debarkation of troops the next morning and to the unloading of vehicles 
and supplies the next afternoon. The physical landing site was ideal: a 450' wide 
LCT and LSMs 
beached on the con-
crete ra1np of the 
Hiro Naval Air 
Station. 
i~ , ~ 
. : .. c-~~ .~ I 
concrete seaplane ramp sloped down to water deep enough to float an L S M; the end 
of the main runway provided a made-to-order landing point for LSTs. By nightfall 
the shore party was all set with cranes, control points, parking areas, and storage 
facilities spotted and ready. At long last it looked as though the 533d were to see a 
really smooth amphibious operation. 
This hope, however, failed to reckon with the Commodore of the transport 
squadron- appropriately nicknamed "Terrible Terry" McGovern. Though he 
had agreed to the plan of landing, he could not bear to "waste" the night, and so 
without notifying the shore party or any of the army authorities, he ordered his 
transports to send in all the vehicles. The as yet unlighted ramp suddenly was 
assaulted shortly before midnight by hundreds of truck- and j eep-bearing landing 
craft, and the vehicles stampeded all over the air base. Order was restored reasonably 
quickly, and the vehicles massed on the airstrip. 
At dawn the troops came in, and by 0700 boat loads of bulk were waiting to be 
unloaded - eight hours ahead of schedule. By the time enough trucks were sorted 
out of the mess on the airfield, unloaded, and pressed into service at the water's edge, 
there was a regular log jam of LCVPs and LCMs loaded to the gunwales with stores. 
Though his own hasty actions had caused the mess, Terrible Terry, against the advice 
of his own navy beachmasters and over the protests of the army shore party com-
The principal dignitaries land at Hiro - Facing camera in center left to right: Rear 
Admiral Rogers, Major General Doe (41st Division) , Major General Sibert (X Corps); 
extreme right: Brig. Gen. Willey (Kure Base). 
mander, ordered working parties from the ships' crews brought ashore, and had them 
unload supplies by hand on an inaccessible rock bulkhead where, before they could 
be rescued, many hundreds of tons were engulfed in the rising tide and destroyed. 
Meanwhile unloading progress on the beach had actually set new records, with 
cranes handling cargo by the netload and trucks delivering stores directly to their 
ultimate destinations in conveyor-equipped, covered warehouses. Despite the extra 
Kure Ho, the part 
of the Inland Sea 
near Kure as seen 
from the 1nountains 
behind the devas-
tated city. 
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work involved in untangling the snarls caused by the Commodore's interference, the 
twenty-one transports were discharged in less than 48 hours, and the 24, I 20 tons of 
cargo, including I 7 ,ooo tons of bulk, had almost all come over a "beach" less than 
I 50 yards wide. 
The 533d boatmen took a bad beating working for this transport squadron, for 
they were made to do all the dirty work, were given no maintenance by their parent 
ships, and frequently were bossed by green and incompetent navy coxswains who 
delighted in banging up the army craft. Altogether this operation did much to undo 
the fine spirit of teamwork which the Regiment had built up in two years with the 
Seventh Fleet. 
The Boat Battalion set up its base and bivouac in the torpedo-and-mine portion 
of the Kure Naval Base. A convenient stone-walled boat basin and overhead cranes 
to lift boats out onto the quai for repairs made this area desirable, but a thorough 
working over by B-2gs, carrier-borne dive bombers, and army medium bombers from 
Okinawa had left most of the buildings a shambles. Yet it was no worse to clean up 
Top left: The shore of Ondo Seto channel; top right and bottom left: portions of the highway 
leading from Hiro to Kure; bottom right: part of the water front of Kure. 
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than a mucky piece of virgin jungle, and so the men cleared away the baka bombs, 
war heads, and twisted girders and set up their last billets in a leaky steel shed. 
Regimental Headquarters joined the Boat Battalion at Kure three days after 
landing, but the Shore Battalion had to remain a few days in the flooded tent camp 
they had first set up at Hiro. By October 15 the bulk of the Regiment at Kure was 
concentrated for the first time since Luzon, and all men except those of B Company 
r 
- •:IJ)C ... 
f· 
The parking area by the 
small boat basin in the 
Kure Mine Base. 
The inner harbor of Kure 
seen from the outer wall of 
the small boat basin. 
LCMs tied up outside the 
small boat basin. Note the 
ruins of the steel mill in 
the background and the 
large hammer-head crane 
used to lift out LCMs for 
repair. 
JAPA N 
The Shore Battalion's 
Shower Room (above) with 
2400 gallon hot water heat-
ing system constructed out 
of ponton cubes. 
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The Kure Mine Base. Top left: Shore Bn motor pool with kitchens, dormitory and huge 
building roofed by the Battalion in rear; top right: chow line; bottom left: hundreds of 25mm 
guns laid out for destruction in front of Boat Battalion Headquarters Company building; 
bottom right: ruins of steel mill blasted by Third Fleet dive bombers. Below: Shore Com-
panies' orderly rooms. 
Part of the Kure Naval 
Base demolished by Third 
Fleet dive bombers. 
Harbor at Yeta Shima. 
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were within casual walking distance of each other for the first time in two years. 
B Company arrived with the 24th Division on October 22 and unloaded without 
incident at Mitsuhama, Shikoku where a tent camp was set up, and a freight service 
inaugurated to Kure, 20 miles to the north. 
During the rest of the stay in Japan there is little noteworthy to report as to 
activities of the 53 3d. The Regiment functioned under X Corps for a few weeks and 
then passed to control of Kure Base. The boat companies lightered cargos from 
Hiro Wan through the Ondo Seto to the docks at Kure, and moved occasional patrols 
and recreation parties around the scenic waterways. The Shore Battalion, in addition 
to its normal functions ofbeach operation, worked cranes on the Kure docks and per-
formed tasks appropriate to any engineer construction outfit. Whole blocks of the 
most thoroughly devastated parts of Kure were cleaned off and leveled by their bull-
dozers to assist Jap reconstruction. A huge warehouse in the naval base was given a 
new tin roof - 1% acres of it, and the base officers' club and post office were built by 
men of the 533d. 
Hiroshim~a - two months after the Bomb. 
Aside from normal work and trying to keep warm with no wool clothes or stoves, 
the principal memories of Japan include the impressions of Hiroshima's appalling 
devastation and of "fraternization" with the little yellow people, as to which let each 
man be his own raconteur. 
Disintegration 
The War Department's announcement while the Regiment was enroute to japan 
that all men with 8o V-J Day points would be homeward bound by November I, 
and all men with 70 points by December I, applied to 8 out of every IO men in the 
533d. No sooner was the area at Kure well settled than the topic on every tongue 
was-would the War Department's word be kept? For a while the bets were against 
the commitments being met. Sweeping the pressure mines from Nagoya took much 
longer than expected. Ships promised by the Navy did not show up, and confusion 
and recrimination reigned. To make matters worse, Yokohama, which had been 
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occupied in August, was doing a rushing business forwarding men of Eighth Army 
units home, while Sixth Army troops had to wait in jealous rage. 
At last the log jam broke. October 23 brought the word that all officers with 
83 points and men with 73 points were to be moved by train to Nagoya by November 
3· Amidst general rejoicing the first trainload, including 232 men from the 533d, 
pulled out the next night, and two days later another 100 men departed. Then 
something went wrong, and a painful delay ensued. 
Meanwhile, with the Regiment due to lose three-fourths of its men in ten days, 
drastic steps had to be taken to get rid of its $I 5,ooo,ooo worth of equipment and at 
the same time insure that the essential functions it was performing for the Corps were 
assumed by other units. Fortunately, two harbor craft companies with relatively low-
point men had arrived and to them in the last days of October the 53 3d turned over 
its fleet of 100-odd craft and the shop trucks and other auxiliary boat equipment, 
along with the 300 low-point replacements who had joined the Boat Battalion at 
Mindanao. No authority for this transfer was obtained from higher headquarters, 
but it was so obviously the only thing to do that they, after considerable blustering, 
finally ratified it. Engineer heavy equipment, radios, arms, vehicles and all other 
types of equipment were turned in progressively so that the companies would not find 
themselves so short handed as to be unable to maintain and move any item. 
Strenuous representations were made to Sixth Army and GHQ to have the 
Regiment inactivated by the end of November so that responsible personnel could 
close its career. These headquarters were agreeable, but repeated radio messages 
Queens of the Imperial Navy blasted in their hiding places near Kure by planes of the 
Third Fleet squat ignobly on the bottom. 
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signed by MacArthur could not expedite procedures in Washington enough to secure 
the necessary War Department authority. 
Between the 5th and 14th of November the exodus of men resumed, with 7I-
point men and go-point officers finally departing. This group used up all the trans-
ports that put into Nagoya, and many had to wait there two to three weeks before the 
Navy sent more ships. Meanwhile before the very eyes of eligible men, hungry for 
the sight of home, AP As and AKAs were sailing empty from Hiro for the States-a 
bitter proof of the disadvantages of divided command. 
The remnants ofthe Regiment, only 30 officers and about 400 enlisted men, had 
no equipment to work with and little with which to endear themselves to the Base 
commander. So on November 2 3 they were ordered to clear out of the Kure Naval 
Base, which by then had been turned into a fairly comfortable camp with hot showers 
and other little luxuries, and trek northward 8 miles to Koyama where they took over 
an attractive J ap barracks on a terrace overlooking the sea. 
Hardly had they settled there when on November 28 orders arrived sending 
homeward another large number of point groups. This was the end. By the 4th of 
December every officer in the Regiment, and all but 40 low-point enlisted men who 
had been retained to act as a care-taking group, were on their way to Nagoya and 
the U.S.A. 
The Base commander directed that the platoon of men, representing all that 
was left of what had been 2000 six weeks before, be attached for all purposes to the 
1874th Engineer Aviation Battalion, and the care-takers of the boxes of regimental 
records moved back to Kure. Not until December 31, 1945 did official inactivation 
orders put an end to this ignominious existence, and bring to a close, after three and a 
half years of vigorous life, the career of the 53 3d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. 
